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For some time now, Lawrence Kohlberg's {1969, 1976) 
work on moral development has attracted a great deal of at-
tention. While psychologists remain sharply divided as .to 
the merits of Kohlberg's model, its popularity appears to 
be growing steadily among educators (Kuhmerker, Mentkowski, 
& Erikson, 1980; Sommers, 1984; Wilcox, 1979). This trend 
is not particularly remarkable in itself, for in modern 
education the responsibility for satisfying traditional and 
societal concerns about encouraging moral behavior is 
coupled with a receptiveness toward psychologistic models 
and techniques. yet to the extent that Kohlberg's views 
are influencing the approach to moral education in this 
country, the soundness of his theory of moral development 
is a matter of practical importance. This is reason enough 
for submitting the cognitive-developmental model to closer 
scrutiny. 
Moral development according to Kohlberg (1969, 1976) 
is a universal and invariant process of cognitive-structural 
change, governing the way individuals organize their under-
standing of moral problems. That process is characterized 
as a stepwise se~uence of distinct cognitive structures, 
referred to as the stages of moral reasoning. Because the 
theory conceptualizes moral development as the progressive 
1 
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unfolding of an innate cognitive potential, it treats moral 
education as a matter of facilitating the emergence of those 
latent structures, and not as one of promoting particular 
moral values (or what Kohlberg describes, rather disparag-
ingly, as the "old bag of virtues"). 
Kohlberg's abandonment of the teaching of traditional 
values has been decried as undermining moral authority and 
the role of discipline in moral training (Sommers, 1984). 
However, the force of those objections depends in large 
part upon whether the stage hierarchy is indeed structural 
and contentless, as Kohlberg claims, or whether it only 
promotes a different "bag of virtues" under the guise of 
an empirical model. 
Being hierarchical in nature, cognitive-developmental 
theory operates from the perspective of the highest stage 
in the series. The highest stage constitutes the goal of 
moral development and defines the limitations of the prior 
stages. According to the model, the apex of moral develop-
ment is the morally autonomous individual who defines his or 
her values in terms of self-chosen principles. This form of 
moral reasoning is dubbed ,,:postconventional," because it 
succeeds the conventional reasoning displayed by persons 
who have identified with or internalized the shared rules 
and expectations of their social group. 
Kohlberg claims that these are descriptions only of 
the structural characteristics of moral reasoning, but some 
J 
psychologists have their doubts. Hogan and Emler (1978), 
for example, charge that Kohlberg's model confounds struc-
ture and content. Whereas Kohlberg explains the distinction 
between the conventional and postconventional forms of moral 
judgment in terms of developmental differences in the cog-
nitive-structural complexity and adequacy of individuals' 
reasoning about moral problems, Hogan and Emler argue that 
among adults this distinction reflects individual differ-
ences in sociopolitical orientation (conservative versus 
liberal) having no cognitive-developmental basis. Further-
more, whereas Kohlberg claims that the form of reasoning 
an individual displays is determined solely by his or her 
level of moral maturityt Hogan and Emler argue that the 
individual's moral judgments are a function of his or her 
sociopolitical reference group and of the specific socio-
political identity that he or she wishes to present. Fi-
nally, Hogan and Emler suggest that Kohlberg's hierarchical 
ordering of conventional and postconventional reasoning is 
an unwitting projection of his own liberal value-system 
and not a fact of cognitive development. 
If Hogan and Emler are correct, there should be a 
systematic relationship between individuals' sociopolitical 
orientation and the level of moral judgment they display. 
There is already some eyidence to this effect (Emler, Ren-
wick t & Malone, 198J). Moreover, if the moral judgments 
that individuals report are an expression of their socio-
political identity, then the level of moral judgment they 
display should vary systematically across conditions under 
which individuals tend to modi~y their self-presentations. 
An upvvard shift in level o~ moral judgment merely in re-
sponse to the context within which those judgments are 
reported would be inconsistent with Kohlberg's claim that 
the forms of moral reasoning are solely a function of level 
of maturity. 
The present study was designed to investigate these 
possibilities, employing Rest's (1979) Defining Issues Test 
to measure level of moral judgment and borrowing Tetlock's 
(1983a) manipulation of subjects' expectations of account-
ability, shown to be effective in eliciting shifts in 
self-reported political attitudes. 
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REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
!he Cognitive-Developmental Model 
By most accounts, the recent wave of interest in 
moral development originated in the pioneering work of Law-
rence Kohlberg (1969, 1976). Kohlberg's model delineates a 
sequence of six stages in the development of an individual's 
capacity to reason about moral problems. This developmental 
sequence is held to be universal and invariant, each stage 
representing an advance over the previous one both in terms 
of its cognitive-structural complexity and in terms of the 
adequacy of its solutions to moral conflict. Each advance 
in moral reasoning re~uires the prior attainment of a paral-
lel stage of logical reasoning as defined by Piaget (1967). 
Kohlberg's stages are grouped into three levels: the 
preconventional (Stages 1 and 2), conventional (Stages 3 
and 4), and the postconventional or principled (Stages 5 
and 6). Stage 6, the last in the developmental sequence, 
is characterized by the explicit and impartial application 
of the principle of distributive justice as a means of re-
solving moral conflict. Although a lack of empirical sup-
port for its existence has persuaded Kohlberg (1978) to 
treat Stage 6 as a theoretical construct only, it is re-
tained in the model to represent the ideal culmination of 
the moral-developmental process. Consequently, Stage 5 
5 
6 
postconventional thought is now considered the most advanced 
form of moral reasoning actually achieved by the subjects 
studied by Kohlberg and his associates. 
Although Kohlberg's model has become exceedingly 
elaborate over time (see Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983), 
its basic elements are unchanged. The three levels of moral 
reasoning are characterized by different types of relation-
ships between the self and society's rules and expectations 
(Kohlberg, 1976). The structural features of each level are 
generated by, and unified in, the sociomoral perspective or 
point of view that an individual operating at that level 
adopts vis a vis that relationship. Within each of the 
three levels, the second stage associated with that level is 
believed to represent the more complete development of the 
perspective acquired at the first stage of that level. 
Briefly, the preconventional level (Stages 1 and 2) 
of moral reasoning is defined by a point of view that Kohl-
berg labels the "concrete individual perspective," from 
which the individual perceives rules and expectations as 
external to himself and focuses exclusively upon his own 
interests and those of the :particular persons with whom he 
is involved. An individual operating at Stage 1 perceives 
morality solely in terms of power and punishment, but the 
Stage 2 individual displays a concrete awareness of the 
benefits of mutual self-interest. The shift to the conven-
tional level (Stages 3 and 4) comes with the ability to 
7 
comprehend the relationship between an individual and soci-
ety from the "member of society" perspective, i.e., the 
shared viewpoint of the participants of a social group, in 
which the interests of each individual are subordinated to 
those of the group. Whereas the Stage 3 individual defines 
moral ·obligation only in terms of his or her participation 
in ongoing personal relationships, the individual operating 
at Stage 4 considers the good of society as a whole. The 
postconventional level (Stages 5 and 6) is said to be 
achieved by the further shi:ft to a "prior to society" per-
spective, from which the individual comes to identify fun-
damental and universal moral principles that are the stan-
dard against which any particular society's laws and con-
ventions must be judged. While the Stage 5 individual views 
moral obligations mainly within the framework of the social 
contract and overall utility, the moral obligations charac-
teristic of Stage 6 derive from a personal commitment to 
univeral ethical principles of justice. 
Kohlberg emphasizes that these levels and corres-
ponding stages of moral development refer specifically to 
the structural characteristics of the way individuals reason 
about moral problems. Accordingly, he holds that these cog-
nitive structures are neutral with respect to the moral con-
tent of the problems addressed or of the particular solu-
tions generated. Jn other words, his stage model describes 
only the manner in which particular judgments are drawn and 
defended. Theoretically, two individuals might perform the 
same cognitive operations and yet generate opposite conclu-
sions, depending upon the norms or background values that 
they introduce as content while formulating their conclu-
sions (Colby, 1978). 
8 
In order to lend plausibility to this feature of the 
model, Kohlberg and his associates have made an effort to 
devise stage-scoring systems in which stage structure and 
content categories are completely orthogonal and independent 
of one another. Yet even among cognitive-developmentalists 
(e.g., Rest, 1979) there is some doubt as to whether struc-
ture and content are entirely independent. It is question-
able, for example, whether arguments characteristic of 
postconventional reasoning can even be advanced in support 
of certain solutions to the moral dilemmas employed by 
Kohlberg--e.g., whether a plausible postconventional argu-
ment can be made for af~irming the value of property over 
that of a human li~e in the Heinz dilemma. Some research 
suggests that individuals operating at certain stages do 
tend to favor certain solutions to certain moral dilemmas 
(Rest, 1979; Wilcox, 1979). But cognitive-developmentalists 
are quick to point out that when the six-stage sequence is 
taken as a whole, there is no linear relationship between 
stage of reasoning and tendency to favor particular out-
comes, and hence no evidence that moral development is mere-
ly a content-dominated movement toward a particular position 
9 
on moral issues (Rest, 1979). Nevertheless, this defense is 
largely irrelevant in the face of those critics (e.g., Emler 
& Hogan, 1981) who by and large acknowledge a cognitive-
developmental basis for the first three stages of moral de-
velopment while arguing that individual differences in the 
moral reasoning of adults--diff erences measured by Kohlberg 
in terms of the conventional versus postconventional dis-
tinction--are a matter of content as well as of structure. 
Kohlberg's cognitive-structural interpretation of 
individual differences in adult moral reasoning has largely 
been taken for granted because empirical support for the 
first three or four stages of the model has seemed so 
strong (Weinreich-Haste, 1983). As a result, various cor-
relates of moral reasoning have been viewed in a rather 
one-sided manner, namely, through the prism of Kohlberg's 
hierarchical perspective. This is particularly apparent in 
cognitive-develo:pmentalists' treatment of the relationship 
between sociopolitical attitudes and level of moral reason-
ing. 
Sociopolitical Orientation and Moral Judgment 
Research over the years has disclosed a systematic 
relationship between subjects' sociopolitical orientation 
and the type of moral reasoning they display (Alker & Pop-
pen, 1973; Candee, 19?6; :Emler, Renwick, & Malone, 1983; 
Fishkin, Keniston, & MacKinnon, 1973; Fontana & Noel, 1973; 
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Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968; Rest, 1979; Sullivan & Quarter, 
1972). Although these studies varied considerably in terms 
of approach, their findings have been rather consistent. 
They reveal significant positive correlations between Stage 
4 conventional reasoning and conservative or right-wing 
attitudes (particularly the so-called "law and order" con-
servatism) and between postconventional reasoning and liber-
al or left-wing attitudes.. In short, the results suggest 
that individuals with a conservative orientation are likely 
to reason at the conventional level, whereas individuals 
with a liberal orientation are likely to reason at the post-
conventional level. 
Not surprisingly, Kohlberg and his associates inter-
pret this relationship in a manner consistent with their 
theory of moral development. As was just indicated, the 
forms of moral reasoning identified by Kohlberg are charac-
terized as steps in a developmental sequence of successively 
more complex and more aae~uate ways of resolving moral con-
flict. Each level of moral reasoning represents a certain 
sociomoral perspective and concept of justice, and the tran-
sition from one level to the next involves the adoption of 
a more inclusive perspective and a more universal concept of 
justice. It follows ~rom this account that the attitudinal 
correlates of any given level of moral reasoning must be the 
Product of the cognitive operations that define that level 
(inasmuch as the relationship is one of content to struc-
11 
ture). Thus, Kohlberg (l980) and Rest (1979) are led to 
conclude that the conservative and liberal positions only 
reflect the sociomoral perspectives and concepts of justice 
characteristic of conventional and postconventional thought, 
respectively. Although the next logical step would be to 
grade the relative adequacy of conservative and liberal so-
lutions to specific sociomoral problems according to the 
hierarchical status of the levels of moral reasoning they 
reflect, this conclusion is only rarely made explicit 
(e.g., Candee, 19?6). 
Nevertheless, such rather profound implications fol-
low unavoidably from the cognitive-developmentalists' notion 
that an individual's sociopolitical orientation is a func-
tion of his or her leYel of maturity of moral reasoning. 
It suggests, for one, that as an individual operating at the 
conventional level matures further, he is likely to abandon 
his conservative attitudes in favor of more liberal ones. 
Furthermore, it suggests that individuals who persevere in 
their adherence to the conservative orientation do so be-
cause--for whatever reason--their cognitive-moral develop-
ment has been arrested prematurely. 
These implications may seem neither surprising nor 
disconcerting to the majority of social scientists, who tend 
to be considerably more liberal than the general population 
(Wilson, 1973). Howevert a conservative spokesman is likely 
to object strongly to the conclusion that he is developmen-
12 
tally immature by virtue of the opinions he holds. Such ob-
jections must not be taken as a measure of the validity or 
invalidity of the argument, of course, but it should give 
one reason to consider it more carefully. Although cogni-
tive-developmentalists insist that their hierarchical rank-
ing of stages refers only to the philosophical adequacy of 
the respective modes of reasoning and does not imply a 
grading of the moral worth of any individual (Rest, 1979; 
Wilcox, 1979), the disclaimer itself conveys an attitude of 
moral condescension. 
It may be argued back and forth whether the princi-
ples embodied in liberal ideologies and said to be charac-
teristic of postconventional reasoning are indeed superior 
on moral-philosophical grounds to those embodied in conser-
vative ideologies and displayed in conventional-level rea-
soning. Kohlberg (l971, 1980) is unusual among contemporary 
researchers in devoting considerable attention to that de-
bate. Yet establishing a hierarchical relationship between 
conventional and pos~conventional patterns of reasoning 
(along with their respective attitudinal correlates) on the 
basis of philosophical argument is a task separate from that 
of determining empirically whether the two are related in 
terms of a developmental sequence. Furthermore, even if it 
can be demonstrated that postconventional reasoning is a 
developmentally later stage in an invariant sequence, this 
does not in itself prove that postconventional reasoning is 
13 
superior to conventional reasoning. Developmental succes-
sion implies developmental progress only within a certain 
framework of assumptions that must themselves be submitted 
to examination. The failure to distinguish clearly among 
these three issues has led some cognitive-developmentalists 
to draw premature and possibly unwarranted conclusions from 
their data, e.g., Candee's (1976) claim that the tendency 
for postconventional reasoners to favor certain positions 
was evidence that those Qositions were in fact objectively 
right. 
Robert Hogan and Nicolas Emler (Emler, 1983; Emler & 
Hogan, 1981; Hogan & Emler, 1978) have challenged Kohlberg's 
interpretation of individual differences in moral reasoning 
along just these lines. Their argument is essentially that 
the conventional and postconYentional perspectives (Stages 
4 and 5 in particular) constitute alternative sociopolitical 
ideologies and value-systems--i.e., differences in the ideo-
logical content of adult individuals' attitudes toward jus-
tice and moral obligation. They reject the notion that 
these perspectives represent successively more adequate 
levels of cognitive-moral development, and with it the no-
tion that postconventional reasoning arises out of some in-
herent need to overcome the structural limitations that 
supposedly characterize Stage 4 conventional thought. In-
stead, they suggest that the perspe·ctive or orientation that 
an individual acquires as an adult is a reflection of his 
14 
or her social identity, reference group and accomodation to 
the social matrix in which he or she is embedded. 
Hogan and Emler support their position with three 
types of argument: (1) addressing what they contend is an 
ideological bias in Kohlberg's approach to moral reasoning, 
(2) criticizing the manner in which that bias purportedly 
infects Kohlberg's methodology, and (J) questioning the ex-
tent to which research supports the cognitive-developmental-
ists' claims regarding the superiority of postconventional 
over conventional reasoning. 
Most of Hogan and Emler's arguments are of the first 
sort, directed at exposing an ideological bias in the cogni-
tive-developmental approach. This emphasis is understand-
able, and perhaps even justified, given that underlying 
assumptions play a crucial role in the way the data on moral 
reasoning and its correlates are interpreted. 
Hogan and Emler charge that Kohlberg approaches the 
data on variations in adult moral reasoning from a point of 
view that already assumes the moral superiority of the lib-
eral philosophy of social relations, justice and moral obli-
gation--which, in their Yiew, is what the sociomoral per-
spective and attitude toward justice embodied in Stage 6 
actually represents. They point out that the cognitive-
developmental model defines the prior stages from the per-
spective of this presumed apex of moral reasoning. In their 
own words, Kohlberg's model 1•is a theory of how to get to 
stage 6, which is ••• different from showing that Stage 6 is 
where you get if you go far enough" (Hogan & Emler, 1978, 
15 
p. 525) . According to them, the lack of empirical data from 
which stage 6 principles could have been ascertained forces 
one to conclude that this perspective is no more than a pro-
jection of Kohlberg's own views. 
This allegation calls into question Kohlberg's ac-
count of the transition from conventional to postconvention-
al reasoning. On the one hand, the theory states that this 
movement is impelled by the need to overcome certain struc-
tural limitations inherent in the Stage 4 perspective (Kohl-
berg, 1971, 1976). Yet Hogan and Emler (Emler, 1983; Emler 
& Hogan, 1981) argue that the characteristics of the Stage 4 
perspective to which Kohlberg refers are limitations only 
from the point of view of the liberal thinker. To an impar-
tial third party, the purported limitations of the Stage 4 
perspective and the :pu.rported solutions to be found in post-
conventional reasoning are merely the values that distin-
guish the conservatiYe and liberal ideologies. 
In effect, Hogan and Emler claim that Kohlberg is 
mistaken in believing that he has been able to separate 
structure and content at the higher levels of his stage 
theory. As was indicated earlier, the issue of structure 
versus content is of immediate importance in interpreting 
the correlation between level of moral reasoning and socio-
political orientation. By Kohlberg's account, the entire 
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sequence of stages reflects an invariant developmental pro-
cess of removing internal contradictions in moral reasoning 
through successive reorganization of its underlying struc-
ture; the significance of each stage lies not in the posi-
tion taken, but rather in how that position is justified. 
AS long as one accepts this account, and with it the corol-
lary that content does not determine structure, one must in-
terpret the correlation between level of moral reasoning and 
sociopolitical orientation as one would the relationship be-
tween an independent and a dependent variable (Emler, 1983) • 
Hogan and Emler reject this interpretation, arguing instead 
that the correlation reflects the fact that moral perspec-
tive and sociopolitical orientation constitute overlapping 
domains--in other words, that most political judgments are 
moral judgments, inasmuch as they involve choices regarding 
human values, and most moral judgments (particularly those 
elicited by Kohlberg 1 s 1'moral dilemmas") entail political 
or social considerations. Consequently, what the cognitive-
developmentalists identi~y as cognitive-structural stages in 
adult moral reasoning are actually patterns of sociopoliti-
cal attitudes having no nierarchical relationship to one 
another based upon developmental sequence. 
Hogan and Emler support their position with a second 
line of argument, namely, that Kohlberg's research strategy 
only serves to support his equation of moral development 
with the developme~t of reasoning defined in terms of logi-
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cal operations (Emler, 198); Hogan & Emler, 1978). They 
claim: (1) that by employing moral dilemmas that pit one 
moral principle against another, instead of a moral princi-
ple against a desire or pragmatic consideration, Kohlberg 
has based his studies upon an atypical and even largely ir-
relevant type of moral conflict; (2) that subjects are en-
couraged by Kohlberg's approach to consider the dilemmas 
hypothetically, removed from the context of situational am-
biguities and real-life conseguences, thereby promoting a 
reliance upon the Yiews that are held in an abstract way 
(as possibly distinguished ~ram those that determine ac-
tions) and supporting the illusion that an individual first 
thinks, then decides and tben acts; and (3) that the inter-
view method used to elicit moral reasoning involves an ele-
ment of covert negotiation with the subject regarding the 
kind of responses that are acceptable, inducing the subject 
to offer "reasons" as de~ined by the theory (all other re-
sponses being treated as unscoraole). The combined result 
of these methodological peculiarities, according to Hogan 
and Emler, is that cognitive-developmentalists are virtually 
guaranteed of finding the kind of data that the theory pre-
dicts. 
Empirical Evidence of Sequential Development 
Emler (198}) suggests that the controversy over Kohl-
berg's claim that tbe conventional and postconventional per-
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spectives constitute a developmental sequence may ultimately 
be reduced to two questions: first, whether the sequence is 
logically necessary (i.e., representing an order of increas-
ing adequacy) and, second, whether change actually occurs in 
that sequence. The first question is mainly a theoretical 
concern, but the second is a matter of empirical evidence. 
unfortunately, there is relatively little research on adult 
moral reasoning to support either side in its claims. 
Ideally, longitudinal data should provide the clear-
est indication of the direction of moral development. How-
ever, whereas the developmental progression from Stage 1 to 
Stage 4 has been well-documented (Kohlberg, 1976; Kuhn, 
1976; Turiel, Edwards, & Kohlberg, 1978), the evidence for 
a developmental transition from Stage 4 to Stage 5 is uncer-
tain at best. owing to inconsistencies (e.g., stage regres-
sions) in the pattern of development within Kohlberg's orig-
inal sample (Kohlberg & Xramer, 1969) , the stage-scoring 
system has undergone considerable modification. This has 
had the effect of depressing the higher stage scores, and 
the few subjects identified as employing Stage 5 reasoning 
still rely to a great extent upon Stage 4 (Colby, 1978). 
There is, moreover, some evidence of a tendency among adults 
to Shift from Stage 5 to Stage 4 (Holstein, 1976) • 
Even if Kohlberg's original longitudinal study had 
Provided clear evidence of a transition from Stage 4 to 
Stage 5 reasoning, there would still be some question as to 
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whether this supported the cognitive-developmental interpre-
tation. Those subjects matured during the late 1960's and 
early 1970's, when the popularity of the liberal attitude 
was at its peak. Thus, a Stage 4 to Stage 5 movement might 
be characteristic only of those cohorts. Individuals tested 
now, when conservative sociopolitical values are in resur-
gence, might not display that shift. 
In lieu of data on the higher stages of development 
obtained using Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, some 
theorists (e.g., Thorn.ton & Thornton, 1983) have sought 
evidence of that cognitive-developmental sequence in studies 
employing James Rest's Defining Issues Test, or DIT (Rest, 
1975, 1979; Rest, Cooper, Coder, masanz, & Anderson, 1974). 
The Defining Issues Test is a paper-and-pencil measure of 
moral judgment requiring subjects to select from a list of 
stage-specific statements those that they consider most im-
portant in resolving certain specified moral dilemmas. Both 
the longitudinal and cross-sectional data reported by Rest 
(1975) do indicate a decline in Stage 4 reasoning in late 
adolescence with a corresponding increase in postconven-
tional reasoning (Stages 5 and 6). 
Nevertheless, several questions may be raised re-
garding the significance of these findings. First of all, 
inasmuch as Rest's (19?5) subjects were studied at a time 
when young people were turning to liberal solutions to so-
cial problems, the same doubt expressed with regard to Kohl-
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berg's longitudinal data may be raised here. Moreover, all 
of the subjects represented in Rest's cross-sectional data 
were students, so the tendency for older subjects to display 
postconventional reasoning might be only a reflection of the 
well-documented liberalizing i~luence of higher education 
(Wilson, 197.3). 
Beyond this, one must bear in mind that Rest's DIT 
and Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview are not equivalent 
measures of moral reasoning. This is immediately evident in 
the fact that, in contrast to Xohlberg's findings, Stage 5 
reasoning as measured by the DIT tends to replace Stage 4 
reasoning among older subjects. Moreover, whereas Kohlberg 
eventually dropped the Stage 6 scoring category from his 
system, Rest's older subjects received relatively high 
Stage 6 scores (albeit never superceding Stage 5). 
Rest (1979) and Xohlberg (1976) agree that their in-
struments tap different aspec-ts of moral reasoning. Kohl-
berg' s measure is said to reveal the subject-' s ability to 
produce spontaneously tbe moral arguments characteristic of 
a given stage, whereas Rest's measure purportedly indicates 
the subject's ability to comprehend the relative adequacy of 
each stage perspective, in terms of the importance the sub-
ject assigns to various considerations typical of the focus 
of each perspective. Rest (19?6, 19?9) explains the con-
sistently higher stage scores obtained on the DIT as the re-
sult of a systematic developmental lag between the ability 
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to comprehend a stage-specific argument and the more diffi-
cult task of reproducing it spontaneously. Rest points to 
the correlation of .68 between the DIT and Kohlberg's scale 
as evidence that his instrument is still a valid measure of 
maturity of moral judgment. Yet, all things considered, it 
remains questionable how far Rest's data on the movement 
from Stage 4 to Stage 5 moral reasoning can be used to sup-
port the cognitive-developmental position in lieu of evi-
dence based on Kohlberg's measure. 
A second empirical approach to evaluating whether 
the conventional-postconYentional distinction is a hierar-
chically sequential one is to examine the relationship be-
tween level of moral reasoning and some characteristic known 
to be developmental. GiYen Xohlberg's emphasis upon the 
development of logical reasoning as a necessary condition 
for the advance of moral reasoning, one should expect to 
find that persons displaying Stage 5 reasoning have achieved 
a higher level of logical development than those who display 
Stage 4 reasoning. Research suggests that the relationship 
between logical reasoning and moral reasoning does hold true 
for the earlier stages of development, concrete operational 
thought being necessary for Stage 2 reasoning (Smith, 1978) 
and formal operational thought for the transition from 
Stage 3 to Stage 4 (Tomlinson-Keasey & Keasey, 1974). How-
ever, there is no substantiYe eYidence that persons who 
display Stage 5 reasoning are more advanced in formal aper-
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ational thought than those who reason no higher than Stage 4 
(Kuhn, Langer, Kohlberg, & Haan, 1977)• 
A number of studies have addressed different aspects 
of Kohlberg's claim that moral development is a function of 
one's ability to comprehend successively higher forms of 
moral reasoning. According to the theory, as one begins to 
comprehend the social perspective and moral arguments that 
define the stage immediately above one's own--owing to de-
velopments in one's level o~ logical reasoning and role-
taking ability, as well as to exposure to higher stage rea-
soning--one begins to recognize the limitations and internal 
contradictions in one's current form of reasoning and to ap-
preciate the greater adequacy of that next stage. As a re-
sult, one begins to gravitate toward that higher form of 
moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976). 
One testable conse~uence of this is that exposure to 
moral arguments characteristic of the stage immediately 
above one's own should stimulate the transition to that 
stage of reasoning, whereas exposure to moral arguments 
several stages beyond one's current level should have a 
lesser effect upon moral development. Most studies of this 
sort have involved children o~erating at the early stages of 
moral reasoning, and the evidence suggests that shifts in 
the predicted direction below the postconventional level can 
be hastened (e.g., Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975). Colby (1973) 
reported that a program of moral discussion facilitated some 
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movement toward Stage 5 thinking among students who had pre-
viously operated exclusively at the conventional level of 
reasoning. This finding remains somewhat equivocal, how-
ever, in view of the sociopolitical climate at the time 
these subjects were tested. It is interesting in this last 
regard that Kohlberg (Kohlberg & Kuhmerker, 1980) accounts 
for the greater incidence of Stage 5 reasoning among college 
students during the 1960's in terms of the atmosphere of 
conflict and reform that typified those years; according to 
Kohlberg, that atmosphere was more conducive to moral devel-
opment beyond Stage 4 than is the present (conservative) 
climate. 
A different approach was tried by Rest (1973), who 
compared subjects' own level of moral reasoning with their 
ability to comprehend statements characteristic of each 
stage of reasoning (Stages 1 through 6). In keeping with 
predictions drawn from the cognitive-developmental model, he 
found that subjects were typically able to comprehend the 
arguments characteristic of the stages below their own pre-
dominant stage, and in most cases were able to comprehend 
the arguments characteristic of their own stage as well. In 
addition, about half of the subjects--principally those who 
made substantial spontaneous use of reasoning higher than 
that of their predominant stage--were able to comprehend 
arguments at least one stage beyond their own. Rest con-
cluded that these results supported the claim that each sue-
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ceeding stage is more difficult to comprehend than the one 
that precedes it, and that an individual's stage of moral 
development is sytematically related to his or her ability 
to comprehend arguments typical of each stage. Rest also 
argued that the tendency for subjects to prefer reasoning 
characteristic of the highest level they could comprehend 
was consistent with the claim that each succeeding stage was 
conceptually more adequate, but this inference seems rather 
dubious, even apart from the finding that those of his sub-
jects who gave no evidence of comprehending the higher 
stages still indicated a preference for them. 
Rest's evidence of a systematic relationship between 
level of moral reasoning and level of comprehension for 
Stages 4 and 5 was rejected as inconclusive by Emler (1983). 
According to Emler, the data suggested that Stage 4 subjects 
were as capable of comprehending postconventional reasoning 
as were those subjects classified as postconventional rea-
soners; he cited the figures that 4 of the 12 Stage 4 
subjects versus 3 of the 6 Stage 5 subjects were able to 
comprehend postconventional arguments. However, Thornton 
and Thornton (198J) have responded that Emler's account of 
the data was misleading, inasmuch as it failed to include 
Rest's finding that the highest stage of reasoning spontane-
ously employed by the subject was a better predictor of com-
prehension than was the stage predominantly employed (i.e., 
the stage at which the subject was typed). They pointed out 
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that of the 16 subjects operating no higher than Stage 4, 
only one was able to comprehend postconventional arguments, 
whereas 12 of the 15 subjects who comprehended postconven-
tional arguments themselyes employed postconventional rea-
soning to at least some extent. 
Although this clarification of Rest's findings ren-
ders Emler's specific objection less plausible, it does not 
remove all doubt regarding the soundness of Rest's conclu-
sion. rt is evident that Kohlberg's original scoring sys-
tem was used to type subjects• stage of reasoning, given 
that five of the subjects were identified as predominantly 
Stage 6--a category eliminated entirely from Kohlberg's 
later scoring systems. As was mentioned earlier, changes in 
the system of scoring have had the effect of depressing 
scores for the higher stages. One can only speculate as to 
how Rest's data would look 11 the stricter scoring system 
had been employed, but it is not implausible that a number 
of subjects originally classified as postconventional rea-
soners would be reclassi~ied as Stage 4 subjects. Inasmuch 
as this reclassification would affect subjects' scores for 
spontaneous stage usage without in any way affecting their 
comprehension scores, the most likely result would be a 
net increase in the number o~ Stage 4 subjects who were 
found to have comprehended postconventional reasoning. In-
terestingly enough, this would once again lend plausibility 
to the sort of objection raised by Emler and seemingly over-
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tunied by the Thorntons. 
Another consideration, although admittedly a highly 
speculative one, should nevertheless be included when evalu-
ating the significance of data on moral comprehension for 
Kohlberg's hierarchical model. Without disputing Rest's 
(1973) conclusion that conventional subjects were unable to 
comprehend postconventional reasoning according to the cri-
teria laid down by cognitive-developmentalists, one may 
still question whether those criteria contain an implicit 
bias favoring individuals who accept the moral principles 
that characterize the postconyentional position, while dis-
criminating against those who reject those principles in 
favor of some others. If indeed Hogan and Emler (1978) are 
correct in charging that the :postconventional perspective 
merely represents the liberal sociopolitical position, it 
should come as no surprise that individuals identified as 
postconventional reasoners were able to rephrase postconven-
tional arguments more accurately than those to whom such 
arguments were foreign. This would not constitute evidence 
that postconventional reasoners were cognitively more ad-
vanced, however, for a conservative--who reasons at the con-
ventional level, according to the research cited earlier--
might just as well argu.e that postconventional individuals 
possessed no more than a superficial understanding of his 
own position. Rest's finding that postconventional reason-
ers were able to comprehend conventional arguments would not 
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necessarily invalidate this claim, inasmuch as Rest's cri-
teria for comprehending conventional arguments were based on 
a postconventional understanding of the conventional per-
spective. If the criteria for comprehension had been estab-
lished by representatives of the conventional position, the 
results might have been different. Obviously, this point 
would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to settle 
on an empirical basis, for the criteria employed in any 
study of comprehension are a reflection of preexperimental 
assumptions. Nevertheless, the lesson in this is that data 
from comprehension studies of the sort conducted by Rest are 
not as compelling as might first appear. 
Other questions raised by Rest's (1973) study concern 
subjects' preferences among the various stages of moral rea-
soning. When asked to rate and to rank stage-specific moral 
arguments in terms of the overall persuasiveness of each, 
subjects tended to prefer the reasoning characteristic of 
the highest stage ·of reason:ing they could comprehend, rather 
than that of their own predominant stage of reasoning. Fre-
quently, subjects preferred the highest stages of reasoning 
even when they gave no evidence of having comprehended those 
arguments. Rest suggested that this observed order of pref-
erence was consistent with the notion that each succeeding 
stage was conceptually more adeguate, and that the subjects 
recognized them as sueh even when they could not make spon-
taneous use of the higher forms of reasoning. 
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Rest admitted that this interpretation was open to 
question in view of the finding that higher stage arguments 
were preferred even when evidence of comprehension was lack-
ing. :sut whether or not the data on subjects' preferences 
provide additional support for the cognitive-developmental 
model, they do pose a problem for the rival position put 
forward by Hogan and Emler (1978). If, as they suggest, the 
type of moral reasoning (Stage 4 versus postconventional) 
that a person displays is a reflection of his or her socio-
poli tical orientation (conservative versus liberal), then 
one might expect the person to show a preference for that 
type of reasoning and to reject the type of reasoning asso-
ciated with the opposite sociopolitical orientation. Yet a 
clear preference for postconventional arguments (associated 
by Hogan and Emler with the liberal position) was expressed 
by both conventional and postconventional subjects. This 
would argue against the claim that moral reasoning followed 
sociopolitical pre~erence, unless an alternative interpreta-
tion of Rest's data oar.. be found. 
Perhaps the most plausible alternative is the one 
suggested by Rest himself to account for the consistent 
Preference for higher stage arguments regardless of level of 
comprehension--namely, that the subjects were attracted to 
the more complex and abstract wording of the postconvention-
statements rather than to their meaning, and were either 
Projecting their own ideas onto those statements or merely 
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responding with the sort of answer that they believed to be 
more appropriate to the test-taking situation (Rest, 1973). 
But, as Rest points out, there is nothing in the data them-
selves that allows one to evaluate these alternatives. 
The latest empirical contribution to the controversy 
over the relationship between comprehension and level of 
moral reasoning is a study by Emler and his associates 
(Emler, et al., 1983). Emler had speculated that if the 
differences between conventional and postconventional forms 
of reasoning were essentially a reflection of sociopolitical 
preferences, then conservatives and liberals should be able 
to predict one another's moral responses equally well. Only 
if the differences were a function of moral development and 
dependent upon level of comprehension would conservatives 
{who tend to use the conventional form of reasoning) be.un-
able to reproduce postconventional responses as accurately 
as liberals (who tend to use postconventional reasoning) 
could reproduce conventional responses. In order to put 
this speculation to the test, subjects who had previously 
defined themselves politically as right-wing, moderate or 
left-wing were instructed to complete Rest's Defining Issues 
Test (DIT) twice--once from their own perspective and once 
from the perspective o~ someone with either extreme conser-
vative views or radical (i.e., extreme liberal) views. 
Other attempts had previously been made to influence 
DIT scores by manipulating the instructional set, with 
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mixed results. McGeorge (l9?5) demonstrated that subjects 
were able to lower their scores for postconventional reason-
ing when instructed to respond with the lowest possible lev-
el of moral judgment, but were unable .to raise their post-
conventional scores when instructed to respond with the 
highest possible level of moral judgment. Rest (1979) took 
that as evidence that the DIT was a valid measure of moral 
development; he claimed that cognitive-developmental theory 
would have predicted that subjects should be able to recog-
nize as being less ade~uate the moral arguments characteris-
tic of the stages through which they had already passed (and 
hence should be able to "i'ake bad"), while being unable to 
reason beyond their own level and recognize the superiority 
of the moral arguments characteristic of the later stages 
(and hence unable to "fake good"). 
Actually, this interpretation is a bit puzzling in 
view of Rest's (1973) discussion of subjects' preferences 
for the highest stages of reasoning, for there he had sug-
gested that subjects were able to recognize that the highest 
stages of reasoning were morally more adequate even though 
they could not spontaneously employ those arguments them-
selves. Rest might be accused of trying to have it both 
ways, for he invokes his alternative interpretation of that 
preference data to account for Yussen's (1976) findings in 
another study manipulating instructional set. Yussen had 
instructed subjects to respond on the DIT as they imagined 
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an "average philosopher" would, and f'ound that subjects were 
indeed able to raise their postconventional reasoning score. 
Rest (1979) dismissed this finding as being the result of 
subjects' tendency merely to associate the more abstract 
wording of the postconventional response alternatives with 
the style of reasoning they imagined to be characteristic of 
a philosopher, without any real understanding of the superi-
ority of those alternatiYes. 
Emler and his associates (Emler, et al., 1983) argued 
that McGeorge's (l9?5J results could be explained another 
way. If individual differences in level of moral reasoning 
were a function of dii"ferences in sociqpolitical orientation 
--i.e., if the conventional versus postconventional distinc-
tion reflected no more than the distinction between conser-
vative and liberal attitudes--then instructing conventional 
(conservative) subjects to ":fake good" should not be expect-
ed to result in an increase in postconventional reasoning 
scores. Postconventional responses would represent for them 
the liberal Yalues that they had rejected in favor of con-
servative values, so would not be considered superior to 
their own conventional responses. Therefore, there was no 
need to invoke the cognitive-deyelopmental notion of moral 
maturity to explain conventional subjects' failure to raise 
their postconventional reasoning scores. Again, it is only 
from the liberal perspective implicit in cognitive-develop-
mental theory that postconventional reasoning is superior. 
32 
In contrast, instructing conventional subjects to re-
spond from the perspective o~ a liberal would be expected to 
result in an increase in their postconventional reasoning 
scores, if indeed the postconventional responses reflected 
the liberal value-system. The results of Emler et al.'s 
(1983) investigation appear to bear out this speculation. 
They found, first, that left-wing subjects achieved signifi-
cantly higher scores ~or postconventional reasoning than did 
moderate and right-wing subjects, whereas right-wing sub-
jects obtained higher scores ~or Stage 4 conventional rea-
soning than did moderate and left-wing subjects. This was 
consistent with previous research on the relationship be-
tween political orientation and level of moral reasoning. 
More importantly, all three groups raised their postconven-
tional reasoning scores to the same level when responding 
from the radical perspective, while lowering their scores to 
the same level when responding from the conservative per-
spective; likewise, all three groups raised their Stage 4 
scores to the same level when responding from the conserva-
tive perspective, while lowering their scores to the same 
level when responding from the radical perspective. 
Emler et al. drew several conclusions from these 
findings. First, the extreme conservative and extreme lib-
eral viewpoints apparently constitute two distinct response 
Patterns that subjects are able to identify and reproduce on 
the Defining Issues Test. Second, inasmuch as these two 
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patterns correspond to the response patterns that typify 
stage 4 conventional and postconventional reasoning, respec-
tively, the DIT scoring system discriminates accurately be-
tween alternative sociopolitical orientations. Finally, in-
asmuch as conventional-type subjects were able to reproduce 
the postconventional pattern of response as well as postcon-
ventional subjects were able to reproduce the Stage 4 pat-
tern, it is unlikely that conventional reasoners differ from 
postconventional reasoners in terms of their ability to em-
ploy alternative perspectives. Conventional subjects could 
indeed offer postconventional solutions to moral problems 
when instructed to respond from that perspective, although 
they chose not to employ those arguments when deciding for 
themselves (as in McGeorge•s, 1975, study) which solutions 
were best. 
Thus it appears that adherence to the conventional 
perspective is not the result of an individual's inability 
to comprehend postconventional reasoning, at least when com-
prehension is operationalized as the ability to generate a 
pattern of response indistinguishable from that of indivi-
duals identified as postconventional reasoners. It might be 
argued that this definition o~ comprehension is inadequate, 
i.e., that the ability to reproduce postoonventional argu-
ments is not sufficient evidence that those arguments are 
truly understood. From tbe cognitive-developmentalists' 
perspective, comprehension must also involve an appreciation -~- ·~< 
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of the moral superiority of the postconventional position. 
In that case, however, the only criterion for evaluating an 
individual's level of comprehension would be his or her ac-
ceptance of the cognitive-deYelopmentalists' assumption that 
the postconventional position was indeed morally more ade-
quate--an assumption that remains questionable on empirical 
as well as moral-philosophical grounds. If this were car-
ried a step further, even the critics of the cognitive-
developmental model could be accused of failing to compre-
hend the postconYentional position--thereby insulating the 
theory quite effectively from any intellectual assault. 
Thornton and Thornton (l9BJ) argued that Emler et al. 
had failed to demonstrate that right-wing (conventional) 
subjects actually understood the postconventional arguments 
that they were able to reproduce. In their view, these sub-
jects might have identified arguments characteristic of the 
left-wing (postconYentional) perspective on the basis of 
cues that were peripheral to an understanding of that per-
spective--e .g., the fancy and rather vague wording of the 
postconventional items on the DIT or their implicit ques-
tioning of the existing social order. This interpretation 
is somewhat less compelling than when applied to Yussen's 
(1976) results, if only because one may question how peri-
pheral such characteristics are to the identity of the post-
conventional perspective. One must already presume that the 
distinction between structure and content is sound in order 
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to argue that a response to the content of the postconven-
tional items is irrelevant to an understanding of their 
structure. Indeed, the main thrust of Emler et al.'s study 
is to cast further doubt upon the validity of that distic-
tion. 
Emler and his associates considered the possibility 
that the increase in postconventional reasoning scores among 
conservative (conventional) subjects was merely fortuitous, 
the result of their simply choosing responses that differed 
from their own spontaneous preferences. However, the per-
formance of the moderate groups--who were consistently able 
to raise or lower their scores as expected--suggested that 
subjects had indeed been guided by some understanding of the 
two approaches to resolving moral problems, identified as 
conservative and radical yet corresponding to the conven-
tional and postconventional perspectives. Unfortunately, 
Emler et al. did not address the possibility that their sub-
jects' understanding involved no more than the ability to 
recall and employ political stereotypes--a strategy that 
would not demand comprehension of the positions to which 
those stereotypes referred. That is, the conservative (con-
ventional) may have been able to predict rather accurately 
the (postconventional) responses that a radical respondent 
would choose, but without necessarily understanding why the 
radical respondent would choose those responses. 
This rival interpretation of the data cannot be dis-
counted, and in this regard Emler et al.'s (1983) study 
falls short as a test of the cognitive-developmentalists' 
claim about comprehension and level of moral development. 
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on the other hand, their study does call into question the 
validity of Rest's Defining Issues Test as a measure of mor-
al development, if for no other reason than that the test 
apparently cannot discriminate between respondents who spon-
taneously employ reasoning characteristic of certain moral 
stages and those who attempt to project a certain sociopoli-
tical identity. Given the strong relationship between so-
ciopolitical orientation and the pattern of DIT scores, the 
test might be considered as much a measure of sociopolitical 
attitudes as one of level of moral reasoning. Furthermore, 
if that relationship is an imperfect one, the test may rate 
an individual as morally more mature in the cognitive-devel-
opmentalists' sense when in fact he or she is merely expres-
sing liberal attitudes acquired without comprehension of 
their underlying rationale. In this case, the argument that 
the ability to reproduce the postconventional response pat-
tern need not imply comprehension becomes a two-edged sword, 
capable of undercutting Rest's De~ining Issues Test as well 
as defending it. 
Moral Judgments as Sel~-Presentations 
Although Emler et al.'s (1983) conclusions regarding 
the relationship between co~prehension and level of moral 
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reasoning may be ~uestioned, their results do at least lend 
credibility to the interpretation that individual differ-
ences in adult moral judgment are a function of sociopoliti-
cal orientation. Beyond the objections to Kohlberg's model 
reviewed earlier, Hogan (:Emler & Hogan, 1981; Johnson & 
Hogan, 1981) has offered a positive account of the sorts of 
findings obtained in the :Emler et al. study. This account 
was formulated initially in response to a report by Meehan, 
Woll and Abbott (1979) , which was critical of his own meas-
ure of moral judgment, the Survey of Ethical Attitudes, or 
SEA (Hogan, 1970). Nevertheless, according to Hogan, his 
remarks apply equally well to the cognitive-developmental-
ists' measures of moral reasoning. 
Meehan et al. (1979) had employed an approach similar 
to the one used by Emler et al. (1983). In this ease, sub-
jects were instructed to complete the Survey of Ethical At-
titudes (SEA) as i~ they were applying for a job with either 
a politically conservative or politically liberal organiza-
tion. Meehan et al. found that subjects consistently raised 
their SEA scores in the "fake conservative" condition and 
consistently lowered their scores in the "fake liberal" con-
dition. According to Rogan (1970), high and low SEA scores 
correspond to two opposing perspectives on moral issues, re-
ferred to as the "ethics of social responsibility" and "eth-
ics of personal conscience,•1 respectively. Inasmuch as sub-
jects were able to reproduce these opposing response pat-
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terns by merely adopting a certain political set, Meehan et 
al. concluded that the SEA was better understood as a meas-
ure of political attitudes than as a measure of moral judg-
ment. Furthermore, they expressed serious doubts over the 
validity of the SEA as a measure of attitudes--moral or pol-
itical--given its obvious susceptibility to dissinru.lation in 
the form of political role-playing. 
Meehan et al.'s study of Hogan's Survey of Ethical 
Attitudes more or less parallels Emler et al.'s study of 
Rest's Defining Issues Test, both in its results and in its 
conclusions. Yet Hogan's response is decidedly different 
from the one offered by the cognitive-developmentalists. To 
begin with, Hogan (Johnson & Rogan, 1981) acknowledged the 
strong relationship between the two types of moral attitudes 
measured by his test and the conservative and liberal poli-
tical orientations, noting that this had already been estab-
lished more directly elsewhere (Lorr & Zea, 1977). Meehan 
et al. were mistaken in interpreting this as evidence that 
his measure of moral judgment was contaminated by political 
and social attitudes, howeyer, inasmuch as moral and politi-
cal attitudes were essentially both aspects of an individu-
al's orientation to others in society. According to Hogan, 
Meehan et al. were operating under the assumption (popular-
ized by Kohlberg) that morality and politics could be sepa-
rated from one another. As was indicated earlier, Hogan and 
Emler reject this assumption, on the grounds that both moral 
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and political attitudes rest on choices regarding human val-
ues and that the issues on which subjects in moral judgment 
research are asked to render judgments have political as 
well as moral implications. Consequently, Hogan argued, all 
measures of adult moral judgment were unavoidably also meas-
ures of political judgment. The only difference between his 
own approach to measurement a.nd the one promoted by Kohlberg 
and Rest was that his did not presume a hierarchical rela-
tionship between alternative politico-moral orientations, 
whereas they had allowed their own ideological bias to in-
sinuate itself into their interpretation of individual dif-
ferences in adult moral judgment. 
The more novel aspect of Hogan's response pertains to 
Meehan et al.'s conclusion that the influence of explicit 
role-playing instructions on SEA scores detracted from the 
validity of his instrument as a measure of moral attitudes. 
Hogan conceded that this conclusion was sound within the 
context of the traditional view o~ test-item responses--
namely, that an ideal sel~-report test should elicit re-
sponses about the subject's true behavior and attitudes, and 
should be immune to role-playing or impression management 
inasmuch as these constituted distortions of actual behavior. 
However, test taking could also be interpreted as a form of 
self-presentation (Mills & Hogan, 1978), akin to that which 
occurs in most social interaction, rather than as a report 
of actual behavior or attitudes4 In this light, subjects 
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would be seen as using their test responses as an opportunity 
to communicate their underlying self-image, or the way in 
which they would like to be regarded by others. 
one aspect of an indiYidual's s~lf-image is his or 
her sociopolitical identity. Expressions of specific politi-
cal or moral attitudes--whether in social interactions or on 
measures of moral judgment--might therefore be viewed as the 
individual's way of informing others as to his or her iden-
tity and social alignments (Emler & Hogan, 1981). These 
self-presentations would Yary both as a function of the in-
dividual's social role--i.e., the structure of the social re-
lationships in which he or she is involved--and as a func-
tion of the specific impression that the individual wished 
to create vis a vis an actual or imagined audience. 
From this perspectiYe, Hogan concluded, it was only 
to be expected that Meehan et al.'s subjects would respond 
differently under standard and role-playing conditions. 
Given the standard instructions, with no particular audience 
specified, subjects could only act on their own expectations 
as to whom they were presenting themselves. In this case, 
their test responses would reflect the politico-moral orien-
tation that they tended io project to the "generalized 
other." 
It is worth noting at this point that Hogan used the 
results from another aspect of Meehan et al.'s study to dis-
Pllte their claim that social desirability concerns might 
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systematically influence test scores under standard condi-
tions. When Meehan et al. instructed subjects only to pre-
sent themselves in a faYorable manner on the SEA, no consis-
tent pattern emerged: 12 subjects raised their scores, 8 sub-
jects lowered their scores, and 5 subjects displayed no 
change. According to Hogan, that indicated that subjects 
differed in their conception of what constituted a "good" 
response. As long as no particular audience was specified--
information that might lead subjects to define "looking good" 
in terms of their audience's values and expectations--sub-
jects had to fall back upon their own definition of a good 
response, based upon their own politico-moral value-system. 
This would seem to vindicate Hogan's claim that his test was 
a valid measure of politico-moral attitudes. It may also be 
recalled that the argument about the relativity of the "good" 
response was later used by Emler et al. (1983) as an alter-
native explanation of McGeorge's (1975) similar findings 
with the Defining Issues Test. 
Returning to Hogan's main argument, it may be observ-
ed that under political role-playing instructions, the test 
respondent's audience becomes explicit and well-defined. 
Because most respondents are generally familiar with the 
Pattern of attitudes that characterizes such an audience, 
they are able to make appropriate modifications in their 
self-presentations so as to ~aster a good impression in that 
situation. Hence, according to Hogan, it was no problem for 
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subjects in the Meehan et al. study to modify their respon-
ses on the Survey of Ethical Attitudes in the appropriate 
direction, resulting in test scores resembling those obtain-
ed under standard conditions by representatives of that so-
ciopolitical orientation. yet, Hogan concluded, subjects 
were making no di:fferent use of their test item responses 
than usual--namely, as a vehicle for self-presentation--
albeit with a more focused and deliberate aim than would 
otherwise have been the case. 
In Meehan et al.'s study of the Survey of Ethical At-
titudes, as well as in Emler et al.'s (1983) study of the 
Defining Issues Test, subjects were given explicit instruc-
tions to alter their responses so as to conform with a par-
ticular political orientation. Thus, the shifts in test 
scores could be described as the result of dissimulation. 
Yet Hogan (Johnson & Hoganp 1981) disapproved of that term 
as a general description of the self-presentational strategy 
of test item responses, arguing that no clear line could be 
drawn between authenticity and dissimulation as long as in-
dividuals spontaneously presented themselves differently to 
different audiences in eyeryday life. 
Of relevance in this regard is Hass' (1981) sugges-
tion that an individual's attitude toward any given issue 
be characterized not as a single fixed point on a scale, but 
rather in terms of the range of opinions to which that indi-
vidual would register some degree of assent--in his terms, 
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the individual's latitude of acceptance. According to this 
model of attitude-as-latitude, an individual might emphasize 
different points within his or her latitude of acceptance, 
depending upon any of a number of situational variables, 
without overpassing the bounds of that latitude and engaging 
in what would then accurately be considered dissimulation. 
Indeed, Hass' research indicates that individuals tend to be 
less aware of shifts within their latitude of acceptance 
than of shifts that constitute a misrepresent~tion of their 
beliefs. This interpretation of attitude shifts avoids the 
unattractive implications of the impression management 
theories currently used to explain anticipatory shifts in 
reported attitudes. On the one hand, when the view that at-
titudes are situationally determined is pressed far enough, 
it may be taken to imply that the concept of internalized 
attitudes is superfluous; on the other hand, in defending 
the concept of stable internalized attitudes, one is led to 
the conclusion that much of an individual's nearly ubiqui-
tous impression management behavior amounts to deliberate 
deceit. 
Applied to Hogan's account of self-presentational 
strategies, Hass' attitude-as-latitude model suggests that 
individuals exhibit a certain latitude of acceptance with 
regard to moral and political issues, presenting one or 
another aspect of that latitude as demanded by the situation 
and the individual's situation-specific interests--e.g., to 
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ingratiate or to persuade, to avoid emba:rTassment, or merely 
to minimize the possibility of interpersonal conflict. It 
would be only under exceptional circumstances, such as in-
tense social pressure, experimental role-playing instruc-
tions, or a deliberate motiYe to deceive, that an individu-
al's self-presentations would no longer represent to some 
extent his or her accepted beliefs. 
The main thrust of Hogan's (Johnson & Hogan, 1981) 
argument, then, is that any attempt to measure social or 
political attitudes must take into account the element of 
self-presentation in the respondent's test-taking strategy. 
In light of the foregoing discussion, spontaneous test item 
responses on any measure of moral judgment should be viewed 
as a function of two essential factors: first, the socio-
political reference group of the respondent, which by and 
large establishes the extent of his or her latitude of ac-
ceptance with regard to moral issues, and second, the re-
spondent's expectations as to the audience to which his or 
her self-presentations are addressed, which determines the 
specific attitudes within that latitude of acceptance that 
the respondent will express. 
In his conclusion, Hogan (Johnson & Hogan, 1981) in-
dicated that although Xohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview 
and Rest's Defining Issues Test had not been critically 
evaluated in terms of their susceptibility to self-presenta-
tional effects, such an examination should demonstrate that 
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they were similar to his own Survey of Ethical Attitudes in 
that regard. 
Following this speculation, the present investigation 
was designed to assess the susceptibility of Rest's Defining 
rssues Test to self-presentational effects, as well as to 
extend Emler et al.'s (1983) examination of the relationship 
between sociopolitical orientation and level of moral judg-
ment as measured by that instrument. 
Emler et al. have already shown that there is a sys-
tematic relationship between an individual's sociopolitical 
reference group and his or her DIT score, in keeping with 
the first point of Hogan's account of test-taking as self-
presentation. However, their study does not provide defini-
tive evidence as to Hogan's second point. Although the re-
sults indicate that individuals could indeed use their DIT 
item responses as a vehicle for false self-presentation when 
instructed to do so, this does not demonstrate that their 
test responses reflect a self-presentational strategy as a 
matter of course. Nevertheless, following Hogan's specula-
tion, one would expect inaividuals to display some degree of 
spontaneous shift in their reported attitudes--registered as 
a shift in DIT scores--merely as a function of the audience 
to whom those self-reports were aadressed. Moreover, given 
the apparent relationship between sociopolitical orientation 
and moral judgments on the DIT, variations in the sociopoli-
tical identity of the audience to whom the respondents must 
present themselves should have a noticeable impact upon 
their DIT scores. 
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The present study had two basic aims. The first was 
to attempt to reproduce Emler et al.'s (1983) finding of a 
systematic relationship between sociopolitical orientation 
and DIT scores. The second aim was to seek evidence of a 
systematic relationship between respondents' DIT scores and 
their expectations as to the sociopolitical orientation 
(conservative versus liberal) of the audience to whom they 
were reporting their moral judgments via their test respon-
ses. Such a relationship would suggest that the respondents 
were engaging in a strategy of selective self-presentation, 
i.e., of selectively modifying the presentation of their 
moral attitudes according to the sociopolitical identity of 
their audience. 
The Anticipatory Opinion Effect 
Self-presentational strategies. of the sort just de-
scribed are not unfamiliar to social psychologists. Re-
searchers have provided ample documentation that subjects 
commonly alter their reported opinions on an issue in anti-
cipation of having to confront someone representing a cer-
tain position on that issue, or of having their opinions 
monitored following exposure to some partisan communication 
on that issue (Cialdini & Petty, 1981; Hass, 1981). This 
Phenomenon, generally referred to as the anticipatory opin-
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ion effect, has principally been studied in terms of sub-
jects' response to forewarning that they would later be ex-
posed to a persuasive message (Hass & Grady, 1975), but a 
number of studies have shown that such an effect also occurs 
when subjects expect to be blvolved in some exchange of 
views on an issue (Deaux, 1968; Sears, 1967; Snyder & Swann, 
1976; Tetlock, 198Ja). The anticipatory opinion effect is 
perhaps better described as a class of effects, for under 
various experimental conditions subjects have been shown to 
become either more resistant or more susceptible to a per-
suasive communication, or to shift their opinions either to-
ward or away from the position of the anticipated communica-
tion. The various factors that influence the direction of 
anticipatory shifts have been detailed by Cialdini and Petty 
( 1981) • 
As was just indicated, the major aim of the present 
study was to manipulate subjects expectations regarding the 
sociopolitical orientation of the au~ience to whom they were 
presenting themselves via their Defining Issues Test respon-
ses, in order to determine whether there would be a corres-
ponding shift in subjects• test scores. So far, however, 
this discussion has ref erred to the self-presentational 
strategy only in general terms, without specifying the di-
rection in which self-reported moral judgments might shift 
in response to the sociopolitical identity of the antici-
pated audience. 
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certainly any systematic shift in test scores as a 
function of the orientation of the respondent's anticipated 
audience would be noteworthy, inasmuch as it would indicate 
that the scores obtained on such measures of moral judgment 
could not be interpreted accurately apart from the socio-
poli tical context in which they were obtained. This would 
have particularly serious implications for an instrument 
such as Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, which involves 
face-to-face interaction with an examiner who, by virtue of 
his or her acceptance of the cognitive-developmental model, 
implicitly represents the postconventional position (and, if 
Hogan and Emler are correct, the liberal position as well). 
But such a finding would have broader implications--for ex-
ample, as regards subjects' impressions of the test adminis-
trator and of the manner and setting in which the test was 
introduced, and even changing expectations as to which so-
ciopolitical identities were most socially desirable. One 
might also speculate that if individuals engaged in the 
strategic self-presentation ~f moral attitudes in a test-
taking situation, they would probably do so in interpersonal 
situations as well; that dimension would have to be taken 
into account in any model of moral behavior. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider the proba-
ble direction of strategie shifts in self-reported judgments. 
Research on anticipatory opinion shifts indicates that sub-
jects sometimes shift their views toward those of the anti-
cipated communication or communicator, and sometimes shift 
in the direction opposite that represented by the anticipat-
ed communication/communicator (Cialdini & Petty, 1981). Po-
larization or entrenchment o~ the subjects' opinions is like-
ly to occur when the topic is one of great personal impor-
tance, when subjects have been given the opportunity to pre-
pare themselves beforehand, or when they have been informed 
that the intent of the upcoming communication is explicitly 
to persuade. On the other hand, shifts toward the position 
of the communication/communicator are likely to occur when 
the topic has little personal relevance, when the subjects 
have had no opportunity to prepare themselves beforehand, or 
when they anticipate positive conse~uences contingent upon 
their agreement or negative consequences contingent upon 
their disagreement. 
In either case, it seems that one essential condition 
must be met in order for the anticipatory opinion effect to 
occur: Subjects must believe that their attitudes will be 
monitored by someone, whether it be the experimenter or the 
communicator himsel~. This consideration, along with the 
finding that subjects either fail to display a shift or else 
quickly revert to their original position when the antici-
pated communication is cancelled, has led some researchers 
(Cialdini, Levy, Herman, Kozlowski, & Petty, 1976; Hass & 
Mann, 1976) to conclude that anticipatory shifts are indeed 
tactical in nature. That is, these shifts represent a stra-
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tegy of impression management, by which the subject attempts 
to maximize whatever rewards he or she perceives in the im-
pending situation by making appropriate modifications in his 
or her self-presentation. For example, if it is important 
that one presents a strong, conf'ident image, one might po-
larize one's position, whereas one might minimize differ-
ences in opinion in order to avoid conflict or embarrassment. 
AS was indicated in the discussion of Hass• (1981) attitude-
as-latitude model, subjects need not even be conscious of 
the fact that they are engaging in such a strategy. The im-
portant point here is that anticipatory shifts do not repre-
sent attitude change in the usual sense of a permanent al-
teration of one's former position, although--again according 
to the attitude-as-latitude model--neither must these shifts 
be considered merely a matter of deception. 
One last point needs to be considered in this regard. 
Although anticipatory shifts in the direction of the commu-
nicator's position had originally been thought to represent 
agreement with the communicator for reasons of compliance 
or ingratiation, it has more recently been suggested that 
such shifts may actually represent a strategy of moderation 
rather than one of conformity (Cialdini, Levy, Herman, & 
Evenbeck, 1973; Hass, 1975). There are several reasons why 
subjects in anticipatory opini:on effect studies might favor 
a moderate or neutral stance. Such a position is more 
flexible and more easily ae~ended, it enables one to project 
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the socially desirable image o~ open-mindedness, and it per-
mits one to assess both sides of an issue before making any 
commitment. 
Unfortunately, early studies had employed only mes-
sage positions that were opposite the subjects' own, so it 
was impossible to determine on that basis whether movement 
in the direction of the communicator represented a shift 
toward a more moderate stance or an attempt to conform to 
the communicator's position. For this reason, Cialdini et 
al. (1973) and Hass (l975) each conducted a series of exper-
iments in which the forewarning either did not indicate the 
position of the communicator or indicated that the communi-
cator held similar but more extreme views. In the first 
case, subjects displayed a shift toward the center of the 
opinion scale, consistent with the moderation hypothesis 
but inexplicable in terms o~ conformity. In the second, 
subjects shifted .slightly toward the center rather than be-
coming more extreme themselYes~ also consistent with the 
moderation hypothesis in terms of direction but of a lesser 
magnitude than would haYe been expected if the strategy had 
been exclusively one of moderation. The latter result led 
Cialdini et al. and Hass to conclude that both conformity 
and moderation pressures were operative in producing antici-
patory shifts. They suggested that the two tendencies would 
enhance one another and produce sizable shifts in the direc-
tion of a communicator holding an opposite view, whereas the 
two would work against one another when the communicator 
held a similar but more extreme view, resulting in smaller 
shifts less predictable in direction. 
In light of these findings, predictions regarding 
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the direction of anticipatory opinion shifts must be formu-
lated carefully. There is little doubt as to the probable 
direction of shift for subjects whose preexperimental posi-
tion on the issue in question is opposite that of their an-
ticipated audience. As long as the issue is one of rela-
tively low relevance to subjects' immediate personal inter-
ests, they should shift their responses toward those charac-
teristic of their audience, for in this situation the direc-
tion of conformity and that of moderation coincide. However, 
in order to predict whether subjects whose preexperimental 
position is already similar will shift further toward their 
audience (i.e., conform) or away from it (i.e., moderate), 
one must have some idea of the relative strength of the 
pressures to conform and to moderate that are specific to 
the conditions of the experiment. 
The design of the present experiment was patterned 
after an investigation of anticipatory opinion shifts con-
ducted by Tetlock (l983a). Unfortunately, however, Tet-
lock's data were not sufficient to make a confident assess-
ment of the relative strength of the conformity and modera-
tion pressures that may have operated within that design. 
Tetlock's study will be described in detail further on, but 
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hiS results are of relevance in this regard. Tetlock (1983a) 
found that subjects who had been forewarned that the politi-
cal orientation of their audience would be liberal reported 
opinions that were more liberal than those of subjects who 
had received no forewarning; likewise, subjects who had been 
forewarned of a conservative audience reported opinions that 
were more conservative. A more curious finding was that 
when the forewarning did not specify the orientation of the 
audience, subjects did not shift toward a more moderate po-
sition at the center of the opinion scale, as would have 
been predicted on the basis of Cialdini et al.'s (1976) and 
Hass & Mann's (19?6) results. Instead, the subjects shifted 
slightly in the liberal direction. Tetlock speculated that 
this shift represented a best guess on the subjects' part 
as to the probable orientation of the audience (identified 
in the forewarning as a university student) • 
Although it appears initially that the pressure to 
conform was consistently more powerful than the pressure to 
moderate under the experimental conditions created by Tet-
lock, this cannot be decided without knowing each subject's 
initial position vis a vis ~he anticipated audience. Tet-
lock' s data are silent in that regard. Yet by modifying 
Tetlock's design to include subjects' initial sociopoliti-
cal orientation as a second independent variable, the pres-
ent experiment was able to avoid that ambiguity. By ana-
lyzing subjects' response to the forewarning in terms of 
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their initial orientation, it was thought possible to deter-
mine whether an observed shift represented a strategy of 
conformity or of moderation. The data on subjects identi-
fied as moderates on the sociopolitical scale could be par-
ticularly revealing, for Hass (1975) has suggested that sub-
jects who perceive themselves as already holding a moderate 
position relative to the anticipated communicator may feel 
little pressure to shift their views. For these subjects, 
then, the three possible strategies for dealing with a par-
tisan audience--conformity, moderation and polarization--
would be clearly distinguishable. 
While the anticipatory opinion effect is of interest 
in its own right, the present study was concerned primarily 
with the role of self-presentational strategies--specifical-
ly of sociopolitical self-presentations--in the reporting 
of moral judgments. In this regard, it was of secondary im-
portance whether anticipatory shii'ts represented conformity 
or moderation. Evidence of any shift in reported judgments 
could constitute a serious problem for the cogntive-develop-
mental model. 
As was noted before, ll' self-reported moral judgments 
are Shown to be systematically influenced by the sociopoli-
tical character of the context in which they are made, then 
such reports (and possibly other forms of moral behavior as 
well) should no longer be interpreted apart from that con-
text. As long as it could be argued that anticipatory opin-
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ion effects were indeed shifts in opinion--that is to say, 
merely a matter of the content of the respondent's judgment, 
and not of its structural character--then this would not 
represent a major threat to the cogni~ive-developmental po-
stti~. 
However, this argument becomes considerably less com-
pelling if (as Hogan and Emler contend) there is a systema-
tic relationship between the sociopolitical identity that an 
individual projects and the cognitive-developmental level of 
moral reasoning that he or she displays. Such a relation-
ship would suggest that any strategic shift in the content 
of an individual's moral judgments, reflecting his or her 
attempt to modify that sociopolitical self-presentation, 
might also result in a shift in what Kohlberg and his asso-
ciates had conceptualized as the structural level of moral 
judgment. In short, a strategic shift in the sociopolitical 
identity an individual displayed might be accompanied by a 
shift in the moral stage perspective from which he or she 
appeared to operate. 
The evidence reviewed earlier indicates that when an 
individual anticipates having to confront some representa-
tive of an opposing position, that individual tends to shift 
his or her views towara those of that representative. 
(Whether this shift represents a strategy of conformity or 
of moderation is irreleYant in this regard.) One would ex-
pect a sociopolitically liberal individual to shift his or 
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her reported opinions in the conservative direction when an-
ticipating a conservative audience. Now, if the liberal 
orientation is closely related to the postconventional pat-
tern of moral judgment, one might expect that a liberal in-
dividual anticipating a conservative audience would display 
a shift from the postconventional response pattern toward 
the conventional pattern of response. 
Even this downward shi~t across stages might not be 
particularly troubling for the cognitive-developmentalist. 
AS should be recalled from the discussion of Rest's (1973) 
comprehension study, postoonventional individuals are be-
lieved to have an understanding of the conventional perspec-
tive--having already passed through it themselves--so it is 
not inconceivable that they could temporarily regress (so to 
speak) in the interests o~ impression management and adopt 
the conventional pattern of response. However, this sort of 
argument would be of no use in explaining the opposite case, 
i.e., an upward shift across stages. If the hypothesized 
relationship holds for conservatives as well as for liberals, 
one might expect a conservative individual anticipating a 
liberal audience to display a shift from the conventional 
response pattern toward the JlOStconventional pattern of 
response. 
According to the cognitive-developmental model, the 
transition from conventional to postconventional forms of 
moral judgment is a function of maturity of moral reasoning, 
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which is purportedly a cognitiYe-structural variable and not 
a. content variable. A spontaneous shift from a conventional 
response pattern to a postconventional one merely as a func-
tion of the sociopolitical orientation of the respondent's 
anticipated audience would suggest that the stage character 
of the respondent's reported moral judgments was not deter-
mined solely by his or her cognitive-developmental level. 
Moreover, it would suggest that the respondent was not con-
strained by his or her measured level of maturity of moral 
reasoning from producing responses o~ a purportedly more 
advanced form. 
Several possible interpretations of such a result 
could be proposed. The one that would be least damaging to 
cognitive~developmental theory is similar to the argument 
used by Thornton and Tho:nlton (1983) to explain away Emler 
et al.'s (198J) findings. Respondents who ordinarily oper-
ate at the conventional level might be able to present them-
selves to a liberal audience as being more liberal themselves 
by choosing responses on that measure of moral judgment that 
simply sound like stereotypical liberal arguments. This in-
terpretation would do no harm to the cognitive-developmental 
model per se, inasmuch as it did not concede the possibility 
that conventional reasoners might actually be able to shift 
into a postconventional perspective. On the other hand, it 
would undermine claims regarding the validity of the stage 
measure in question. The arguraent would virtually acknow-
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ledge that the structural leyel of the items of that L~stru­
ment were confounded with their sociopolitical content. Fur-
thermore, it would cast doubt upon the data generated thus 
far using that stage measure, for without knowing the extent 
to which the subjects in those studies had engaged in stra-
tegic response shif'ts, one could draw no conclusions as to 
their actual level of moral reasoning. 
Of course, the most damaging interpretation would be 
the one consistent with Hogan and Emler's objections to the 
cognitive-developmental model, i.e., that there is no cogni-
tive-developmental basis for the distinction between conven-
tional and postconventional types of moral judgment, and 
that the two simply represent alternative positions on the 
sociopolitical scale. An indiYidual's typical position on 
that scale would be explained in terms of his or her social 
identity and reference groups, rather than in terms of his 
or her level of moral maturity. According to this interpre-
tation, there are no unidirectional maturational barriers to 
the comprehension of either alternative position, so an in-
dividual would be able to shift his or her judgments accord-
ing to the demands of the situation and his or her expecta-
tions as to the most rewarding self-presentational strategyo 
A third possible interpretation, based on the atti-
tude-as-latitude model of anticipatory shifts (Hass, 1981), 
might be invoked as a way of partially salvaging both the 
cognitive-developmental model and the measures of moral 
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judgment based upon it. Instead of viewing an individual's 
1evel of moral reasoning as a single point on the cognitive-
developmental scale, it would be viewed as a range of per-
spectives, with only the upper extreme. (in terms of cogni-
tive-structural complexity) fixed by that individual's de-
gree of moral maturity. He or she might operate anywhere 
within that range, depending upon situational demands, and 
thus might be observed at times to employ a form of reason-
ing more advanced than the one usually employed. Actually, 
Rest's (1976) description of an individual's cognitive stage 
structure in terms of probabilities of response implies 
something similar to this, but it should also be said that 
Kohlberg (1976) rejects that approach in favor of the fixed-
point model of level 0£ moral reasoning. 
Although this level-as-latitude interpretation is 
mentioned here as one possibility, it would undoubtedly be 
subject to criticism from both camps. From Hogan and Em-
ler's perspective, the assumption that the upper limit of an 
individual's latitude constituted a developmentally more ad-
vanced position could be disputed on the same grounds as 
those cited in regard to the current cognitive-developmental 
model. From the cognitive-developrnentalists' perspective, 
on the other hand, the level-as-latitude interpretation 
might be seen as blurring the structural distinction between 
conventional and postconventional ~arms and as allowing so-
cial factors--as opposed to cognitive-developmental factors 
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--too great a role in determining the character of an indi-
vidual's moral judgments. 
The foregoing considerations serve to illustrate that, 
whatever the interpretation, strategic shifts in patterns of 
moral judgment would haYe unavoidable implications for cog-
nitive-developmental theory. It was the aim of this investi-
gation to document whether such shifts could be observed as 
a function of the sociopolitical orientation of the respon-
dent's anticipated audience. Jn order to do so experimen-
tally, it was necessary to ascertain the respondents' ini-
tial sociopolitical orientation (i.e., their spontaneous 
sociopolitical sel~-presentation), to manipulate systemati-
cally their expectations regarding the sociopolitical iden-
tity of the audience monitoring their responses and, final-
ly, to measure the level of their subsequent moral judg-
ments. As was indicated earlier, all of these requirements 
were met through appropriate modification of an experimental 
design employed recently by Tetlock (198Ja). 
Tetlock (1983a) was interested specifically in asses-
sing the impact o~ an individual's expectation of accounta-
bility upon the structural complexity of his or her reason-
ing about controversial social issues. Accountability is 
defined as the pressure to justify one's opinions or behavi-
or to an evaluative audience; the expectation that one will 
have to account for one's position on some issue thus con-
stitutes the kind of situation in which anticipatory shifts 
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commonly occur. Tetlock had speculated that when subjects 
were forewarned of the position of the audience to whom they 
would be accountable, they would adopt the cognitively ef-
fortless approach of strategically shifting their own posi-
tion in that direction, thereby ensuring that their respon-
ses would be acceptable or that the negative consequences of 
the experience (e.g., conflict or embarrassment) would be 
minimal. On the other hand, when the forewarning did not 
include information as to the position of the audience, sub-
jects would strategically adopt a moderate position, but 
would also engage in more conceptually complex and multi-
dimensional thinking on that issue so as to be prepared for 
a variety of critical reactions to their response. 
Tetlock tested these hypotheses by dividing his sub-
jects into four groups and proYiding each a different set of 
instructions. All subjects were informed that they would be 
required to indicate their positions on three current social 
issues by responding to a orie~ questionnaire. Subjects in 
the three experimental groups were also forewarned that 
their questionnaire responses would afterwards be revealed 
to another subject, to whom they would be asked to explain 
and justify those responses in face-to-face discussion. The 
forewarning given to the first group did not indicate the 
position of the discussion partner~ whereas the forewarning 
to the second and third groups indicated that the discussion 
Partner's views on those issues were either consistently 
62 
conservative or consistently liberal. The fourth group re-
ceived no forewarning whatsoever, thus serving as a no ac-
countability control. In order to obtain a sample of sub-
jects' reasoning on the issues--and thereby be able to as-
sess its structural complexity--Tetlock had his subjects 
write down their thoughts on each issue before committing 
themselves to a position on the attitude questionnaire. Be-
cause he was interested here in tapping the subjects' pri-
vate thought processes rather than their self-presentational 
strategies, he emphasized to subjects in the experimental 
groups that their written thoughts would not be revealed to 
their discussion partners along with their questionnaire 
responses. 
Most of Tetlock's findings were in accord with his 
predictions. His ~indings regarding anticipatory opinion 
shifts have already been mentioned. Briefly, the attitude 
scale responses of subjects accountable to a conservative 
tended to be more conservative than those of the no account-
ability group, whereas the responses of subjects accountable 
to a liberal tended to be more liberal. The one unexpected 
result was that subjects accountable to an unidentified 
partner did not moderate their opinions, i.e., shift toward 
the center of the opinion scale. Their responses were 
slightly more liberal than those of the no accountability 
subjects, although the difference was not statistically sig-
nificant. Tetlock interpreted this as a shift toward what 
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these subjects inferred was the most likely orientation of 
their partner, but an alternatiYe explanation might be that 
these subjects perceived themselves as moderate enough and 
thus felt no need to shi~t. 
Tetlock's findings regarding the structural complex-
ity of subjects' thoughts conformed to his predictions. 
Subjects accountable to an unidentified partner displayed 
significantly more complex and more multidimensional think-
ing than did subjects in the other three conditions. There 
were no differences among the latter groups in this regard. 
F1nally, by assessing the relative number of liberal and 
conservative thoughts in the subjects' written reports, Tet-
lock was able to compare their private orientation with the 
orientation of their public se~-presentation. Subjects 
accountable to a liberal or to a conservative displayed con-
siderably greater shifts in their attitude scale responses 
than in their written reports, suggesting that these shifts 
represented a strategy of impression management, serving 
either as an expedient (cognitively "lazy") approach to ar-
riving at opinions easily justi~ied to the anticipated audi-
ence or as a way of ensuring a positive response from that 
audience. 
Overall, Tetlock's results indicated that the ex-
perimental manipulation basic to his design could be effec-
tive in inducing anticipatory shifts in reported attitudes, 
and was thus suitable for use in the present experiment. 
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rn place of the controversial social issues employed by Tet-
lock, moral dilemmas from Rest's Defining Issues Test were 
presented. Subjects could register their judgments by means 
of their responses on the Defining Is~ues Test questionnaire. 
Subjects' expectations regarding the sociopolitical orienta-
tion of the audience to whom those responses were addressed 
were established by forewarning them that their responses 
would be revealed to an individual whose views were either 
consistently conservative or consistently liberal. Because 
one of the factors known to increase the likelihood of an 
anticipatory shift is the expert status of the communicator 
(Cialdini & Petty, 198l)t subjects were informed that the 
individual to whom they would have to explain and justify 
their questionnaire responses was a university instructor 
(rather than another student subject, as in Tetlock's study). 
Tetlock's unknown orientation condition was omitted 
from the present study on the ass~mption that results such 
as those obtained by Tetlock would be too ambiguous to be 
of much value. But the no accountability condition was of 
course retained so as to have a control group against which 
shifts in moral judgment due to accountability could be 
measured. 
As was indicated earliert one shortcoming of Tet-
lock's design was rectified by categorizing subjects accor-
ding to their initial sociopolitical orientation. The pres-
ent experiment thus became a three by three factorial design, 
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in which the first factor was the subject variable, socio-
political orientation, consisting of three levels--conserva-
tive, moderate and liberal. The second factor was the mani-
pulated variable, expectation of accountability, consisting 
of the three conditions just described--no accountability, 
accountability to a conservative and accountability to a 
liberal. 
categorization of subjects by sociopolitical orienta-
tion was essential to the two basic aims of this study. 
First, the examination of subjects' level of moral judgment 
in the no accountability condition as a function of their 
sociopolitical orientation would constitute an independent 
test of Emler et al.'s (1983) hypothesis that conservatives 
tend to be Stage 4 conventional reasoners while liberals 
tend to reason at the postconventional level. Whereas Emler 
et al. categorized their subjects on the basis of self-
defined political orientation, subjects in the present study 
were categorized on the basis of their scores on a standard-
ized measure of sociopolitical orientation, the Wilson-Pat-
terson Attitude Inventory (Wilson, 1973, 1975). The second 
reason for including the factor of sociopolitical orienta-
tion has already been noted. By knowing the subjects' ini-
tial orientation, it might be possible to determine not only 
whether they engaged in strategic shifts, but also whether 
those shifts represented a moderation of their initial posi-
tion or an attempt to conform to the position of their anti-
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cipated audience • 
.lrtegrative Complexity 
One aspect of Tetlock's (198Ja) design in particular 
distinguished it from other approaches to studying anticipa-
tory opinion effects. This was its inclusion of an unstruc-
tured writing task, for the purpose of obtaining a record of 
the spontaneous thoughts that subjects entertained before 
committing themselves to a puolic position on some issue. 
Through an analysis of such written records, Tetlock was 
able to assess the structural complexity of his subjects' 
reasoning, as distinct from the content of their opinions 
(which was measured by means of the attitude questionnaire). 
This unique feature was turned to advantage in the present 
study, both for the purpose for which it was employed by 
Tetlock and for a purpose specific to moral judgment re-
search. 
The concept of the structural complexity of an indi-
vidual's reasoning--or conceptual complexity, for short--is 
of interest in the context of research on moral judgment be-
cause one of the basic assumptions of the cognitive-develop-
mental model is that ea~h higher stage of moral judgment re-
flects a cognitively more complex way of reasoning about 
moral issues (Kohlberg, 1976) • It does appear that at the 
early stages of moral reasoning the transition from one 
stage to the next depends upon developments in logical rea-
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soning (Smith, 1978). However, research seems to indicate 
that by the time individuals display Stage 4 conventional 
reasoning, they have already achieved the level of formal 
operational thought (Kuhn, et al., 1977), and the dearth of 
evidence regarding differences in logical reasoning between 
conventional and postconventional thinkers has been inter-
preted to mean that the distinction is not a cognitive-
developmental one (Emler, 1983). Obviously, it would be of 
considerable interest to examine whether there were differ-
ences in the structural complexity of individuals' reasoning 
about moral dilemmas corresponding to the distinction be-
tween conventional and postconventional types of thought. 
The model of conceptual complexity employed by Tet-
lock (1983a) was one developed some years ago by Schroder 
and his associates (Schroder, 1971; Schroder, Driver, & 
Streufert, 1967). The model is based upon the notion that 
whenever an individual is thinking, judging or valuing, he 
or she is engaged in an activity of information processing. 
An individual processes information by means of a structure, 
or interrelated set, of conceptual rules that organize or 
combine the particular units of information into meaningful 
constructs. The complexity of this conceptual structure is 
described in terms of two fundamental properties of thought. 
The first property of thought is its degree of differentia-
tion, i.e., the extent to which different dimensions or 
characteristics of a given stimulus domain are identified 
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and discriminated. The second is the degree to which those 
differentiated characteristics are integrated, i.e., organ-
ized and interrelated. The level of integration of an indi-
vidual's thinking is a reflection of the number of rules 
that he or she employs in combining various units of infor-
mation, and especially of the kinds of connections that ex-
ist among those combinatory rules. Thus, two individuals 
considering an issue might display the same degree of dif-
ferentiation and yet process that information in very dif-
ferent ways. 
Schroder et al.'s (196?) model delineates four struc-
tural levels of integratiYe complexity. At the low end of 
the scale are conceptual structures that involve a single 
combinatory rule or set of rules; thinking of this sort 
tends to be concrete and categorical. Somewhat more complex 
are structures consisting of multiple unconnected rules, 
which make possible alterr.iate interpretations of the same 
stimulus under different conditions; although less rigid 
than the single-rule structure, thinking at this level may 
appear compartmentalized or inconsistent, inasmuch as the 
only relationship between alternate perspectives is one of 
conditionality. The third level of integrative complexity 
is characterized by the e~ergence of higher order rules for 
interrelating alterr.iate perspectives; individuals operating 
at this level are able to consider several points of view 
simultaneously, permitting them to make adjustments in their 
overall interpretation of an issue on the basis of their 
mutual implications. At the highest level of structural in-
tegration there emerge even more complex superordinate rules 
for systematizing a variety of interacting substructures; it 
is at this level that the capacity for highly abstract think-
ing develops, and with it the possibility of generating the-
oretical constructs and universal rules or principles. 
Schroder and his associates used this model to devel-
op a set of criteria for rating the integrative complexity 
of written samples of a subject's thinking (Schroder et al., 
1967, Appendix 1). This scoring system has been used suc-
cessfully with a variety of written materials to assess sys-
tematic individual differences in integrative complexity and 
the impact of various situational variables (e.g., Porter & 
Suedfeld, 1981; Schroder, 1971; Schroder et al., 1967; Tet-
lock, 1983a, 1983b, 198~). 
Following Tetlock's (198Ja) procedure, subjects in 
the present experiment were required to record their 
thoughts on the moral dilemmas taken from the Defining Is-
sues Test, in order to determine whether there were systema-
tic differences in integrative complexity as.a function of 
the type of moral judgment they displayed on the Defining 
Issues Test. This was thought to constitute a valid test of 
Kohlberg's hypothesis that the stages of moral reasoning are 
characterized by successively more complex cognitive struc-
tures, particularly in view of the marked similarity between 
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the structural criteria delineated by Schroder et al. and de-
scriptions of the cognitive-structural features that purpor-
tedly differentiate the conventional and postconventional 
forms. According to Wilcox (1979), for example, moral rea-
soning at the Stage 4 conventional level is characterized by 
dichotomization--what, in Schroder et al.'s view, might be 
considered a multiple rule structure governed mainly by 
principles of conditionality--whereas postconventional rea-
soning is characterized oy dialectical thinking that samples 
and seeks to reconcile opposing alternatives--clearly a con-
ceptual structure involving higher order combinatory rules. 
Even if an analysis of the integrative structure of 
subjects' thinking on moral dilemmas did reveal a systema-
tic relationship between conceptual complexity and type of 
moral judgment, interpreting that relationship might be 
more problematic than the cognitive-developmentalist would 
like. This would depend u:PQn whether or not the data also 
indicated a systematic relationship between sociopolitical 
orientation and type o~ moral judgment. It will be recalled 
that conservatives have consistently been found to employ 
conventional moral arguments whereas liberals have been 
found to employ more postconventional arguments. These ob-
servations are relevant because several studies have sug-
gested that individuals differ in the integrative complexity 
of their thinking on various social issues according to 
their political orientation (Russell & Sandilands, 1973; 
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~ Tetlock, 1983b, 1984) • Moreover, the relationship is such 
that liberals tend to display reasoning that is structurally 
more complex than that of conservatives. Taken together, 
these suggest that the conventional thinker might be found 
to be both sociopolitically conservative and conceptually 
iess complex, while the postconventional thinker was both 
sociopolitically liberal and conceptually more complex. 
The cognitive-developmentalists' interpretation of 
such a result would probably be rather straightfo:rward. In-
asmuch as postconventional reasoning constitutes the per-
spective of the impartial observer, it would be by defini-
tion structurally more complex. Thus, if postconventional 
reasoners tended to adopt liberal values it must be because 
these were judged as providing morally more adequate solu-
tions to social problems. 
Other interpretations might be equally plausible, 
however. One is suggested by Tetlock's (1983b, 1984) dis-
cussion of integrative complexity and political orientation. 
Tetlock speculated that liberals were forced by their own 
system of values to think about social problems in concep-
tually more complex ways. Following Rokeach (1973), he 
characterized the liberal ideology as attaching equal impor-
tance to the principles of individual freedom and social 
equality, in contrast to the conservative ideology, which 
emphasizes freedom over equality, or to the ideology of the 
radical left, which emphasizes equality over freedom. Be-
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cause important social issues frequently involve some ten-
sion between equality and freedom, liberals must develop 
more complex strategies in order to reconcile their inter-
ests. Conservatives, on the other hand, should not experi-
ence as much cognitive coni'lict in such situations because 
their ideology already favors one alternative over the other, 
so they are under considerably less pressure to develop 
complex strategies. In support of this model, Tetlock 
pointed out that representatives of the far left--who, like 
their conservative counterparts on the far right, possess a 
monistic (one-value) ideology--tended to interpret issues in 
an integratively less complex manner than did representa-
tives of the moderate left (i.e., liberals). 
Tetlock (1984) also cautioned against assuming that 
one ideological group would always be integratively more 
complex than another, pointing out instead that the level of 
complexity displayed may be partly a function of the extent 
to which a given issue pits values considered equally impor-
tant against one another. The kinds of issues that appear 
in the moral dilemmas employed by Kohlberg and his acsoci-
a tes are typically conflicts between personal conscience and 
the legitimate limits of authority (Hogan & Emler, 1978). 
One might expect that on such issues the conservative solu-
tion would be more straightforward than one acceptable to 
the liberal thinker; consequently, it would not be surpris-
ing if the reasoning displayed by liberals in that situation 
was--out of necessity--more complex than that displayed by 
the conservative thinker. 
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Thus, the cognitive-developmentalists• approach to as-
sessing moral judgment may itself introduce a selection bias 
that significantly distorts their results. Certainly the 
suggestion is that sociopolitical content may play a more 
crucial role in determining the character of moral reasoning 
than the cognitive-developmentalist is willing to grant. 
Moreover, the adoption of particular sociopolitical values 
may be more important in determining the structural charac-
ter of moral reasoning than any innate cognitive-developmen-
tal factor. 
Although the present experiment can provide no basis 
for choosing between these alternatives, it was designed to 
clarify at least whether the multiple relationships hypothe-
sized above do in ~act appear. For compelling evidence re-
garding the nature of moral development we must await more 
extensive longitudinal studies, preferably including some 
that do not share the apparent biases of the cognitive-
developmentalists • approach. Until then, the considerations 
just reviewed ought to be kept in mind to avoid premature or 
unwarranted inferences from other sources of data, including 
the present experiment. 
Design and Hypotheses 
In summary, the present experiment employed a three 
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by three factorial design. The first factor was sociopoliti-
cal orientation, consisting of three levels: conservative, 
moderate and liberal. Subjects were categorized on the ba-
sis of their scores on the Conservatis.m scale of the Wilson-
Patterson Attitude Inventory (Wilson, 1973, 1975). The sec-
ond factor was expectation of accountability, and consisted 
of three conditions: expectation of accountability to a con-
servative, expectation of accountability to a liberal, and 
no expectation of accountability. Subjects• expectations of 
accountability to a specific audience (conservative or lib-
eral) were manipulated by informing them that their respon-
ses on the Defining Issues Test questionnaire would be re-
vealed to an instructor from the university identified as 
holding either conservative or liberal views, and that they 
would be required to explain and justify their responses to 
the instructor at that time. Subjects in the no accounta-
bility condition received instructions that omitted the 
accountability forewarning. 
Subjects received the appropriate set of accountabil-
ity instructions after having completed the Wilson-Patterson 
Attitude Inventory and the New Left Scale (Gold, Christie, & 
Friedman, 1976), the measure of sociopolitical attitudes em-
ployed by Emler et al. (198J) • Attached to the accountabil-
ity instructions were two booklets: the story booklet, con-
sisting of three moral dilemmas from the Defining Issues 
Test along with ruled paper for subjects to write down their 
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thoughts on each problem, and the questionnaire booklet, con-
sisting of the DIT questionnaire itself along with a second 
questionnaire based upon its items (to be described below). 
The instructions for the story booklet informed subjects 
that after reading each story problem they were to write 
down all of their thoughts on that problem; subjects were 
also informed that their written thoughts would remain anon-
ymous. After completing the story booklet, they turned to 
the questionnaire booklet and answered the questions con-
tained therein; the instructions for this booklet reminded 
subjects in the two accountability to an audience conditions 
that their responses would be revealed in their upcoming 
discussion. 
When subjects completed the questionnaire booklet, 
they were administered several supplementary questionnaires, 
including a demographics survey, a postexperimental debrief-
ing questionnaire, and the Good Impression scale of the 
California Psychological Inventory (Gough, l969). Subjects 
in the two accountability conditions also engaged in a 
brief discussion of their DIT responses with the experiment-
er before being dismissed. 
The dependent measures of primary interest were 
subjects' scores on the Defining Issues Test and ratings of 
the level of integrative complexity of subjects' written 
reports. 
There were four basic objectives to this study. The 
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first was to ascertain whether subjects differed in the type 
of moral judgments they displayed as a function of their so-
ciopoli tical orientation. To this end, the sociopolitical 
orientation and moral judgment scores of subjects in the no 
accountability condition were examined. In keeping with 
Emler et al.'s (1983) findings, it was predicted that con-
servatives would score higher on Stage 4 conventional rea-
soning and that liberals would score higher on postconven-
tional reasoning, relative to moderate subjects. 
The second objective was to determine whether sub-
jects' moral judgment scores differed as a function of their 
expectations regarding the sociopolitical orientation of the 
audience to whom they would be accountable. Following the 
anticipatory opinion effect research discussed earlier, it 
was expected that subjects accountable to an audience of the 
opposite sociopolitical orientation would display the type 
of moral judgment characteristic of that audience. That is, 
liberals accountable to a conservative audience would obtain 
higher Stage 4 scores and lower postconventional scores than 
liberals in the no accountability condition, and that con-
servatives accountable to a liberal audience would obtain 
lower Stage 4 scores and higher postconventional scores than 
conservatives in the no accountability condition. 
The third objective was an extension of the second. 
This was to examine the direction of any anticipatory shift 
in moral judgment scores on the part of subjects accountable 
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to an audience of the same sociopolitical orientation, so as 
to assess whether those shifts were more characteristic of 
conformity or of moderation. If Tetlock (198Ja) was correct 
in inferring that his design generated a greater pressure to 
conform than to moderate, then both moderates and conserva-
tives accountable to a conservative audience should display 
higher Stage 4 scores and lower postconventional scores than 
moderates and conservatives in the no accountability condi-
tion; likewise, both moderates and liberals accountable to 
a liberal audience should display lower Stage 4 scores and 
higher postconventional scores than their counterparts in 
the no accountability condition. However, if the pressure 
to moderate is actually greater, then conservatives ac-
countable to a conservative should display lower Stage 4 
scores and higher postconventional scores than no accounta-
bility conservatives, while liberals accountable to a lib-
eral should display higher Stage 4 scores and lower post-
conventional scores than no accountability liberals. In 
that case, following Hass (1975), moderates would be ex-
pected to display little or no shift in their moral judgment 
scores in response to the accountability forewarning. 
The last objective was to assess the integrative com-
plexity of subjects' written thoughts as a function of their 
sociopolitical orientation and as a function of the type of 
moral judgments they displayed. Following Tetlock (198Jb, 
1984), it was predicted that liberals would obtain the high-
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est integrative complexity scores and that conservatives 
would obtain the lowest scores, with moderates somewhere in 
between. On the basis of Kohlberg's (1976) claims and the 
expected relationship between sociopolitical orientation and 
level of moral reasoning, it was expected that integrative 
complexity scores would be directly related to postconven-




One hundred and thirty-five undergraduates, 59 males 
and 76 females (mean age= 18.56 years, SD= 1.01), served 
as subjects. They were obtained through the Psychology De-
partment subject pool and participated in return for course 
credit. Subjects were categorized according to sociopoliti-
cal orientation--conservative, moderate or liberal--by means 
of their Conservatism scores on the Wilson-Patterson Atti-
tude Inventory, which was administered and scored by the ex-
perimenter at the beginning of the experimental session. 
The cut-off scores used to define type of sociopolitical 
orientation were established on the basis of the distribu-
tion of scores obtained from students in two large, inter-
mediate-level psychology courses at the same university. 
This approach yielded three groups of equal size, each hav-
ing the appropriate sociopolitical identity. Upon categori-
zation, members of each group were randomly assigned to one 
of three accountability conditions--no accountability, ac-
countability to a conservative, and accountability to a lib-
eral. Thus, there was a total of nine cells with 15 sub-
jects per cell. Participation in each experimental session 




The test materials consisted of four standardized 
psychological tests and three questionnaires prepared by the 
investigator. Sociopalitical orientation was measured by the 
Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (Wilson, 1973, 1975) and 
the New Left Scale (Gold, Christie, & Friedman, 1976). Lev-
el of moral reasoning was measured by the Defining Issues 
Test (Rest, 1979). The Goad Impression scale of the Cali-
fornia Psychological InYentory (Gough, 1969) was included to 
assess subjects' concern about making a good impression. 
The investigator's ~uestiarmaires included the Moral Posi-
tion Survey, designed to assess the conservatism of subjects' 
positions on the Defining Issues Test issues, as well as a 
demographics survey and a postexperimental questionnaire. 
Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory. The Wilson-
Patterson Attitude Inven~ary (Wilson, 1973, 1975) is a 50-
item self-report questionnaire designed ta measure sociopo-
litical attitudes. Each item consists of a brief label or 
catch-phrase representing some familiar social controversy--
e.g., "death penalty, 11 "evolution theory," and "white super-
iority." The respondent indicates his or her position on 
that item by answering "Yes" (favors or believes in that 
item), "No" (does not favor or believe in that item), or 
"?" (absolutely uncertain). According to Wilson (1973), 
this format eliminates the problem of acquiescence response 
bias fostered by other attitude measures due to the ambi-
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guity, multinegative grammar and evaluative wording of their 
items. The inventory yields an overall Conservatism score, 
as well as five subscale scores. Sociopolitical conserva-
tism is defined in terms of seven basic characteristics: 
(1) religious fundamentalism, (2) a right-wing (pro-Estab-
lishment) political orientation, (3) an insistence upon 
strict rules and punishments, (4) ethnocentrism and intoler-
ance of minority groups, (5) a preference for the conven-
tional in art, clothing and institutions, (6) an anti-hedon-
istic outlook (i.e., the tendency to regard pleasure--par-
ticularly sexual pleasure--as intrinsicially bad), and 
(7) superstition and resistance to scientific progress. The 
first four subscales, consisting of 12 items each, represent 
the major attitude content areas of the overall Conservatism 
scale. The Militarism-Punitiveness subscale contains items 
related to authoritarian concerns, e.g., the maintenance of 
military strength, harsh punishment and political conserva-
tism. The Anti-hedonism subscale items represent matters of 
sexual freedom, as well as pleasure-seeking as a general 
Philosophy of life. The Ethnocentrism subscale deals with 
racial prejudice and intolerance of minorities and socially 
deviant subcultures (e.g., "hippies"), as well as with the 
role of women in society. The Religion-Puritanism subscale 
items relate to fundamentalist religious dogma and to issues 
involving human reproduction such as legal abortion and 
birth control. The fifth suoscale, consisting of 36 items, 
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is labelled Realism (versus Idealism). Ostensibly similar 
to Eysenck's (1954) concept of toughmindedness, Realism re-
fers to the tendency to be racialistic, punitive, hedonistic 
and conforming, and to be guided by selfish and expedient 
interests rather than by any systematic ideology. 
New Left Scale. The revised form of the New Left 
scale (Gold, et al., 1976) is a 60-item self-report ques-
tionnaire originally developed for use with college students 
as a measure of political attitudes. Each item is an opin-
ion statement with a ?-point Likert-type scale {from disa-
gree strongly to agree strongly). The inventory is scored 
for five 12-item subscales. The Traditional Moralism sub-
scale measures adherence to a conservative, status quo view 
of society, valuing hard work and the maintenance of social 
order. The Machiavellian Tactics subscale reflects agree-
ment with a pragmatic outlook on life and the opportunistic 
use of various strategies for interpersonal manipulation. 
The Machiavellian Cynicism subscale taps pessimistic beliefs 
about people and the existing social order. The New Left 
Philosophy subscale measures disillusionment with modern so-
ciety and the belief that society has corrupted human nature. 
The Revolutionary Tactics subscale reflects a rejection of 
existing social institutions and approval of violent meas-
ures to bring about change. Gold et al. (1976) found that 
Politically conservative respondents typically achieved 
higher scores on the first two subscales, whereas political-
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ly liberal respondents scored higher on the last three sub-
scales. 
Defining Issues Test. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) 
is a self-report measure of moral reasoning designed to iden-
tify the kinds of issues that the respondent considers most 
crucial in formulating judgments on particular moral dilem-
mas (Rest, 1979). After reading a hypothetical moral prob-
lem, the respondent is required to indicate which of two 
conflicting outcomes he or she favors; the respondent also 
has the option of indicating that he or she cannot decide 
between them. The respondent must then indicate the level 
of importance (on a 5-point scale from "great importance" to 
"no importance") that he or she ascribes to each of 12 
statements of issues to consider in deciding about the prob-
lem. Finally, the respondent must rank order the four 
statements that were judged as being the most important. 
The statements accompanying each story problem involve is-
sues characteristic of Stages 2, J, 4, 5A, 5B and 6 in Kohl-
berg's typology, so the respondent's choices indicate the 
relative prominence of the various stage-characteristic 
ways of thinking in his or her reasoning about moral dilem-
mas. The questionnaire also includes several issue state-
ments characteristic of an antisocial orientation (A items), 
as well as several meaningless (M) items for detecting any 
tendency to endorse statements merely for their high-sound-
ing language. 
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The present study employed a short form of the Defin-
ing Issues Test, consisting of three of the six stories that 
comprise the long form. Rest (1979) reported that such 
short forms had been used successfully where it was neces-
sary to economize on subjects' time. The stories included 
in the questionnaire were "The Doctor's Dilemma," "Escaped 
Prisoner," and "Student Takeover." These were selected by 
the investigator on the basis of two criteria: (1) the con-
tent of the stories was such that the outcome favored in 
each case would be likely to vary as a function of sociopo-
li tical orientation, and (2) the number of Stage 4 state-
ments and postconventional (Stages 5A, 5B and 6) statements 
accompanying each story were comparable (three versus four 
for the first, four versus three for the second, and three 
versus four for the third). 
Three sets of measures were chosen from the various 
indices for summarizing respondents• DIT judgments (Rest, 
1979). These were as follows: 
(a) Stage scores. Stage scores are the indices most 
commonly employed in studies using the DIT. These are ob-
tained by assigning weights of four, three, two and one to 
the statements ranked as first, second, third and fourth 
most important, respectively. The weights assigned to state-
ments representing each type of item are then summed across 
all stories, yielding a weighted score for that type of 
item. Weighted scores were obtained for Stages 2, 3, 4, 5A, 
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5B and 6, as well as for the antisocial (A) and meaningless 
(M) items. Following Rest (1979), the weighted scores for 
stages 5A, 5B and 6 were combined to produce a single score 
for "principled" or postconventional reasoning (designated 
the P score). 
(b) Importance ratings. These ratings are the re-
spondent's judgments on the 5-point scale of the importance 
he or she assigns to each of the issue statements, prior to 
ranking the four statements considered most important. Im-
portance ratings are not generally used in typing respond-
ents because these tend to have lower test-retest reliabili-
ty than do the weighted stage scores (Rest, 1979). Never-
theless, they were included here on the speculation that 
they might be more sensitive to anticipatory shifts than the 
weighted stage scores. Importance ratings were established 
by assigning weights of four, three, two, one and zero to 
statements rated as having great, much, some, little and no 
importance, respectively. A mean weight was then calculated 
for each type of item, yielding a mean importance rating for 
that type of item. A postconventional item rating (P item 
rating) was obtained from the mean weight assigned to state-
ments representing Stages 5A, 5B and 6. 
(c) Action-choice scores. Action-choice refers to 
the solution or outcome of the hypothetical moral dilemma 
favored by the respondent. A measure of action-choice was 
included in order to determine whether subjects' action-
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choices were systematically related either to their level of 
moral reasoning or (given the politically controversial na-
ture of the issues raised in the DIT stories--euthanasia, 
crime and punishment, and civil disobedience) to their socio-
political orientation. An action-choice score for each 
story was derived by designating one outcome the conserva-
tive solution and the other the liberal solution. (The out-
comes designated conservative solutions were: for the Doc-
tor's Dilemma, the doctor should not give the overdose; for 
the Escaped Prisoner dilemma, Mrs. Jones should report Mr. 
Thompson to the police; and for the Student Takeover dilem-
ma, the students should not have taken over the administra-
tion building.) In each case, the conservative action-
choice was assigned a score of "2", the "can't decide" op-
tion a score of "l", and the liberal action-choice a score 
of "0". 
Good Impression Scale. The Good Impression scale of 
the California Psychological Inventory (Gough, 1969) con-
sists of 40 items presented in a true-or-false format. It 
is employed as a measure of the respondent's level of con-
cern about how others react to his or her self-presentation, 
as well as of the respondent's capacity for creating a fa-
vorable impression. Its items inquire into matters that 
typically stimulate social desirability concerns. The Good 
Impression scale was included in the test materials to de-
termine whether any observed shift in subjects• reported 
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attitudes under conditions of accountability was related to 
subjects' level of concern about making a good impression 
(as would be suggested by the impression management theory 
of anticipatory shifts). 
Moral Position Survey. The Moral Position Survey 
(MPS) was a 33-itern forced-choice questionnaire composed by 
the investigator and based on the issue statements contained 
in the short form of the Defining Issues Test (see Appendix 
A)· It was designed to elicit subjects• pro-or-con posi-
tions on the issues presented in those statements. In con-
structing this questionnaire, the DIT items were recast in 
the form of position statements, to which the respondent 
would have to indicate agreement or disagreement by answer-
ing either "True" or "False." For example, the DIT item 
"Whether only God should decide when a person's life should 
end" was rendered as "Only God should decide when a person's 
life should end." Whereas in the DIT questionnaire the re-
spondent was instructed to ascribe some level of importance 
to the issue, irrespective of his or her own position on the 
issue, the Moral Position Survey required the respondent to 
take an explicit stand on that issue. Of the 36 items on 
the DIT questionnaire, all but three were included in the 
new inventory. Two of the three excluded items were the 
meaningless issue statements used to assess the validity of 
the DIT record, and the third ("Was Mrs. Jones a good friend 
of Mr. Thompson?") was a Stage 3 response that could not be 
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rendered as a position statement on which the respondent 
could register an opinion. In recasting the DIT items as 
position statements, two requirements were observed: (1) the 
need to construct a grammatically correct statement, while 
(2) minimizing the extent to which the original DIT item was 
altered. 
Subjects' MPS judgments were sought in order to as-
sess whether there was a systematic relationship between the 
importance subjects ascribed to an issue on the DIT ques-
tionnaire and their pro-or-con position on that issue. The 
rationale here was that if the Defining Issues Test consti-
tuted an indirect measure of the content of subjects' atti-
tudes toward certain moral issues--as opposed to the content 
independent structural level of their moral reasoning--then 
the positions subjects reported on the Moral Position Survey 
might correspond to their importance ratings for those is-
sues on the Defining Issues Test. 
Subjects' MPS judgments were also sought in order to 
assess whether there was a systematic relationship between 
subjects' sociopolitical orientation and their pro-or-con 
position on each issue. Following Emler and Hogan (1981), 
it was considered likely that opposing positions on the is-
sues presented on the DIT questionnaire were polarized along 
liberal-conservative lines. An MPS Conservatism scale was 
devised by designating one response alternative for each MPS 
item as being the conservative position. (For example, for 
89 
the MPS item "Only God should decide when a person's life 
should end," the response "True" was designated the conser-
vative position.) The designation for each item followed 
the criteria for sociopolitical conservatism outlined in 
Wilson (1973). This scoring key is included in Appendix A. 
conservative responses were each assigned a score of "2" and 
liberal (i.e., nonconservative) responses were assigned a 
score of "0". Items not endorsed either way were assigned 
a score of "l". Thus, MPS Conservatism scores could range 
from zero through 66, with a higher score indicating a more 
conservative position across the issues. 
Besides provid:ing an estimate of the conservatism of 
subjects' positions on the issues presented on the DIT ques-
tionnaire, this scale provided a sociopolitically oriented 
measure of the impact of the accountability forwarning upon 
subjects' self-reports. 
Demographics Survey. The Demographics Survey (see 
Appendix B) was a one-page questionnaire designed by the in-
vestigator to obtain the following background information on 
each subject: the subject's age, sex, undergraduate class, 
intended major and intended career; the subject's current 
religious preference (if any), along with that of each par-
ent; the occupation and the racial and/or ethnic background 
of each parent. In addition, subjects were asked to rate 
their views on economic issues and on social issues, along 
with the social views of each parent, using a ?-point scale 
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of sociopolitical orientation (from "extremely liberal" 
through "moderate" to "extremely conservative"). 
Postexperimental Questionnaire. A postexperimental 
questionnaire (see Appendix C) was prepared for subjects in 
the two accountability conditions as part of the postexperi-
mental debriefing. It consisted of five items inquiring in-
to the subjects• perceptions of the impact of various as-
pects of the accountability forewarning upon their test 
responses. 
The foregoing materials were organized into a series 
of test packets and presented to subjects in the manner 
described below. 
Procedure 
upon arrival, subjects seated themselves at desks 
prearranged in order to ensure their relative isolation 
during the experimental session. No more than six subjects 
participated in any session. When all subjects were seated, 
the experimenter delivered the following introduction: 
The purpose of our study is to investigate how people 
think about social problems. We have a series of ques-
tionnaires that we would like you to complete. The in-
structions for each ~uestionnaire are printed on the 
first page of each one, so please read the instructions 
carefully before you begin that questionnaire. I would 
prefer not to take any questions, and there should of 
course be no discussion during the experimental session. 
When you have finished with·a questionnaire, just turn 
it over on your desk and I will be in shortly to pick it 
up and give you the next one. 
The experimenter then distributed to all subjects the first 
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packet of test materials, consisting of an instruction page 
and the Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory. The instruc-
tions read as follows: 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how 
people think about social problems. For this reason, we 
will be asking you to complete a series of brief ques-
tionnaires. 
The first questionnaire is attached to this page. 
Please read the instructions before you begin. Work 
quickly and answer every item. Your responses will re-
main entirely anonymous, so please be candid. 
When you have finished, the experimenter will 
collect this questionnaire and provide you with the 
next one. 
After having been completed by all subjects, this question-
naire was removed and the second packet of test materials 
was distributed. The second packet consisted of an instruc-
tion page, the New Left Scale questionnaire, and a separate 
answer sheet. The instructions read as follows: 
Attached to this page you will find the second 
questionnaire, along with an answer sheet. 
Please read the instructions carefully before you 
begin. Mark your responses on the answer sheet and not 
in the questionnaire booklet. Your responses will re-
main entirely anonymous, so please be candid. 
When you have finished, the· experimenter will 
collect this questiormaire and provide you with the 
next one. 
While subjects were completing the seoond question-
naire, the experimenter scored their Wilson-Patterson Atti-
tude Inventory responses and assigned them to treatment con-
ditions randomly as indicated above. 
Upon completing the New Left Scale, subjects received 
the third packet of test materials. Although the question-
naires contained in this packet were identical for all sub-
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jects, the accompanying instruction pages differed according 
to the treatment condition to which each subject had been 
assigned. 
The opening instructions for subjects in the no ex-
pectation of accountability condition were as follows: 
In this part of' the study, we would like you to 
give us your opinions on the problems described in the 
following stories. Dii"ferent people often have differ-
ent opinions on these :problems, so there are no "right" 
answers in the way that there are right answers to math 
problems. 
Once you have had an opportunity to organize your 
thoughts on these :problems, we would like you to indi-
cate your position on each problem by answering a brief 
questionnaire. 
Your responses will remain entirely anonymous, so 
please be candid. 
Turn now to the Story Booklet and follow the in-
structions given there. 
In the opening instructions for subjects in the two account-
ability conditions, the statement assuring conf'identiality 
was replaced by the following forewarning of accountability: 
After you have completed the questionnaire, you 
will be asked to explain and justify your positions to 
an instructor f'rom this university. Your questionnaire 
responses will be used as a starting point for your dis-
cussion. 
In order to satisf'y the methodological require-
ments of experimentation, it is necessary to have a bal-
anced representation of viewpoints. Therefore, you have 
been assigned to explain and justify your responses to 
the instructor who takes a position on social issues 
that is consistently 
conservative moderate _liberal. 
Turn now to the Story Booklet and follow the in-
structions given there. 
Subjects assigned to the accountability to a conservative 
condition received an instruction page indicating that the 
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instructor took a conservative position, whereas the instruc-
tions for subjects in the accountability to a liberal condi-
tion indicated that the instructor's position was liberal. 
The test packet contained two booklets, the story 
booklet and the questionnaire booklet. The story booklet 
contained the three stories from the Defining Issues Test, 
one story per page. Each story page was followed by one 
ruled page, upon which subjects were to record their thoughts 
about the story problem. The instructions for the story 
booklet for subjects in the no accountability condition 
read as follows: 
This booklet contains three short stories. Each 
story describes a situation in which the characters are 
confronted with a particular social problem. After 
reading the first story, please consider your position 
on that problem. Then turn the page and use the space 
provided to write down your thoughts and opinions on 
that problem, explaining the reasons for your decision. 
Follow the same procedure for the remaining stories. 
This booklet is your opportunity to collect your 
thoughts on each problem before committing yourself to 
a position on the opinion questionnaire. Your responses 
will remain entirely anonymous, so please be candid. 
You should take five minutes to report your 
thoughts on each proble~ 
Respond to the problems in the order in which 
they are presented, and do not turn to the questionnaire 
booklet until you have finished writing down.your 
thoughts. 
For subjects in the two accountability conditions, the sec-
ond paragraph of these instructions read instead as follows: 
This booklet is your opportunity to collect your 
thoughts on each problem before committing yourself to a 
position on the opinion questionnaire. The thoughts you 
report in this booklet will therefore remain confiden-
tial and will not be revealed during your upcoming dis-
cussion. 
Upon completing the story booklet, subjects proceeded 
directly to the questionnaire booklet. This booklet con-
sisted of the three stories presented in the story booklet, 
each accompanied by the corresponding questionnaire items 
from the Defining Issues Test; the Moral Position Survey was 
included at the end of the booklet. The instruction page 
for the questionnaire booklet given to subjects in the no 
accountability condition read as follows: 
This booklet contains the three stories that you 
have just read, along with a series of questions about 
each story. Please answer the questions according to 
the instructions given there. 
Your responses will remain entirely anonymous, so 
please be candid. 
For subjects in the two accountability conditions, the sec-
ond paragraph read instead as follows: 
Your responses on this questionnaire will be re-
vealed to your assigned instructor as a starting point 
for discussion. You will be asked to explain and jus-
tify your responses at that time. 
When subjects completed the questionnaire booklet, 
the experimenter distributed the fourth packet of test ma-
terials. Subjects in the no accountability condition re-
ceived the Demographics Survey. Subjects in the two ac-
countability conditions received the Demographics Survey 
plus the postexperimental questionnaire. 
Upon completing these questionnaires, subjects were 
provided the last packet o~ test materials, consisting of 
an instruction page, the Good Impression scale and a sepa-
rate answer sheet. The instructions were the same for all 
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subjects: 
Attached to this page you will find the last ques-
tionnaire, along with an answer sheet. 
Please read the instructions carefully before you 
begin. Mark your responses on the answer sheet and not 
in the questionnaire booklet. Work quickly and answer 
every question. Your responses will remain entirely 
anonymous, so please be candid. 
When you have finished, the experimenter will 
collect this questionnaire and provide you with your fi-
nal instructions. 
Because subjects assigned to the two accountability 
conditions had been led to expect a face-to-face interaction 
as part of the experiment, they were interviewed individual-
ly by the experimenter at the end of the session. Subjects 
assigned to the no accountability condition were not invited 
to participate in an interview, inasmuch a$ they had been 
promised that their questionnaire responses would remain 
anonymous. 
The interviews were conducted privately in an adjoin-
ing room. Each interview entailed asking the subject to ex-
plain his or her reasons for choosing the four statements 
ranked as most important in the story questionnaire booklet 
for one of the three story problems. When the subject was 
seated, the experimenter deliYered the following introduc-
tion: 
I am the instructor to whom you have been assign-
ed to explain and justify your questionnaire responses. 
You have before you a copy of the questionnaire, open to 
the problem about -----. I have your questionnaire here. 
For this problem, you chose question number -- as the 
first most important issue to consider in making a de-
cision. Please explain why you chose that issue as your 
first most important consideration. 
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After the subject explained his or her reasons for the rank-
ings indicated on the ~uestionnaire, the experimenter asked 
"Why didn't you choose issue number --?" about any item from 
a predetermined list that was not among the subject's rank-
ings. In the accountability to a conservative condition, the 
list consisted of the items scored as Stage 4 responses; in 
the accountability to a liberal condition, this list con-
tained the items scored as postconventional responses (i.e., 
5A, 5B or 6). This element of the procedure was included to 
establish the identity of the instructor as one who took a 
position on social issues that was consistently either con-
servative or liberal, thereby satisfying the conditions that 
the subject had been instructed to expect. 
After the subject's responses were reviewed in this 
manner, the subject was debriefed and dismissed. 
Jntegrative Complexity Coding 
The thoughts that subjects recorded in the story 
booklet were rated for level of integrative complexity using 
the coding system developed by Schroder, Driver and Streu-
fert (1967). Subjects' written thoughts consisted of three 
short paragraphs, one per page, in response to the three 
story problems taken from the Defining Issues Test. 
As defined by Schroder et al. (1967), the integrative 
complexity of an indiYidual's thoughts on any issue refers 
to the number of aspects or considerations taken into ac-
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count and the extent to which these are combined and inter-
related. Thus, in rating the integrative complexity of a 
response, two structural properties of the individual's rea-
soning are recognized: degree of differentiation (the number 
of aspects considered) and level of integration (the extent 
to which interrelationships among those differentiated as-
pects are developed). Integrative complexity ratings are 
unrelated to the specific content of the individual's posi-
tion on the issue, inasmuch as any position may be supported 
by reasoning that is structurally simple or complex. 
The integrative complexity scoring system employs a 
7-point scale, representing a continuum from low to high 
levels of integrative complexity. Points 1, J, 5 and 7 con-
stitute the nodal levels of conceptual structure, with 
points 2, 4 and 6 representing intermediate or transitional 
forms. A rating of 1 (low differentiation with low integra-
tion) would be assigned to a response that displayed a sing-
le, fixed perspective. If the response made reference to 
alternative but unconnected perspectives, it would be given 
a rating of 3 (moderate or high differentiation with low in-
tegration). A response would be assigned a rating of 5 
(moderate or high differentiation with moderate integration) 
if it demonstrated that different perspectives had been con-
sidered jointly and viewed as having interactive implica-
tions. A rating of ? (high differentiation with high inte-
gration) would be reserved for a response demonstrating that 
the outcomes of comparisons among alternative perspectives 
were themselves subject to joint consideration and fitted 
into a more inclusive framework. More detailed criteria for 
assigning integrative complexity ratings to written respon-
ses are given in the scoring manual prepared by Schroder et 
al. (1967, Appendix 2). 
The level of integrative complexity of each subject's 
written thoughts was represented by the mean integrative 
complexity rating across the three paragraphs comprising the 
subject's thought protocol. All integrative complexity rat-
ings were performed by the investigator. The paragraphs com-
prising each thought protocol were separated beforehand and 
coded for later identification, in order to ensure that the 
ratings would be performed independently and without know-
ledge of the subject's sociopolitical orientation or treat-
ment condition. 
In order to assess the reliability of the investiga-
tor's ratings, two judges were recruited to perform inde-
pendent ratings on a sample of subjects' paragraphs. Nei-
ther judge had had any prior experience with the integrative 
complexity coding system. After receiving approximately one 
hour of training, tbe judges rated a sample of 20 paragraphs. 
Pearson product-moment correlations with the investigator's 
ratings were .65 and .59. (In each case, 85% of the judges' 
ratings were within one scale-point of the investigator's 
ratings.) 
RESULTS 
The results of this experiment are presented in the 
same order as the hypotheses detailed at the end of the Re-
view section. Following a check on assignment to treatment 
conditions, the sociopolitical orientation scores (on the 
Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory, New Left Scale and 
Self-defined Social Position) for subjects in the no ac-
countability condition are examined to provide a more de-
tailed profile of the socio~olitical characteristics of the 
sample and of specific differences across the three types 
of orientation. The hypothesized relationship between so-
ciopolitical orientation and level of moral judgment among 
subjects in the no accountability condition is then explored 
in terms of the aforementioned measures of sociopolitical 
orientation and the measures of moral judgment derived from 
the Defining Issues Test (Stage 4 score and item rating, 
P score and item rating, and Action-choice scores). Sub-
jects' pro-or-con positions on the Defining Issues Test 
issues--as indicated by their Moral Position Survey re-
sponses--are also examined in relation to both the measures 
of sociopolitical orientation and measures of moral judg-
ment. 
Following this, the Moral Position Survey Conserva-
tism Scale scores for subjects at each level of sociopoli-
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tical orientation across the three accountability conditions 
are examined as a check on the effectiveness of the experi-
mental manipulation. The second major aim of the study, 
which was to assess the impact of the accountability fore-
warning on subjects' self-reported moral judgments, is then 
accomplished by analyzing subjects' Stage 4 scores and P 
scores at each level of sociopolitical orientation across 
accountability conditions. These analyses also constitute 
a test of the competing explanations of accountability 
shifts (i.e., conformity versus moderation). Postexperimen-
tal questionnaire responses and Good Impression Scale scores 
are then examined to determine whether the tendency to dis-
play anticipatory opinion shifts was related either to the 
self-perceived impact of accountability or to the level of 
concern over making a good impression. 
Finally, the level o~ integrative complexity of sub-
jects' written thoughts are examined in terms of their so-
ciopolitical orientation, level of moral judgment and de-
gree of anticipatory opinion shift. 
Check on Assignment to Treatments 
Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (WPAI) Conserva-
tism Scale means and standard deviations for subjects at 
every level of sociopolitical orientation in the three ac-
countability conditions are presented in Table 1. A two-
way ANOVA (Type o~ Orientation by Type of Accountability) 
Table 1 
Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (WPAI) 
Conservatism Scale Means and Standard Deviations 
:for All Groups 
Treatment Condition 
Type of Accountable to No Accountable 
orientation Conservative Accountability Liberal 
conservative 
1VI 57.27 59.07 57.93 
SD 2.22 3.03 4.33 
Moderate 
1VI 49.53 49.67 49.20 
SD 2.72 2.32 2.27 
Liberal 
1VI 39.87 39.53 38.40 
SD 4.64 3.70 3.79 




on WPAI Conservatism scores confirmed that the assignment 
procedure had been effective in yielding three distinct 
levels of conservatism, with no significant differences in 
overall conservatism across the treatment conditions at any 
level. The main effect f'or sociopolitical orientation was 
highly significant, F(2, 126) = 3.5?.65, ,E < .001. There was 
no significant main effect f'or accountability, F{2, 126) = 
.84, and no interaction effect, F(4, 126) = .57. 
Sociopolitical Characteristics of the Sample 
The scores for subjects in the no accountability con-
ditions on the WPAI, the New Left Scale and the self-defined 
position scales provide a more detailed sociopolitical pro-
file of the overall sample and of specific differences 
across the three types of' orientation. Although these re-
sults were generally as expected, there was some evidence 
that these groups did not adequately represent the full 
range of sociopolitical positions with which they were iden-
tified. 
Means and standard deviations for the three orienta-
tion groups--conservative, moderate and liberal--on each 
WPAI subscale are given in Table 2. One-way ANOVAs were 
significant for four of' the five conservatism subscales, 
with all differences in the predicted direction. For the 
general Conservatism (C) scale, a Newman-Keuls test revealed 
significant differences (~ < .01) among all three orienta-
Table 2 
Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory {WPAI) 
Subscale Means and Standard Deviations 
by Type of Sociopolitical Orientation 
(No Accountability Condition) 
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Type of Orientation 
Subscale conservative 
Conservatism a M 59.07 
SD 3.oJ 
Militarism- b M 14.60 
Punitiveness SD 2.64-
Anti-hedonism b M 15.8? 
SD J.02 
Ethnocentrism b JYl 8.6? 
SD J-3.5 
Religion- b JYl 17.20 
Puritanism SD 2.43 
Realism c M 27.67 
SD 5.72 
~cores could range from O to 100. 
bscores could range from O to 24-. 















tion groups. For Militarism-Punitiveness (MP), there were 
significant differences between conservatives and liberals 
and conservatives and moderates(£< .01), and between lib-
erals and moderates (..E. < .05). For Anti-hedonism {AH), 
there were significant differences between liberals and con-
servatives and liberals and moderates(~< .01), and between 
conservatives and moderates (~ < .05). For Religion-Puritan-
ism {RP), there were significant differences between liber-
als and conservatives(..£< .Ol), and between liberals and 
moderates and moderates and conservatives(~< .05). The 
three orientation groups were not significantly different on 
the Ethnocentrism (E) subscale, although their scores were 
still in the predicted direction. 
The ANOVA for the Realism (R) subscale was also sig-
nificant. However, the pattern of scores was different from 
that displayed on the conservatism subscales, moderates 
having scored higher than either conservatives or liberals. 
Only the difference between moderates and liberals reached a 
significant level(~< .05). 
Pearson product-moment correlations among the WPAI 
subscales are given in Table J. As expected, each of the 
four subfactors of conservatism contributed significantly 
(E < .001) to the general conservatism score. In this sam-
ple, AH and RP were significantly related to one another 
(E < .001), but not to either MP or E; conversely, MP and E 
were marginally related(..£< .05). In accord with its defi-
Table J 
Intercorrelations among Wilson-Patterson Attitude 
Inventory (WPAI) Subscale Scores in the 
No Accountability Condition 








*..E < .05. 
**..E < .001. 
(N = 4.5) 














- • .58** 
.23 
- • .52** 
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nition, the Realism factor yielded a positive correlation 
with MP (.E < .05) and negative correlations with AH and RP 
(.E < .001). 
Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations 
for each orientation group on the five New Left subscales. 
Although reliable differences had been anticipated in each 
case, one-way ANOVAs were significant only for Traditional 
Moralism (TM), the factor that bore the closest resemblance 
to general conservatism. The Newman-Keuls test on TM scores 
yielded significant differences between liberals and conser-
vatives (.E < .01) and between liberals and moderates 
(.E < • 0.5) • 
It should be noted that the difference between TM sub-
scale means for the liberal and conservative groups in this 
sample was approximately two-fifths the difference between 
left-wing and right-wing groups in Emler et al.'s (1983) 
study; in addition, the mean TM score for this liberal group 
was somewhat higher (i.e., more conservative) than for Emler 
et al.'s moderate group. Similarly, the mean TM score for 
the entire sample was higher--and the standard deviation 
lower--than for any student sample reported by Gold et al. 
(1976). Altogether, these comparisons suggest that the 
present sample was sociopolitically both more homogeneous 
and more conservative than samples studied elsewhere. 
The intercorrelations among the New Left subscales 
are given in Table 5, For the most part, these did not fol-
Table 4 
New Left Subscale Means and Standard Deviations 
by Type of Sociopolitical Orientation 
(No Accountability Condition) 
Type of Orientation 
Subscale Conservative Moderate 
Traditional M 4.12 3.94 
Moralism SD .55 .52 
Machiavellian M J.58 3.74 
Tactics SD .80 .74 
Machiavellian M 3 .46 3.97 
Cynicism SD .J6 .69 
New Left M 3.48 3.46 
Philosophy SD .48 .58 
Revolutionary M 3.04 3.18 
Tactics SD .47 .48 














Intercorrelations among New Left Subscale Scores 
in the No Accountability Condition 
(N = 45) 
MT MC NLP RT 
Traditional 
.05 -.28* -.09 -.12 Moralism (TM) 
Machiavellian 
.oo .04 .18 Tactics (MT) 
Machiavellian 
.29* .20 Cynicism (MC) 
New Left 
-.OJ Philosophy (NLP) 
Revolutionary 
Tactics (RT) 
*.E < .05. 
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low predictions based upon Emler et al.'s results or those 
reported by Gold et al. The only expected correlations that 
actually reached a significant level (~ < .05) were between 
Machiavellian Cynicism (MC) and New Left Philosophy (NLP) 
and between MC and TM. Particularly surprising was the ab-
sence of a significant negative correlation between the con-
servative TM subscale and either NLP or Revolutionary Tac-
tics (RT), the subscales that represent liberalism and radi-
calism, respectively. It is uncertain whether these anoma-
lies are attributable to the relative homogeneity of the 
sample. 
The third measure o~ sociopolitical orientation was 
subjects' self-defined position on economic issues and on 
social issues, from the Demographics Survey. Each rating 
was on a 7-point scale, from extremely liberal (a rating of 
1) through moderate (4) to extremely conservative (7). 
Means and standard deviations for conservatives, moderates 
and liberals on Self-defined Economic Position were 4.27 
(SD= .88), 3.93 (SD= I.OJ) and J.93 (.§12. = 1.53), respec-
tively. For Self-defined Social Position, these were 4.JJ 
(SD = 1.35), J.40 (SD = 1.18) and 2.93 (SD = 1.58), respec-
tively. As expected, although the two ratings correlated 
significantly, ..r(4J) = ,55, .2 < .001, subjects reported a 
much narrower range of views on economic issues. Only the 
one-way ANOVA for Self-defined Social Position was signifi-
cant; the Newman-Keuls test revealed a significant differ-
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ence (~ < .05) in the predicted direction between the con-
servative and liberal groups. 
In light of indications that the entire sample was 
rather conservative, it is curious to note that the mean 
Self-defined Social Position for conservative subjects was 
only slightly to the sociopolitical right of moderate--i.e., 
only slightly above the midpoint of the scale. This dis-
crepancy between standardized measures and self-ratings of 
sociopolitical orientation may indicate a systematic distor-
tion in subjects' perceptions of their own views (e.g., a 
tendency to think of themselves as moderate, regardless of 
the content of their position). Alternatively, it may be 
merely the reflection of changes in the definition of con-
servatism and liberalism over time. The data offer no basis 
for deciding this question. 
Finally, the intercorTelations among the three mea-
sures of sociopolitical orientation are presented in Table 6. 
As expected, the three primary indices of sociopolitical 
conservatism--the WPAI C scale, the New Left TM subscale and 
Self-defined Social Position--were significantly related to 
one another. Although Self-defined Social Position also 
correlated significantly (~ < .05) with all four WPAI sub-
factors of conservatism, the TM subscale correlated signifi-
cantly only with MP (..£ <. • 01) and AH (~ < . 05) • The remain-
ing nonsignificant correlations were unexpected, particular-
ly the absence of significant negative correlations between 
Table 6 
Intercorrelations among the Three Measures of Sociopolitical 
Orientation in the No Accountability Condition 
(N = 45) 
Self-
Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory (WPAI)a defined 
Social 
New Left Scale c MP AH E RP R Position 
Tra<litiona.l 
.44*** .36** .Z8* .22 .23 -.09 .34* Moralism 
Machie.vellian 
-.01 .28* -.24 .11 -.lJ .)O* .06 Tactics 
Machiavellian 
-.19 -.22 -.07 .03 -.15 .01 -.10 Cyniciam 
New Left 
-.09 -.14 -.10 .20 -.09 .23 -.Ol Philosophy 
Revolutionary 
.02 -.12 .03 -.02 .22 -.26* -.19 Tactics 
Self-defined 
.43*** .JO* .26* .32* .27* -.03 Social Position 
aWPAI subscales are Conservatism (C), Militarism-Punitiveness (MP), 
Anti-hedonism (AH), Ethnocentrism (E), Religion-Puritanism (RP), and 
Realism (R) • 
*.E < .05. 
**.E < • 01. 
***.E < .005. 
the various measures o~ conservatism and either New Left 
Philosophy or Revolutionary Tactics. 
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Overall, the foregoing results indicate that the lib-
eral and conservative groups were significantly different on 
most measures of sociopolitical conservatism, with the pat-
tern of scores across all three types of orientation con-
forming to predictions. However, subjects in this sample 
may represent a somewhat narrow range of sociopolitical at-
titudes, somewhere in the moderate-to-conservative region of 
the sociopolitical spectrum. 
Sociopolitical Orientation and Moral Judgment 
The relationship between sociopolitical orientation 
and moral judgment among subjects in the no accountability 
condition was explored in terms of the sociopolitical meas-
ures just discussed and four De~ining Issues Test (DIT) 
scores--the Stage 4 score, P score, and mean importance 
ratings for Stage 4 items and for postconventional items. 
Action-choice scores for each DIT story problem were examin-
ed along with the stage measures of moral judgment. 
The intercorrelations among these measures of moral 
judgment were generally as expected: There was a signifi-
cant correlation between the Stage 4 score and P score, 
E(43) = -.61, ..£ < .001. The Stage 4 score was significantly 
related both to the Stage 4 item rating, E(43) = .Jl, 
~ < .025, and to the postconventional item rating, £(43) = 
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-.45, R < .001. The P score was significantly related to 
the postconventional item rating, £(43) = .65, R < .001, but 
it was unrelated to the Stage 4 item rating, £(43) = .01. 
Contrary to expectation, the significant correlation 
between Stage 4 item rating and postconventional item rat-
ings was positive rather than negative, £(43) = .35, R < .01. 
However, it should be noted in this regard that subjects' 
ratings were frequently concentrated at either the upper or 
the lower end of the rating scale. This tendency, which ac-
cording to Rest (1979) renders item ratings inferior to the 
stage scores based on item rankings, could result in a posi-
tive correlation between the two types of item regardless of 
their actual relationship to one another. In view of this 
possibility, correlations involving Stage 4 ratings and P 
item ratings should be interpreted cautiously. 
Finally, there were no significant correlations among 
the three Action-choice scores, and no significant correla-
tions between Action-choice and DIT scores except for Action-
choice One ("Doctor's Dilemma") and Stage 4 score, £(43) = 
.30, R < .05. 
Table 7 gives the means and standard deviations for 
the DIT scores and Action-choice scores of subjects at each 
level of sociopolitical orientation in the no accountability 
condition. Planned com:parisons between liberal and conser-
vative groups indicated that differences were significant 
for Stage 4 scores, F(l, ~2} = 8.85, R < .005, and P scores, 
Table ? 
Means and Standard Deviations for 
Defining Issues Test (DIT) Scores 
by Type of Soc io:po li "ti cal Orientation 
(No Accountability Condition) 
Type of Orientation 
score Conservative Moderate 
Stage 4 Score a M 12.73 10.60 
SD 2.52 4.52 
P Score b M 8.07 11.93 
SD J,20 4.54 
Stage 4 Rating c M 2 .47 2.41 
SD .52 .60 
P Item Rating c M 2.24 2.50 
SD .53 .40 
Action-choice ld M 1.JJ 1.13 
SD .90 .99 
Action-choice zd M .6( .67 
SD .82 .90 
Action-choice Jd l'v'.I l.80 2.00 
SD .. 56 .oo 
astage 4 Scores could range from o to 40. 
bp Scores could range from O to 44. 

















d t• h • Ac ion-c oice scores could range from O to 2. 
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£(1, 42) = l0.07, R < .005. The differences between liber-
als and conservatives were not significant for either Stage 
4 item ratings, F(l, 42) = 1.57, ~ < .25, or postconvention-
al item ratings, F(l, 42) = 3,25, ~ < .10. However, all 
differences were in the predicted direction, with moderates 
scoring between the liberal and conservative extremes. 
With regard to Action-choice scores, there were sig-
nificant differences in the predicted direction between lib-
erals and conservatives for Action-choice One, F(l, 42) = 
4.62, ~ < .05, and Action-choice Two ("Escaped Prisoner"), 
F(l, 42) = 4.08, ~ < .05, but not for Action-choice Three 
("Student Takeover"). 
The interco:r:Telations between measures of sociopoli-
tical orientation and moral judgment are set out in Table 8. 
For the WPAI subscales and DIT scores, all results were in 
the predicted direction. The general Conservatism (C) score 
correlated significantly with the Stage 4 score and P score 
(.E < • 005) and with the Stage 4 and postconventional i tern 
ratings(~< .05). The only subfactors of conservatism sig-
nificantly related to both the Stage 4 score and P score 
were AH (~ < .005) and RP (E < .05); the correlation between 
the E subscale and Stage 4 score was also significant 
(R < . 05) • 
However, contrary to predictions based upon Emler et 
al.'s (1983) findings, there were no significant correla-
tions between DIT scores and either the New Left subscales 
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Table 8 
Intercorrelations between Measures of 
Sociopolitical Orientation and Moral Judgment 
in the No Acco1.IDtability Condition 
(N = 4.5) 
Stage 4 p Stage 4 P Item 
Score Score Rating Rating 
Wilson-Patterson 
Attitude Inventory 
Conservatism .. 43*** -.43*** .26* -.25* 
Militarism-
.15 -.12 .14 -.11 Punitiveness 
Anti-hedonism .42-li** -.44*** .26* -.22 
Ethnocentrism .}2* -.23 .26* -.09 
Religion-
.26* -.29* .12 -.26* Puritanism 
Realism -.12 .14 .04 .1.5 
New Left Scale 
Traditional 
• 20 -.24 .12 -.09 Moralism 
Machiavellian 
- .. 0.5 -.05 -.14 -.14 Tactics 
Machiavellian 
-.13 .07 .16 .12 Cynicism 
New Left 
-.11 - .. 07 .08 .05 Philosophy 
Revolutionary 
.05 -.09 -.30* -.36** Tactics 
Self-defined 
.07 .04 .17 .oo Social Position 
*.£ < .05. **~ < .01. ***.£ < .005. 
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or Self-defined Social Position. The only correlations that 
approach significance in the predicted direction were be-
tween TM and the Stage 4 score and P score (~ < .10). 
Correlational analysis of sociopolitical measures and 
Action-choice scores also yielded mixed results. As indi-
cated in Table 9, there were low significant correlations 
in the predicted direction between the WPAI C score and Ac-
tion-choices One and Two(~< .05). In addition, there were 
significant correlations (~ < .05) between Action-choice One 
and RP and between Action-choice Two and both MP and AH. 
These relationships were congruent with the content of the 
story problems, which dealt with euthanasia and criminal 
justice, respectively. The only significant correlation 
with a New Left subscale was between NLP and Action-choice 
One(~< .05). Self-defined Social Position was not signi-
ficantly related to any Action-choice score. 
Overall, the foregoing results support the prediction 
that the Stage 4 scores obtained by conservatives on the 
Defining Issues Test would be significantly higher than 
those obtained by liberals~ whereas the P scores obtained by 
liberals would be significantly higher than those obtained 
by conservatives. KoweYer, although conservatives and lib-
erals displayed a slight tendency to favor different out-
comes on two of the three story problems, the results do not 
suggest that favoring a :particular outcome was appreciably 
related to subsequent DIT performance. 
Table 9 
Intercorrelations between Action-choice Scores 
and Measures of Sociopolitical Orientation 
























(N = 45) 
Action-choice 
One Two Three 
.25* .27* .OJ 
.04 .26* -.09 
.20 .26* .05 
.20 .18 -.04 
.28* -.02 .12 
-.25* -.OJ -.06 
.09 -.06 -.06 
-.16 .14 .07 
-.20 -.02 .OJ 
-,Jl* .04 -.16 




Analysis of subjects' forced-choice judgments on the 
Moral Position Survey (MPS) provided additional insight into 
the relationship between their sociopolitical orientation 
and DIT responses. In order to assess the extent to which 
the alternatives implicit in the DIT items represented op-
posing sociopolitical perspectives on the issues addressed, 
the corresponding MPS items were scored according to a key 
that designated one alternative conservative and the other 
liberal (see Appendix A). The resulting MPS Conservatism 
score, which represented the number of conservative alterna-
tives favored, correlated significantly with the WPAI C 
score, r(43) = .56, ~ < .001. Analysis of the individual 
MPS items revealed correlations with the WPAI C score that 
ranged between .42 and .oo. Of the 33 MPS items, 11 items 
correlated at or above .25 (E. < .05), with another 7 items 
at or above .19 (~ < .10). All of these correlations were 
in the predicted direction, as indicated in the scoring key. 
Finally, when the MPS items were ranked in terms of the ab-
solute magnitude of their correlation with the WPAI C score, 
the mean rank for the 10 Stage 4 items was 16.00 (SD= 6.17), 
whereas the mean rank ~or the 11 postconventional items was 
16.46 (SD= 11.48). 
These results suggest that the alternative positions 
implicit in many of the DIT items could be identified as so-
ciopolitical positions, and that when subjects were asked to 
take a position on the issues raised in the DIT--as opposed 
120 
to simply rating the importance of considering those issues--
their choices reflected their sociopolitical orientation. A 
comparable number of Stage 4 issues and postconventional is-
sues were included among those that could be polarized along 
sociopolitical lines. 
The failure of a number of MPS items to correlate 
with sociopolitical attitude implied that the direction of 
scoring those items on the MPS Conservatism scale was arbi-
trary. Therefore, a Refined MPS Conservatism scale was con-
structed for use in subsequent analyses. This scale con-
sisted of the 14 items that correlated with the WPAI C scale 
at or above .24 in absolute magnitude: two Stage 3 items, 
four Stage 4 items, six postconventional items and two anti-
social items. These items are indicated in Appendix A. The 
Refined MPS scale and the original MPS scale were highly 
correlated, K(43) = .93, ~ < .001. Coefficient alpha for 
the Refined MPS scale was .78, or near the .80 level gener-
ally considered the criterion of internal consistency for an 
attitude scale. 
The Refined MPS scale proved to be significantly re-
lated to every measure of sociopolitical orientation. Its 
strong correlation with the WPAI C scale, K(43) = .63, 
~ < .001, is not remarkable, given the criterion by which 
its items were selected. Its correlations with three of the 
four WPAI subfactors of conservatism were significant beyond 
the .005 level (.4J for MP, .40 for AH, and .44 for RP), 
121 
with the fourth significant at the .025 level (.29 for E). 
Furthermore, the Refined MPS scale was significantly related 
both to the New Left TM subscale and to Self-defined Social 
position, r(43) = .27, .E < .05, in each case. Not unexpec-
tedly, then, the difference between the MPS scores of con-
servatives and liberals in the no accountability condition 
proved to be a highly significant one, F(l, 42) = 29.27, 
.E < .001. 
The correlations between the Refined MPS Conservatism 
scale and the DIT measures of moral judgment are given in 
Table 10. These were significant for the Stage 4 score 
(.£ < .001), P score (.E < ,025), and Stage 4 item rating 
(.E < .005), as well as for Action-choices One (.E < .001) and 
Two (.E <. • 025) • Al together, these results suggest that the 
positions held by subjects on an array of issues drawn di-
rectly from the DIT were related not only to their socio-
poli tical orientation, but also to the relative importance 
they assigned to various stage-specific issues on the DIT 
itself. 
Further evidence of the relationship between sub-
jects' positions on the DIT issues and the importance they 
assigned to those issues comes from the correlational analy-
sis of subjects' individual MPS responses and the importance 
ratings assigned to the corresponding DIT items. Correla-
tions between subjects' position on an issue and their rat-
ing of its importance ranged from .85 to .05. Of the 33 
Table 10 
correlations between Refined MPS Conservatism Scale 
and Defining Issues Test (DIT) Measures 
in the No Accountability Condition 
(N : 45) 
DIT Measure 
Stage 4 Score 
P Score 
Stage 4 Rating 




*~ < • 025. 
*~ < .005. 















items, 16 items correlated at or above .25 (~ < .05), with 
another 4 items at or aboYe .19 (~ < .10). When the MPS 
items were ranked according to the absolute magnitude of 
their correlation with the corresponding DIT item rating, 
the mean rank for the 10 Stage 4 items was 11.00 (SD= 6.89), 
whereas the mean rank for the 11 postconventional items was 
22.27 (SD = 9.09). 
In short, for about half of the DIT items there was a 
significant relationship between the position taken on the 
issue in question and the importance assigned to that issue. 
This relationship was twice as common among Stage 4 items as 
among postconventional items. 
Because the indices most commonly employed to sum-
marize DIT performance are the stage scores based on the 
ranking rather than the rating of issue importance, a cor-
relational analysis was performed on the relationship be-
tween subjects' individual MPS responses and whether or not 
the corresponding DIT items appeared in subjects• rankings 
of the most important issues in each story problem. The re-
sults were essentially the same as those obtained with item 
ratings. Correlations between subjects• position on an is-
sue and the frequency with which it was ranked ranged from 
.70 to .01. Of the JJ MPS items, 16 items correlated at or 
above .25 (~ < .05), with another 4 items at or above .19 
(~ < .10). When the MPS items were ranked according to the 
absolute magnitude of their correlations, the mean rank for 
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the 10 Stage 4 items was 11.70 (SD= 8.49), whereas the mean 
rank for the 11 postconventional items was 22.27 (SD= 9.J4). 
Thus, as was the case with item ratings, for about 
half of the DIT items there was a significant relationship 
between the position taken on the issue in question and the 
frequency with which it was ranked as being among the most 
important to consider. Again, this relationship was twice 
as common among Stage 4 items as among postconventional 
items. 
The pattern of correlations between individual MPS 
items and their corresponding DIT items, whether rated or 
ranked, along with the correlations between the Refined MPS 
conservatism scale and the four DIT indices, suggests that 
the relationship between MPS position and DIT response was 
more significant overall ~or Stage 4 items than for postcon-
ventional items. In other words, the level of importance 
that subjects assigned to many of the Stage 4 items on the 
DIT was systematically related to their position on the is-
sues involved, whereas the level of importance assigned to 
most of the postconventional items was unrelated to their 
position on those issues. However, it does not necessarily 
follow from this that subjects treated the two types of item 
differently--as, for example, by responding to Stage 4 items 
in terms of their positions on the issues involved while re-
sponding to postconventional items in a manner indifferent 
to their positions on those issues. 
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On the contrary, the data are not inconsistent with 
the possibility that the subjects did in fact respond to all 
of the DIT items in terms of their positions on the issues 
involved. In order to infer from the apparent independence 
of any MPS position and corresponding DIT response that the 
two were actually unrelated, one must assume that all sub-
jects had made the same interpretation of the item in ques-
tion and would have ascribed the same meaning to a given re-
sponse. If subjects did differ among themselves in either 
respect, any systematic relationship between position and 
response on that item would have been obscured. 
Unfortunately, the data cannot reveal whether or not 
subjects differed in their interpretation of the DIT items 
and the meaning of their responses. Nevertheless, several 
considerations may be brought to bear upon this question. 
First, there may be nothing intrinsically different about 
Stage 4 issues and postconventional issues in themselves, 
inasmuch as subjects' roPS positions on both types of issue 
were consistent with their sociopolitical orientation when 
the alternatives were made explicit and subjects were re-
quired to indicate which alternative they favored. However, 
the items on the Defining Issues Test differ from their cor-
responding MPS items in one important respect, namely, in 
that they present the issue in the form of direct or indi-
rect questions rather than as explicit position statements. 
As a result, the degree to which one's position on an issue 
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can be expressed unambiguously by means of an importance rat-
ing varies considerably from one item to the next. It is 
possible, therefore, that the magnitude of the observed rela-
tionship between MPS position and DIT response reflected the 
degree to which subjects interpreted that item similarly. 
The fact that the distinction between DIT item responses 
that did or did not display a systematic relationship to MPS 
position cut across all types o~ item further suggests that 
the salient factor was some characteristic specific to the 
individual items rather than to the type of issue they rep-
resented. 
The relative dearth of postconventional items among 
those that correlated significantly with MPS position may 
actually be consistent with this possibility, inasmuch as 
the postconventional items are generally acknowledged as be-
ing more abstract and even more ambiguous than other types 
of DIT item. Indirect s~pport for this characterization 
might be gleaned from the manner in which subjects handled 
these items during the discussion phase of the experiment. 
Whereas subjects referred to Stage 4 items only in the con-
text of conservative arguments, they were able to interpret 
several postconventional items as supporting either liberal 
or conservative positions. 
The foregoing analysis of the relationship between 
sociopolitical orientation and DIT performance may be sum-
marized as follows: First, the results indicate that con-
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servative and liberal groups could be differentiated on the 
basis of their DIT scores, with conservatives obtaining sig-
nificantly higher Stage 4 scores than liberals and liberals 
obtaining significantly higher F scores than conservatives. 
Second, an examination of MPS responses showed that the al-
ternative positions implicit in many of the DIT items could 
be identified as representing opposing sociopolitical view-
points--conservative versus liberal--and that subjects' po-
sitions on those issues followed their sociopolitical orien-
tation. Third, a comparison of subjects' MPS responses and 
DIT responses revealed that for many of the DIT items, there 
was a significant relationship between the subjects' posi-
tion on an issue and both the level of importance at which 
it was rated and the frequency with which it was ranked as 
among the most important issues to consider. There is some 
evidence that the magnitude of the observed relationship be-
tween MPS position and DI~ response for any item was a func-
tion of the degree to which subjects interpreted that item 
similarly on the DIT, although the data are not conclusive 
in this regard. 
Accountability and Sociopolitical Attitudes 
The discussion period at the end of the experimental 
session afforded the experimenter the opportunity to note 
subjects' individual interpretations of the accountability 
forewarning. The surprise that some subjects showed at actu-
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ally being directed to engage in a discussion signalled to 
the experimenter that a number of subjects had distrusted 
the authenticity of the forewarning. He subsequently asked 
subjects to rate on a scale from 1 to 10 the degree to which 
they had believed the forewarning instructions. The most 
frequent was a rating of 7, but a few subjects indicated 
that having recently participated in an experiment involving 
deception, they had become somewhat distrustful of all ex-
periments. In addition, it was evident that a few subjects 
had not read the instructions carefully and had believed 
that their test responses would be revealed to the instruc-
tor of the course for which they were receiving subject pool 
credit. The impact of the accountability forewarning in 
that case is a matter of speculation. Because data on sub-
jects' interpretations of the forewarning were not collected 
from the outset, it is impossible to say more than that such 
failures may have reduced the impact of the forewarning, 
thereby resulting in an underestimation of the accountabili-
ty effect. 
Refined MPS Conservatism scale scores at each level 
of sociopolitical orientation across accountability condi-
tions were examined for two reasons: first, as a check on 
the effectiveness of the accountability manipulation in eli-
citing anticipatory opinion shifts and, second, as the 
strongest test of the competing explanations for such shifts 
(i.e., conformity Yersus moderation). Because.the accounta-
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bility forewarning made salient the sociopolitical identity 
of the anticipated audience, it was expected that the impact 
of the manipulation would be most apparent on a measure of 
the sociopolitical attitudes these subjects subsequently 
displayed. As was indicated above, the Refined MPS Conser-
vatism scale correlated highly with the WPAI Conservatism 
scale in the no accountability condition. Thus, it was 
thought to constitute an adeguate measure of the conserva-
tism of subjects' attitudes toward the issues presented in 
the DIT questionnaire booklet. 
The Refined MPS Conservatism scale means and standard 
deviations for the three sociopolitical orientation groups 
under the three accountability conditions are given in 
Table 11. The pattern o~ mean MPS scores for these groups, 
illustrated in Figure 1, con~orms precisely to the pattern 
predicted under the moderation hypothesis of anticipatory 
shifts. As was noted before. both the conformity hypothesis 
and the moderation hypothesis specify that sociopolitically 
extreme subjects accountable to a sociopolitically opposite 
audience--i.e., conservatives to a liberal audience and lib-
erals to a conservative audience--should score closer to the 
middle of the attitude scale than their counterparts in the 
no accountability condition. However, whereas the conform-
ity hypothesis speci~ies that extreme subjects accountable 
to a similar audience--i.e., conservatives to a conservative 
audience and liberals to a liberal audience--should obtain 
Table 11 
Refined Moral Position Survey (MPS} Conservatism Scale 
Means and S~andard Deviations 
for All Groups 
Treatment Condition 
Type of Accountable to No Accountable 
Orientation Conservative Accountability Liberal 
Conservative 
M 16.07 18.87 12.47 
SD .5. JB 4.76 5.74 
Moderate 
M 13.13 13.40 13.33 
SD 6 .J6 6.61 6.65 
Liberal 
M 12.lJ 8.53 11.13 
SD 5._58 3.96 5.51 
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more extreme scores than their no accountability counter-
parts, the moderation theory holds that they should respond 
similarly to subjects accountable to an opposite audience 
and obtain scores that are less extreme. Consistent with 
the moderation hypothesis, the mean MPS scores for conserva-
tives and liberals held accountable to either type of audi-
ence were in each case less extreme than those of conserva-
tives and liberals who were not accountable. 
The results depicted in Figure 1 are somewhat mis-
leading with respect to the MPS responses of moderate sub-
jects. The mean scores for moderates across the three ac-
countability conditions suggest that the forewarning had no 
impact upon their MPS responses. However, when the three 
moderate groups are diYided into moderately conservative and 
moderately liberal subgroups on the basis of their WPAI C 
scores, it becomes apparent that their response to the ac-
countability forewarning was similar to that of the conser-
vative and liberal groups. Table 12 gives the Refined MPS 
Conservatism scale means and standard deviations for the 
moderately conservative and moderately liberal subgroups 
across accountability conditions. The mean MPS scores for 
these moderate subgroups are depicted in Figure 2, along 
with the means for the liberal and conservative groups. 
Figure 2 illustrates that the mean MPS scores for the 
moderately conserYative and moderately liberal subgroups 
held accountable to either type of audience were in each 
Table 12 
Refined Moral Position Survey (MPS) Conservatism Scale 
Means and Standard Deviations 
for the Moderate Subgroups 
Treatment Condition 
Accountable to No Accountable 
Subgroup Conservative Accountability Liberal 
Moderately 
Conservative 
M 1J.13a 17.43b 12 • .38a 
SD 7.08 6.60 6 • .32 
Moderately 
Liberal 
M 1J.14b 9.88a 14.4.3b 
SD 5.98 4.42 7.35 
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case less extreme than those of the corresponding moderate 
subgroups who were not held accountable. Thus, at each of 
the four levels of sociopolitical orientation depicted in 
Figure 2, subjects in the no accountability condition dis-
played more extreme attitudes than did subjects accountable 
either to a conservative or to a liberal. 
Following the procedure employed by Murphy, Dewolfe 
and Mozdzierz (1983) , a binomial test was performed to as-
sess the statistical significance of this result. Given a 
probability of .33 that at any level of orientation the no 
accountability mean would be more extreme than the two ac-
countability means, the appearance of this pattern in four 
out of four cases yields a binomial z = 2.85, ~ < .01. 
Thus, it seems likely that subjects who received the ac-
countability forewarning did in ~act moderate their reported 
sociopolitical attitudes in anticipation of their encounter, 
irrespective of the orientation of their audience. 
Two complementary sets of analyses were performed in 
order to clarify the significance of the differences in MPS 
scores across accountability conditions and types of socio-
poli tical orientation. 
First, planned comparisons were performed at each 
level of sociopolitical orientation between the MPS scores 
of subjects in the no accountability condition and those of 
subjects in each of the two accountability conditions. Only 
one difference proved to be statistically significant, viz., 
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between conservatives in the no accountability condition and 
conservatives accountable to a liberal, F(l, 126) = 9.53, 
~ < .005. So the magnitude of the apparent shift in MPS 
scores across treatment conditions at each level of orienta-
tion was rather low relative to the variability of MPS 
scores within those groups. 
However, if the differences in MPS scores across ac-
countability conditions were indeed the result of moderation 
shifts, then at best their magnitude should not much exceed 
that of the interval between an extreme position score and 
a moderate one. Because the magnitude of this interval is 
equal to approximately one half the difference between the 
MPS scores of liberals and conservatives in the no accounta-
bility condition, it is a function of the heterogeneity of 
the sample. In other words, the smaller the initial differ-
ence between the extremes, the lower the ceiling on poten-
tial moderation shifts. Although the MPS scores of liberals 
and conservatives in the no accountability condition were 
found to be significantly di~ferent, there was also evidence 
that the present sample represented a somewhat narrow range 
of sociopolitical positions. I~ so, then rather small 
shifts in response to the accountability forewarning would 
have to be expected. 
Although this constraint upon the magnitude of dif-
ferences in MPS scores across accountability conditions 
renders the results of the planned comparisons somewhat 
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equivocal, it has no effect upon the second approach to as-
sessing the impact of the accountability manipulation. This 
was the simple effects analysis of sociopolitical orienta-
tion under each of the accountability conditions. The ra-
tionale is straightforNard and the test recommends itself on 
the basis of its practical significance: If subjects tended 
to moderate their sociopolitical positions in response to an 
accountability forewarning, then the differences apparent 
among conservatives, moderates and liberals in the no ac-
countability condition should diminish or disappear under 
conditions of accountability. In keeping with the results 
already discussed, the simple effect of orientation upon MPS 
scores in the no accountability condition was highly signifi-
cant, F(2, 126) = 12.43, £ < .001. In contrast, the simple 
effect of orientation was not significant under either the 
accountability to a conservative condition, F(2, 126) = 1.94, 
or the accountability to a liberal condition, F(2, 126) = .57. 
The foregoing analysis indicates that the differences 
in MPS scores among conservatiYes, moderates and liberals 
are statistically significant under the no accountability 
condition and not significant under either of the two ac-
countability conditions. HoweYer, this result does not en-
sure that the range of mean MPS scores in the no accounta-
bility condition was significantly greater in magnitude than 
the range of mean MPS scores in the two accountability con-
ditions. Therefore, a second binomial test was performed to 
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establish whether the differences among the means in the no 
accountability condition exceeded the corresponding differ-
ences among the means in the two accountability conditions. 
Five comparisons among pairs of means in the no accountabil-
ity condition and the two accountability conditions were 
treated as legitimate. (Using the upper, middle and lower 
means as the basis for determining the pairs, the five com-
parisons were as follows: the interval between upper and 
lower no accountability means with the two intervals between 
upper and lower accountability means; the interval between 
upper and middle no accountability means with the intervals 
between upper and middle and between middle and lower ac-
countability means; and the interval between middle and low-
er no accountability means with the intervals between upper 
and middle and between middle and lower accountability 
means.) For any single comparison, the probability of the 
difference between no accountability means being the great-
est by chance is .33, 
Examination of the mean MPS scores revealed that in 
five out of five comparisons the interval between the pair 
of means in the no accountability condition exceeded the 
interval between both pairs of accountability condition 
means, yielding a binomial~= 3.17, ~ < .01. This result 
indicates that the differences in mean MPS scores among 
conservatives, moderates and liberals in the no accounta-
bility condition were signi~icantly greater in magnitude 
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than the differences among conservatives, moderates and lib-
erals who had anticipated being held accountable for their 
responses. 
The examination of Refined MPS Conservatism scores 
for the three sociapolitical orientation groups across ac-
countability conditions thus suggests that subjects who had 
initially presented themselves on the WPAI as having rela-
tively extreme sociapolitically attitudes (either conserva-
tive or liberal) tended to report saciopolitically more mod-
erate positions on the MPS when forewarned that they would 
be held accountable for their views. Inasmuch as subjects 
shifted toward the middle of tbe scale irrespective of 
whether the saciapalitical identity of their anticipated 
audience was apposite or similar to their own, the results 
support the moderation hypothesis of anticipatory opinion 
shifts. Although in most cases these moderation shifts were 
of low magnitude, their combined effect was to reduce the 
range of mean MPS scores among accountable conservatives, 
moderates and liberals ta the extent that (in contrast to 
their counterparts in the no accountability condition} the 
mean MPS scores for tbese groups were not significantly 
different. 
Accountability and Moral Judgment 
The foregoing analysis of MPS scores demonstrates 
that the accountability forewarning was effective in elicit-
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ing discernable anticipatory shifts on an explicit measure 
of sociopolitical attitudes. However, the main point of the 
study was to determine whether the accountability forewarn-
ing would result in comparable sh.ifts on the Defining Issues 
Test. Hence, the same analyses performed on MPS scores were 
applied to the Stage 4 scores and P scores of subjects in 
the three orientation groups across treatment conditions. 
This approach requires one basic assumption, namely, 
that there is a systematic relationship between subjects' 
typical sociopolitical orientation and the stage-specific 
types of moral judgment that they ordinarily employ. It as-
sumes, in other words, that subjects grouped according to 
their initial sociopolitical orientation would obtain pre-
dictable, reliably di~ferent DIT scores if tested under 
standard conditions. This assumption is indispensable be-
cause subjects were not pretested on the DIT to determine 
their baseline performance. Hence, in order to assess the 
impact of the accountability manipulation, the initial level 
of moral judgment of subjects receiving the forewarning must 
be estimated on the basis of their initial sociopolitical 
orientation. 
The evidence already reviewed with regard to the re-
lationship between sociopolitical orientation and DIT per-
formance in the no accountability condition suggests that 
this assumption is essentially sound. Both the Stage 4 
scores and P scores of the three sociopolitical orientation 
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groups were significantly different, conforming to predic-
tions based on previous research. Given that subjects at 
each level of orientation were randomly assigned to treat-
ment conditions, the accountability groups should initially 
have been similar in this respect. Nevertheless, type of 
sociopolitical orientation constituted an imperfect estima-
tor of level of moral judgment. As the correlations between 
the WPAI Conservatism scale and the Stage 4 score and P 
score (.43 and -.4J, respectively) indicate, sociopolitical 
orientation failed to account for a considerable amount of 
the variance in DIT scores. This shortcoming was tolerated 
inasmuch as it did not increase the risk of crucial Type I 
error; on the contrary, it could only have reduced the like-
lihood of detecting any genuine experimental effect. 
The Stage 4 means and standard deviations for the 
three sociopolitical orientation groups under the three ac-
countability conditions are given in Table 13. The mean 
Stage 4 scores for these groups are depicted in Figure 3. 
Figure J illustrates that the mean Stage 4 scores for 
both liberals and conservatives in the accountability to a 
liberal condition were less extreme than those for their 
counterparts in the no accountability condition. In fact, 
the two means were nearly identical and about midway between 
their no accountability counterparts. The mean Stage 4 
score for conservatives accoUJ1't8.ble to a conservative was 
also less extreme than that for conservatives in the no ac-
Table 13 
Defining Issues Test (DIT) Stage 4 
Means and Standard Deviations 
for All Groups 
Treatment Condition 
Type of ACCOW1table to No Accountable 
orientation Conservative Accountability Liberal 
Conservative 
M 11 .. 80 12.73 10.93 
SD 4 .. 04 2.52 5.59 
Moderate 
M 10 .. 27 10.60 9.93 
SD 5 .. 80 4.52 3.45 
Liberal 
M 8.80 8.73 11.13 
SD 4.04 3.73 5.07 
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countability condition, although this difference was not as 
pronounced. There was almost no difference between the 
stage 4 scores for liberals accountable to a conservative 
and liberals in the no accountability condition. 
This configuration of results suggests that the fore-
warning had a moderating effect upon the Stage 4 scores for 
both conservatives and liberals accountable to a liberal. 
However, evidence of a similar effect in the accountability 
to a conservative condition is limited to the conservative 
group. 
Mean Stage 4 scores for the moderate groups indicate 
that the accountability forewarning had little impact at 
this level of orientation. Yet, as was the case with MPS 
scores, a different picture emerges when the moderate groups 
are divided into moderately conservative and moderately lib-
eral subgroups on the basis of their WPAI Conservatism 
scores. Table 14 gives the Stage 4 means and standard devi-
ations for the moderately conservative and moderately liber-
al subgroups across accountability conditions. The mean 
Stage 4 scores for these moderate subgroups are depicted in 
Figure 4, along with those for the conservative and liberal 
groups. 
It is evident ~rom Figure 4 that the accountability 
forewarning did have an impact upon the Stage 4 scores of 
moderate subjects. The pattern. of mean scores across ac-
countability conditions for each of the moderate subgroups 
Table 14 
Defining Issues Test (DIT) Stage 4 
Means and Standard Deviations 
for the Moderate Subgroups 
Treatment Condition 
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resembles the pattern for the conservative or liberal ex-
treme to which it corresponds: The mean scores for moderate-
ly conservative subjects were lower under accountability 
conditions than in the no accountability condition, whereas 
the mean scores for moderately liberal subjects were higher 
under accountability conditions than in the no accountabili-
ty condition. Following the procedure employed earlier with 
regard to mean MPS scores, the binomial z was established 
for the pattern of Stage 4 means depicted in Figure 4. In 
four out of four cases, the no accountability mean was more 
extreme than the mean for either accountability group at 
the same level of sociopolitical orientation, yielding a 
z = 2.85, ~ ( .01. Howeyer, the effect must be considered 
somewhat weaker than is suggested by this result, owing to 
the virtually negligible difference between no accountabili-
ty liberals and liberals accountable to a conservative (8.7J 
versus 8.80). 
Aside from their conformity to the pattern observed 
previously, the moderate subgroup profiles display two unex-
pected, yet prominent reatures. First, the mean Stage 4 
scores for the two moderate subgroups in the no accountabili-
ty condition were no less extreme than those for the conser-
vative and liberal groups to which they corresponded. Sec-
ond, the differences across accountability conditions for 
each of the moderate subgroups were considerably greater in 
magnitude than the difrerences for either the conservative 
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or liberal groups; in one case, the difference actually 
spans the interval between the conservative and liberal no 
accountability extremes. 
Given the small size of the moderate subgroups, 
coupled with their rather high within-group variance, the 
significance of these unexpected findings is questionable. 
Nevertheless, the overall pattern of Stage 4 scores for the 
moderate subgroups seems to demonstrate that the accounta-
bility forewarning had a systematic impact upon moderate 
subjects. Evidence that the ~orewarning had a comparable 
effect upon the Stage 4 scores for the moderate subgroups 
across both accountability conditions is particularly worth 
noting, inasmuch as tne results for the liberal and conser-
vative groups raised some doubt as to whether the forewarn-
ing had been effective in the accountability to a conserva-
tive condition. 
AS had been done in the case of MPS scores, planned 
comparisons were performea at eacn level of sociopolitical 
orientation betw~en the Stage 4 scores of subjects in the 
no accountability condition and those of subjects in each of 
the two accountability conditions. No differences proved to 
be statistically significant. However, these results are of 
questionable value in evaluating the impact of accountabili-
ty upon the Stage 4 scores o~ subjects in the present sample, 
at least with regard to the hypothesis of moderation shifts. 
No shift to the middle o~ the scale could have proved signi-
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ficant, inasmuch as neither interval between moderate and ex-
treme Stage 4 scores in the no accountability condition rep-
resented a statistically significant difference. 
For this reason, the simple effects analysis of so-
ciopolitical orientation under each of the accountability 
conditions again constitutes a more balanced test of the im-
pact of the accountability ~orewarning. Consistent with re-
sults discussed earlier, the simple effect of orientation 
upon Stage 4 scores in the no accountability condition was 
significant, F(2, 126) = J.08, ~ < .05. In other words, 
when subjects were not accountable for their responses, the 
Stage 4 scores of conservatives, moderates and liberals were 
significantly different. In contrast, the simple effect of 
orientation was not significant under either the accounta-
bility to a conservative condition, F{2, 126) = 1.73, or the 
accountability to a liberal condition, F(2, 126) = .32. In 
short, when subjects were held accountable for their respon-
ses, there were no signi~icant differences among the Stage 4 
scores for conservatives, moderates and liberals. 
As before, a binomial test was performed to establish 
whether the differences among the means in the no accounta-
bility condition exceeded the corresponding differences 
among the means in both o~ the accountability conditions. 
Examination revealed that this was the case in five out of 
five comparisons, yielding a binomial~ = 3.17, ~ < .01. 
This result indicates that the di~ferences in mean Stage 4 
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scores among conservatives, moderates and liberals in the no 
accountability condition were significantly greater in mag-
nitude than the differences among conservatives, moderates 
and liberals who anticipated being held accountable for 
their responses. 
Inspection of Stage 4 scores for the three sociopoli-
tical orientation groups across accountability conditions 
thus reveals a pattern similar to that observed with respect 
to MPS Conservatism scores--a pattern interpreted as evi-
dence that accountable subjects had engaged in a strategy of 
anticipatory moderation. Suojects who were accountable 
either to a liberal or to a conservative obtained less ex-
treme Stage 4 scores than did unaccountable subjects with 
the same initial sociopolitical orientation. Although the 
individual shifts attributed to accountability were not 
large, their combined effect was to reduce the range of mean 
Stage 4 scores among accountable conservatives, moderates 
and liberals to the extent that (in contrast to their coun-
terparts in the no accountability condition) the mean Stage 
4 scores for these groups were not significantly different. 
The P score means and standard deviations for the 
three sociopolitical orientation groups under the three ac-
countability conditions are given in Table 15. The pattern 
of mean P scores for these groups, depicted in Figure 5, 
differs in two important respects from the pattern common to 
both MPS scores and Stage ~ scores. First, the only defi-
Table 15 
Defining Issues Test (DIT) P Score 
Means and Standard Deviations 
i'or All Groups 
Treatment Condition 
Type of Accountable to No Accountable 
Orientation Conservative Accountability Liberal 
Liberal 
M 13.60 13.40 12.93 
SD 
.5 '25 5.72 4.82 
Moderate 
M 12 .4-o 11.93 12.13 
SD 4.J2 4.54 4.19 
Conservative 
M 11.60 8.07 13.87 
SD 4.69 3.20 4.07 
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nite shifts in mean P scores across accountability condi-
tions were on the part of the conservative groups. Whereas 
liberals had displayed shifts in both MPS scores and Stage 4 
scores comparable to those displayed by conservatives, there 
were only negligible differences in their mean P scores 
across accountability conditions. Second, although the P 
score shifts displayed by conservatives were consistent with 
their MPS and Stage 4 shifts in terms of direction--namely, 
toward the middle of the scale--they were of considerably 
greater magnitude relative to the interval between extremes 
in the no accountability condition. In the case of conser-
vatives accountable to a liberal, the shift actually spanned 
that interval. 
Examination of the mean P scores across accountabili-
ty conditions for moderates divided into two subgroups on 
the basis of their WPAI C scores does not substantially al-
ter this picture. Table 16 gives the P score means and 
standard deviations for the moderately conservative and mod-
erately liberal subgroups across accountability conditions. 
The mean P scores for these subgroups are depicted in Figure 
6, along with the means for the conservative and liberal 
groups. The profile reveals small shifts toward the middle 
of the scale for both moderately conservative subgroups who 
received the accountability forewarning, but a comparable 
shift to a less extreme position on the part of moderately 
liberal subjects was evident only in the accountability to 
Table 16 
Defining Issues Test (DIT) P Score 
Means and Standard Deviations 
for the Moderate Subgroups 
Treatment Condition 
Accountable to No Accountable 
Subgroup Conservative Accountability 
Moderately 
Liberal 
M lJ.ooa 12.88b 
SD _5,03 4.22 
Moderately 
Conservative 
M 11.ssb l0.86a 
SD 3 .87 4.98 
Note. Scores could range from O to 44. 
~ = 7. 
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a conservative condition. 
As before, the binomial z was established for the 
pattern of mean P scores depicted in Figure 6. In only two 
out of four cases--namely, at the conservative and moderate-
ly conservative levels--was the no accountability mean more 
extreme than the two accountability condition means, yield-
ing a nonsignificant ~ = .72. This result provides no basis 
for concluding that the pattern of mean P scores depicted in 
Figure 6 was the result of a strategy of anticipatory moder-
ation, where the pattern indicative of moderation is defined 
as a shift toward the middle of the scale on the part of 
both extremes under conditions of accountability. 
Planned comparisons reyealed that the P scores for 
conservatives in the no accountability condition were signi-
ficantly lower than the P scores for both conservatives ac-
countable to a conserYatiYe, F(l, 126) = 4.46, ~ < .05, and 
conservatives accountable to a liberal, F(l, 126) = 12.01, 
~ < .001. There were no significant P score differences 
across accountability conditions ~or either liberals or mod-
erates. 
The results of the simple effects analysis of socio-
political orientation under the three accountability condi-
tions for P scores are similar to those obtained for MPS 
scores and Stage 4 scores. The simple effect of orientation 
upon P scores in the no accountability condition was signi-
ficant, F(2, 126) = 5.42, ~ ~ .01, indicating that the P 
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scores of conservatives, moderates and liberals were signifi-
cantly different when subjects were not held accountable for 
their responses. On the other hand, the simple effect of 
orientation was not significant under either the accountabil-
ity to a conservative condition, F(2, 126) = .72, or the ac-
countability to a liberal condition, F(2, 126) = .54. In 
other words, when subjects were held accountable for their 
responses, there were no significant differences among the 
P scores for conservatiyes, moderates and liberals. 
As before, a binomial test indicated that the inter-
val between pairs of P score means in the no accountability 
condition exceeded the corresponding intervals between ac-
countability condition means in five out of five compari-
sons, yielding a binomial~ = 3,17, E < .01. This result 
confirms that the di~ferences in mean P scores among conser-
vatives, moderates and liberals in the no accountability 
condition were significantly greater in magnitude than the 
differences among conservatives, moderates and liberals who 
anticipated being held accountable for their responses. 
In short, the analysis of P scores for the three 
types of sociopolitical orientation across accountability 
conditions yields mixed results compared to those obtained 
for MPS scores and Stage 4 scores. On the one hand, while 
conservatives held accountable for their responses displayed 
significant shifts toward tne middle of the scale relative 
to their no accountability counterparts, there was no com-
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parable shift on the part of accountable liberals. On the 
other hand, the magnitude of the accountability shifts dis-
played by conservatives was so great that the net effect of 
the accountability forewarning was the same as for MPS 
scores and Stage 4 scores, namely, to reduce the range of 
mean P scores among accountable conservatives, moderates and 
liberals to the extent that (in contrast to their no ac-
countability counterparts) the mean P scores for these 
groups were not significantly different. 
Finally, the DIT meaningless (M) item scores for sub-
jects at each level of sociopolitical orientation across ac-
countability conditions were examined to determine whether 
the large increases in P scores on the part of conservatives 
in the two accountability conditions were accompanied by any 
increase in subjects' endorsement of the two meaningless 
items appearing in the DIT short form. M score means and 
standard deviations for all groups are given in Table 17. 
Rest (1979) had argued that the increase in P scores 
Yussen (1976) obtained under role-playing conditions was 
the result of subjects' endorsing postconventional items 
merely because of their abstract and high-sounding language; 
on that basis, Rest had proposed that further analysis would 
have revealed a corresponding increase in M scores, render-
ing those test results inYalid. Nevertheless, in the pres-
ent experiment planned comparisons on M scores between the 
no accountability condition and each of the two accounta-
Table 17 
Defining Issues Test (DIT) Meaningless (M) Item 
Means and Standard Deviations 
































Note. M scores could range from 0 to 8. 
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bility conditions confirmed that there were no significant 
increases in M scores associated with accountability for 
any sociopolitical orientation group. This suggests that 
subjects who significantly raised their P scores in response 
to the accountability forewarning displayed a level of com-
prehension sufficient to discriminate between those abstract 
and high-sounding items that were meaningful (i.e., post-
conventional items) and those that were meaningless. 
Means and standard deviations for the remaining DIT 
scores--Stage 3 scores, Stage 2 scores and Antisocial (A) 
item scores--for each type of sociopolitical orientation 
across accountability conditions are provided in Appendix D. 
There were no significant differences among conservatives, 
moderates and liberals in the no accountability condition on 
any of these measures, and no eyidence of any systematic 
shifts associated with accountability. 
Awareness of Anticipatory Shifts 
The five-item postexperimental questionnaire (Appen-
dix B) explored the accountable subjects' own perceptions of 
the impact of the forewarning instructions. Mean item rat-
ings and standard deviations for the three sociopolitical 
orientation groups in the two accountability conditions are 
presented in Table 18. 
The first item asked subjects to rate on a 5-point scale 
the importance of knowing that they would have to explain 
Table 18 
Postexperimental Questionnaire Item Means 
and Standard Deviations for Accountable Groups 
Accountable to Accountable to 
Conservative Liberal 
Item Conservative Moderate Liberal Conservative Moderate Liberal 
Importance of 
Discussion 
M 2-. 7') Z.87 z.73 2.73 2.67 3.47 
SD i.zz 1.30 l.)9 1.10 1.11 .99 
Imtiorta.nce of' 
rnatruotor 
M 3.00 2.87 2.67 2.60 2.87 3.67 
fill l.ZO l.25 1.29 1.06 1.25 1.05 
Impact on 
Questionnaire 
M 1.73 1.93 1.27 1.60 1.80 1.47 
SD 1.22 .96 .46 .83 1.15 .74 
Impact on 
Written Thoughts 
M 1.80 1.73 1.33 1.60 1.67 1.67 
SD 1.27 1.03 .62 .80 .98 .98 
Note. Higher scores indicate greater importance/impact. 
Ratings ranged from 1 to 5. 
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and justify their responses to someone, irrespective of that 
person's identity. A two-way ANOVA (Sociopolitical Orienta-
tion by Type of Accountability) revealed no significant ef-
fects, indicating that regardless of their sociopolitical 
orientation or treatment condition, subjects attributed an 
equivalently moderate degree of importance to their antici-
pation of face-to-face accountability. 
The second item asked subjects to rate on the same 
5-point scale the importance of knowing that the person to 
whom they would be accountable was an instructor, irrespec-
tive of that person's views. Again, a two-way ANOVA reveal-
ed no significant effects, indicating that regardless of 
their orientation or treatment condition, subjects attri-
buted an equivalently moderate degree of importance to their 
awareness that it was an instructor to whom they would be 
accountable. 
The third and fourth items asked subjects to rate on 
5-point scales how much their questionnaire booklet respon-
ses and their written thoughts had been influenced by their 
knowledge of the instructor's viewpoint. Two-way ANOVAs re-
vealed no significant effects on either item. In short, re-
gardless of their sociopolitical orientation or treatment 
condition, subjects reported that. their awareness of the 
sociopolitical orientation of the anticipated audience had 
had very little impact upon either their DIT/MPS question-
naire responses or their written thoughts. 
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The last item gave subjects the opportunity to indi-
cate specifically how their J:.mowledge of the instructor's 
viewpoint had affected their test responses: whether their 
responses remained as conservative, as moderate, or as lib-
eral as usual, whether their responses became more conserva-
tive or more liberal, or whether their responses shifted 
from conservative to moderate or from liberal to moderate. 
Of the 90 accountable subjects, only 12 reported that the 
orientation of their DIT/MPS responses shifted as a result 
of the forewarning; these subjects were not concentrated at 
any level of orientation or in either treatment condition. 
Furthermore, in only three cases did the direction of the 
self-reported shift correspond to the direction of shift 
observed for the group to which the subject belonged. 
Overall, the postexperimental questionnaire results 
indicate that subjects did not differ significantly in their 
self-reported perceptions o~ the impact of the accountabili-
ty forewarning. Irrespective o~ their sociopolitical orien-
tation or the identity o~ their anticipated audience, sub-
jects reported that the contents of the forewarning instruc-
tions were of some importance to them. However, despite 
evidence that subjects displayed substantial shifts on the 
DIT/MPS questionnaire, they reported that the forewarning 
had had very little e~fect on their test responses. 
Subjects' Self-defined Social Position ratings from 
the Demographics Sur-vey were then examined to assess whether 
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subjects who had been exposed to the accountability fore-
warning subsequently rated their own sociopolitical orienta-
tion differently from subjects at the same level of orienta-
tion in the no accountability condition. Mean ratings and 
standard deviations for Self-defined Social Position for all 
types of sociopolitical orientation under the three account-
ability conditions are given in Table 19. The mean self-
ratings for these groups are depicted in Figure 7. 
It was not expected that accountable subjects' self-
ratings would differ significantly from those reported by 
their no accountability counterparts, inasmuch as they had 
been informed that--unlike the DIT/MPS responses for which 
they were being held accountaole--their self-ratings would 
remain entirely anonymous. Nevertheless, the mean self-
ratings illustrated in Figure ? follow the pattern of moder-
ation shifts displayed by MPS scores an~ Stage 4 scores. 
Analysis of the simple effect of sociopolitical orientation 
under the three accountability conditions yielded similar 
results as well: Whereas the simple effect of orientation 
upon self-defined position was significant in the no ac-
countability conditionp F(Z, 126) = 3.75, R < .05, it was 
not significant under either the accountability to a conser-
vative condition, F(2, 126) = 1.06, or the accountability to 
a liberal condtion, F(2, 126) = l.00. Furthermore, the bi-
nomial test revealed that in four out of five comparisons 




Self-Defined Social Position 
Mean Ratings and Standard Deviations 
for All Groups 
Treatment Condition 
Accountable to No Accountable 
Conservative Accountability Liberal 
conservative 
M 4-. 00 4.33 3.80 
SD i.51 1.35 1.01 
Moderate 
M 4.20 3.40 3.47 
SD 1.57 1.18 .92 
Liberal 
M J.47 2.93 3.07 
SD 1-5.5 1.58 1.22 
Note. Ratings were on a 7-point scale from 1 (ex-
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Across Accountability Conditions 
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bility condition exceeded the corresponding intervals be-
tween accountability condition means, ~ = 2.22, ~ < .05. 
In short, subjects who had earlier been exposed to 
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the accountability forewarning produced ratings of their own 
sociopolitical position that were less extreme than the self-
ratings of subjects in the no accountability condition. Al-
though these shifts were not great in magnitude, their com-
bined effect was to reduce the range of mean self-ratings 
among accountable conservatives, moderates and liberals to 
the extent that (in contrast to their no accountability 
counterparts) the mean self-ratings for these groups were 
not significantly different. 
Although subjects• postexperimental questionnaire 
ratings of the impact o~ the accountability forewarning have 
already been considered in terms of group means, it was also 
of interest whether individual differences in subjects• 
self-reports were systematically related to the magnitude of 
the opinion shifts they had displayed. The extent to which 
each subject had modified his or her initial position could 
not be determined exactly, inasmuch as no measure of socio-
political attitude was administered both before and after 
the accountability ~orewarning was given. Nevertheless, the 
probability that a given subject had engaged in an anticipa-
tory opinion shift was estimated from the magnitude of the 
deviation of that subject's MPS score from the mean MPS 
score for subjects at the same initial level of orientation 
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in the no accountability condition. (MPS scores were used, 
first, because the MPS scale was explicitly a measure of 
sociopolitical attitude and, second, because comparable 
shifts in MPS scores had been obtained across accountability 
conditions and levels of orientation.) 
Inasmuch as the mean MPS scores for subjects at each 
level of orientation were more moderate when subjects were 
held accountable for their responses--irrespective of the 
identity of the anticipated audience--only deviations toward 
the middle of the MPS scale were assumed to represent prob-
able accountability shifts. Accordingly, for conservatives 
in either accountability condition, the lower the MPS score, 
the more likely it represented an accountability shift. 
Conversely, for liberals in either accountability condition, 
the higher the MPS score, the more likely it represented an 
accountability shift. This approach was ruled inapplicable 
for estimating accountability shifts at the moderate level 
of orientation, insofar as the direction of shifts appeared 
to differ for moderately conservative and moderately liberal 
subjects. The option of combining these moderate subgroups 
with the corresponding extremes was also rejected, for there 
was no assurance that their initial positions were compar-
able. 
Given this rationale, the relationship between sub-
jects' self-reports of the impact of the accountability 
forewarning and the magnitude of their anticipatory opinion 
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shifts was examined by means of correlations between each 
postexperimental ~uestionnaire item and subjects' MPS scores. 
It was expected that if subjects' ratings of the impact of 
the forewarning were directly related to the magnitude of 
their opinion shifts, then the correlation between rating 
and MPS score would be negative for accountable conserva-
tives and positive for accountable liberals. 
The correlations between Refined MPS Conservatism 
scores and postexperimental ~uestionnaire item ratings for 
accountable conservatives and liberals are given in Table 20. 
Examination reveals no signi~icant result for any self-
report item at either level of orientation, as well as no 
consistent pattern with regard to the direction of the cor-
relations. In short, there appears to be no systematic re-
lationship between subjects' ratings of the impact of the 
accountability forewarning and the extent to which their 
MPS scores deviated ~rom those of their no accountability 
counterparts. 
The same approach was used to examine the relation-
ship between accountable subjects' scores on the Good Impres-
sion Scale and the magnitude of their MPS shifts (i.e., the 
degree to which their MPS scores deviated from the mean MPS 
score for subjects in the corresponding no accountability 
group). It had been speculated that subjects who were par-
ticularly concerned about how others reacted to them--and 
who were therefore more likely to obtain high scores on the 
Table 20 
Correlations between Refined MPS Conservatism Scores 
and Postexperimental Questionnaire Item Ratings 
for Accountable Conservatives and Liberals 
Correlation with MPS Score 
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Accountable Accountable 
Postexperimental Conservatives Liberals 
Questionnaire Item en = 30) <n = 30) 
Importance of Discussion -.17 -.03 
Importance of Instructor -.17 -.11 
Impact on Questionnaire .14 .23 
Impact on Written Thoughts .16 .15 
Acknowledgment of Shii't -.05 .10 
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Good Impression Scale--might be particularly susceptible to 
the accountability manipulation and more likely to display 
anticipatory opinion shifts. Following the rationale out-
lined above, if subjects who scored high on the Good Impres-
sion Scale also tended to moderate their opinions in re-
sponse to the accountability forewarning, then the correla-
tion between Good Impression score and MPS score would be 
negative for accountable conservatives and positive for ac-
countable liberals. 
Examination of the actual correlations reveals no 
significant result either for conservatives, £(28) = .11, 
or for liberals, £(28) = .oo. Apparently, then, there was 
no systematic relationship between subjects' degree of con-
cern about making a good impression (as inferred from their 
Good Impression scores) and the extent to which they had 
moderated their MPS responses. 
Integrative Complexity 
Subjects• written thoughts were rated for level of 
integrative complexity using Schroder et al.'s (1967) 7-
point scale and examined in terms of subjects• sociopoliti-
cal orientation, level of moral judgment, and degree of an-
ticipatory opinion shift. Jn each case, there was no evi-
dence to support the hypothesized relationship between inte-
grative complexity and the variaole in question. 
With regard to sociopolitical orientation, liberals 
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had been expected to display a somewhat higher level of in-
tegrative complexity than conservatives when subjects' writ-
ten thoughts were obtained w-tder standard (no accountabili-
ty) conditions. However, mean integrative complexity rat-
ings were nearly identical ~or all three sociopolitical ori-
entation groups: 2.00 (SD = .58) for conservatives, 2.22 
(SD = .73) for moderates, and 2.02 (SD = .54) for liberals. 
A one-way ANOVA con~irmed that these mean ratings were not 
significantly different, F(Z, 42) = .58. In order to assess 
whether the integrative complexity ratings for these groups 
differed across the three story problems, a two-way ANOVA 
(Level of Orientation by Story Problem) was also performed. 
This, too, yielded no significant results. Conservatives, 
moderates and liberals could not be differentiated in terms 
of the integrative complexity of their written thoughts on 
any of the story problems, and their written thoughts did 
not differ significantly in integrative complexity from one 
story problem to another. 
Correlational analysis revealed no relationship be-
tween level of integrative complexity and any measure of so-
ciopoli tical orientation. Correlations with the mean inte-
grative complexity rating across the three story problems 
were as follows: for the WPAI Conservatism scale, r(43) = 
.05; for the New Left TM subscale, r(43) = .04; for Self-
defined Social Position, ~(43) = -.06; and for the Refined 
MPS Conservatism scale, £(43) = .06. 
173 
With regard to level of moral judgment, it had been 
speculated that subjects in the no accountability condition 
who favored postconventional arguments on the Defining Is-
sues Test might display a higher level of integrative com-
plexity in their written thoughts on the story problems. 
This proved not to be the case, however. The correlation 
between the mean integrative complexity rating across the 
three story problems and the DIT P score was neither signi-
ficant nor in the predicted direction, ~(43) = -.10. In 
short, subjects who displayed a higher level of integrative 
complexity in their written thoughts on the story problems 
were no more likely to go on to endorse a greater number of 
postconventional items on the Defining Issues Test. 
Before examining the relationship between integrative 
complexity and degree o~ anticipatory opinion shift, a two-
way ANOVA (Level of Orientation by Type of Accountability) 
was performed to assess the overall impact of the accounta-
bility forewarning upon leYel of integrative complexity. 
Integrative complexity ratings had been expected not to dif-
fer significantly across accountability conditions. Al-
though the integrative complexity ratings for subjects ac-
countable to a conservative were in fact slightly lower, 
and the ratings for subjects accountable to a liberal slight-
ly higher, than those ~or subjects in the no accountability 
condition, the main effect for accountability was not signi-
ficant, F(2, 126) = 2.J6, ~ < .10. The differences are too 
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small to suggest a systematic response on the part of ac-
cotmta ble subjects to the sociopolitical identity of the an-
ticipated audience, but the pattern does indicate that ac-
cotmtabili ty per se had no consistent effect upon level of 
integrative complexity (i.e., of consistently either raising 
or lowering the level of integrative complexity of subjects' 
written thoughts). 
Finally, with regard to the degree of anticipatory 
opinion shift, it had been expected that subjects who did 
not shift their opinions in response to the accotmtability 
forewarning might instead display a higher level of integra-
tive complexity in their written thoughts. As before, the 
deviation of a subject's MPS score from the mean MPS score 
for subjects at the same level of orientation in the no ac-
cotmtabili ty condition was used as an estimate of that sub-
ject's anticipatory opinion shift. Again, all anticipatory 
opinion shifts were assumed to be toward a more moderate 
position. Thus, if subjects who did not engage in a moder-
ation shift instead recorded thoughts that were integrative-
ly more complex, then the correlation between integrative 
complexity rating and MPS score would be positive for con-
servatives and negative for liberals. 
Examination of the actual correlations revealed no 
significant result either for conservatives, £(28) = .19, or 
for liberals, £(28) = -.03r Apparently, then, subjects who 
did not moderate their opinions in response to the accotmta-
bility forewarnhlg recorded thoughts that were similar ill 
level of hltegrative complexity to those of subjects who 
did engage in moderation shi~ts. 
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DISCUSSION 
The sociopolitical orientation data reviewed earlier 
suggested that the subjects of this study were sociopoliti-
cally more homogeneous and more conservative than student 
samples reported on by other investigators (e.g., Emler et 
al., 1983; Gold, et al., 1976; Wilson, 1973). These charac-
teristics may be attributed, at least in part, to the fact 
that subjects were drawn from the undergraduate population 
of a major Jesuit university. The sample was predominantly 
Roman Catholic, with 71% of the subjects reporting this as 
their current religious preference. Except for religious 
fundamentalists, Roman Catholics tend as a group to be more 
conservative than members of other denominations (Wilson, 
1973). Assuming that most of these students were also 
raised in the parochial school system, with its rather uni-
form atmosphere of social and moral values, neither the rela-
tive homogeneity nor the conservatism of their sociopoliti-
cal attitudes is particularly remarkable. Aside from the 
influence of religious affiliation, the relative conserva-
tism of this sample may also reflect the current trend in so-
ciopolitical attitudes among American college students. 
There is no guestion that the subjects assigned to 
the liberal and conservative groups failed to represent the 
extremes of the sociopolitical scale. For example, the mean 
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WPAI Conservatism score for the liberal group (39.27) was 
about 22 points higher than for a sample of students identi-
fied as socialists, and nearly 9 points higher than for a 
sample of scientists and physicians; the mean score for the 
conservative group (58.09) was about 15 points lower than 
for a sample of John Birch Society members. In comparison 
to these representatives o~ le~t-wing and right-wing atti-
tudes (reported in Wilson, 19?J), the subjects in the pres-
ent study might be described as rather moderate. 
Nevertheless, for the purposes of this research it 
was essential only that the three orientation groups display 
significantly different sociopolitical attitudes along the 
liberal versus conservatiYe dimension. The analysis of WPAI 
subscale scores across types of orientation demonstrated 
that this minimum requirement had been satisfied. The re-
stricted range of attitudes represented by the sample merely 
reduced the likelihood of detecting individual differences 
that correlated imperfectly with sociopolitical orientation. 
Despite this limitation, the two main predictions 
I 
were both supported by the data: First, there did appear 
to be a systematic relationship between sociopolitical ori-
entation and level of moral reasoning as measured by the 
Defining Issues Test. Second, it was possible to elicit 
shifts both in sociopolitical position and in DIT scores by 
manipulating subjects' expectations of accountability. 
These will be discussed in t~rn. 
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The systematic relationship between sociopolitical 
orientation and Defining Issues Test performance for sub-
jects in the no accountability condition followed the re-
sults obtained by Emler et al. (1983). That is, conserva-
tives obtained Stage 4 scores that were significantly higher 
than those obtained by liberals, whereas liberals obtained 
significantly higher postconventional reasoning (P) scores 
than did conservatives; moderates scored between the ex-
tremes in each case. 
Moreover, the difference between conservatives and 
liberals in each case was of considerable magnitude: The 
difference in percentage scores for the Stage 4 items was 
lJ.J and for the postconventional items was 17.8. Particu-
larly for the P score, which is the most commonly used index 
of moral reasoning on the DITt this range of mean scores is 
remarkable. By comparison, composite data provided by Rest 
(1979) indicate that the difference in P scores between ju-
nior high school students and college students is only about 
20.0. Further research may establish whether the P score 
difference between liberals and conservatives increases fur-
ther as sociopolitically more extreme groups are sampled. 
In considering the magnitude of the correlations be-
tween DIT scores and measures of sociopolitical attitude, it 
should be recalled that these scores were obtained using a 
short (three story) form of the Defining Issues Test. Davi-
son (1979) indicates that such correlations tend to be some-
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what lower than those based on the full DIT form, owing to 
the somewhat lower reliability _of the short form. Correla-
tions might be reduced even further in a homogeneous sample. 
Nevertheless, the correlations between WPAI Conserva-
tism (C) scores and both Stage 4 scores and P scores were 
highly significant. For this sample, at least, the subfac-
tor of general conservatism that proved to be most strongly 
related to DIT performance was Anti-hedonism (the AH sub-
scale of the WPAI). The subfactor dubbed Religion-Puritan-
ism (RP)--with which Ali tends to be closely related--also 
correlated significantly with both Stage 4 scores and P 
scores. On the other hand, Ethnocentrism (E) correlated 
significantly only with Stage 4 scores, and the Militarism-
Punitiveness (MP) subfactor failed to correlate significant-
ly with either one, although the relationships were still in 
the predicted direction. 
Anti-hedonism and Religion-Puritanism might be de-
scribed as the more explicitly "moral" subscales of the WPAI, 
dealing with issues such as are the main focus of the so-
called "Moral Majority" movement: for example, chastity, 
moral training, pot smoking, :pornography and censorship (all 
items included on the AH subseale), and Divine Law, evolu-
tion theory, legalized abortion and miracles (on the RP sub-
scale). By contrast, the Militarisrn-:Pu.nitiveness subscale 
involves matters that are more political or legalistic, such 
as patriotism, disarmament, the death penalty and corporal 
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punishment. 
In short, although subjects' DIT scores were signifi-
cantly related to the general factor of conservatism, their 
judgments appear to have had more in common with their atti-
tudes toward pleasure and religion than with their attitudes 
toward political and legalistic matters. This distinction 
between the explicitly moralistic and the authoritarian di-
mensions of conservatism may prove important in understand-
ing the relationship between the levels of moral judgment 
and the liberal-conservative dimension. Rest (1979) cited 
extensive evidence o~ either very low or inconsistent corre-
lations between the DIT and various measures of political 
attitudes to support his claim that DIT results could not be 
explained in terms o~ the construct of liberalism-conserva-
tism. However, the measures of political attitudes employed 
in those studies were mainly of the sort that tapped the 
authoritarian subfactor of conservatism rather than the 
moralistic subfactor. Thus, Rest's conclusion may prove to 
be an unwarranted generalization. Further research into the 
relationship between DIT per~ormance and the subfactors of 
conservatism--preferably across a variety of populations--
may settle the question. 
It is not entirely clear why the New Left subscale 
correlations with the DIT ~ailed to reach the level of sig-
nificance obtained by Emler et al. (1983), but this may have 
to do with the comparatively narrow range of New Left sub-
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scale scores displayed by the present sample. The New Left 
Scale may simply be less sensitive than the WPAI to small 
differences in sociopolitical orientation. As was indicated 
earlier, even the intercorrelations among the New Left sub-
scales and between those subscales and the WPAI failed to 
conform very well to the predicted pattern. 
The most likely explanation for the near zero corre-
lations between Self-defined Social Position and the DIT is 
more straightforward. Many subjects did not identify their 
own sociopolitical orientation very accurately. Assuming 
that subjects were candid in their item endorsements on the 
WPAI, it was apparent that in many cases the position sub-
jects ascribed to themselves did not correspond to their at-
titudes toward issues clearly indicative of a conservative 
or liberal orientation. This is evident in the surprisingly 
low correlation between self-defined position ratings and 
WPAI Conservatism scores. The nature of the criteria that 
these subjects used in evaluating their own orientation can-
not be determined from the data, but would be of interest in 
its own right. 
The Moral Position Survey (MPS) data from the no ac-
countability condition offered evidence of a different sort 
that subjects' sociopolitical orientation and DIT judgments 
were related. To begin with, the MPS results supported the 
speculation that the content of the issues presented for 
consideration on the DIT fell within the sphere of sociopoli-
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tical concerns. Merely asking subjects to indicate their 
positions on those issues prayed to be a reasonably accurate 
measure of their sociopolitical orientation. In fact, the 
correlation of .56 between the initial MPS Conservatism 
scale and the WPAI ConserYatism scale exceeded that of any 
comparison between the sociopolitical measures themselves. 
Analysis of individual MPS items revealed that the opposing 
positions implicit in about half of the corresponding DIT 
issue statements were polari~ed along the liberal-conserva-
tive dimension. It is not unlikely, then, that in consider-
ing those issue statements respondents• own sociopolitical 
attitudes were spontaneously engaged. 
However, this is not in itself sufficient to suggest 
that the Defining Issues Test is no more than an indirect 
measure of sociopolitical attitude. Although the correla-
tions between the MPS Conservatism scale and DIT scores in-
dicate some relationship between subjects• positions on the 
issues and their preference ~or a particular type of item, 
it does not necessarily follow that subjects' DIT responses 
were dictated by their positions. Inasmuch as the MPS scale 
was shown to function as a measure of sociopolitical orienta-
tion, its relationship to the DIT may be no more direct than 
the relationship between the WPAI and the DIT. 
It may be argued that, unlike the Moral Position Sur-
vey, the Defining Issues Test does not require that subjects 
indicate their position on each issue in question. It re-
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quires only that subjects decide how much importance should 
be attached to that issue when considering the moral problem 
to which it refers. The test assumes, in short, that sub-
jects' responses reflect their understanding of the moral 
relevance of that issue, irrespective of their pro-or-con 
position on the issue itself. The format of the test items 
as well as the accompanying instructions appears to have 
been designed to thwart any tendency on the subjects' part 
to use their importance ratings as a way of registering 
their pro-or-con positions. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that DIT responses 
may reveal subjects' sociopolitical attitudes. Emler et al. 
(1983) demonstrated earlier that subjects could reproduce 
the response patterns typical of liberals and conservatives 
by selectively favoring certain DIT items, thus implying 
that subjects had identified and exploited some relationship 
between the DIT response alternatives and the two opposing 
orientations. However, although Emler et al.'s results indi-
cated that sociopolitical attitudes could be reflected in 
subjects• DIT responses under deliberate role-playing condi-
tions, some question remained as to whether this would gen-
eralize to standard test-taking conditions. 
To the extent that the no accountability condition of 
the present study approximated standard conditions, it ap-
pears that subjects• spontaneous DIT responses may also re-
veal their sociopolitical attitudes. The analysis of the 
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relationship between subjects' MPS position on each issue 
and their rating of the corresponding DIT issue statement 
yielded significant correlations for about half of the items. 
In other words, there was a systematic relationship between 
the pro-or-con position that subjects took on these issues 
and the level of importance they assigned to the correspond-
ing DIT issue statements. 
This finding is not particularly remarkable when one 
examines the individual DIT items, for in some cases it is 
an exceedingly fine line between ascribing importance to an 
issue and taking a position on the issue itself. For example, 
consider the Stage Li- issue statement, "Whether only God 
should decide when a person's life should end." Here the 
respondent's belief system is clearly liable to dictate 
whether the issue is considered crucial or irrelevant. The 
importance rating for this issue correlated .84 with the MPS 
position statement, 11 0nly God should decide when a person's 
life should end." Similarly, for a respondent with a con-
servative orientation, it may be a foregone judgment that 
certain issues are im:portant--e.g., "Wouldn't it be a citi-
zen's duty to report an escaped criminal, regardless of the 
circumstances," which correla-ted . .53 with the position that 
it was indeed a duty. 
This is not to suggest tha"t tbe rated importance of 
an issue invariably corresponded in such direct fashion to 
that subject's position--tha"t, for example, the rating 
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"great importance" simply implied agreement and "no impor-
tance" implied disagreement. In many cases, the relation-
ship between the two was undoubtedly more complex and varied. 
For example, on the postconventional DIT item, "Does the 
state have the right to force continued existence on those 
who don't want to live," the subjects who rated this issue 
as being important were more likely to believe that the 
state did not have such a right--opposite what would have 
been expected if subjects had merely registered their level 
of agreement in terms of level of importance. In this case, 
the importance rating may have reflected the intensity of 
the negative reaction on the part of some subjects to the 
claim implicit in the issue statement. 
Apart from issue statements that seem to carry an im-
plicit sociopolitical bias, there are some that could serve 
as effective rhetorical devices to support both liberal and 
conservative positions--e.g., the postconventional item, 
"Can society allow suicides or mercy killing and still pro-
tect the lives of individuals wbo want to live." The corre-
lations between importance rating and MPS position were gen-
erally rather low for such items, which may imply that lib-
erals and conservatives interpreted their importance differ-
ently. For other issue statern.ents--e.g., "How would the 
will of the people and the public good best be served?"--
the importance ratings simply de~y interpretation as covert 
position responses. In these cases, subjects' importance 
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ratings may indeed represent how well they feel each issue 
statement conforms to their definition of the problem in 
question, as Rest (1979) assumes. 
Nevertheless, this still leaves unsettled whether in-
dividual differences in subjects' definitions of the problem 
are primarily a function of the sociopolitical attitudes 
they have acquired or of the level of moral maturity they 
have attained. The foregoing results indicate that there is 
a systematic relationship between sociopolitical orientation 
and the type of moral argument favored on the Defining Is-
sues Test; they even suggest that in some cases the level of 
importance attributed to a particular DIT issue statement 
may be related to the position taken on that issue. However, 
as with any strictly correlational evidence, the data do not 
reveal the nature of the relationship between subjects' so-
ciopolitical identity ana their DIT responses. 
Yet it is on just this :point that the controversy be-
tween the cognitive-developmentalists and their critics ulti-
mately turns. The opposing interpretations have already 
been reviewed: On the one side, having maintained that the 
cognitive structures defining moral problems are develop-
mental in origin, Kohlberg and Rest insist that the conven-
tional and postconventional forms of reasoning represent 
successive levels of moral maturity; thus, any evidence of a 
systematic relationship be-tween the form of reasoning indi-
viduals display and the sociopolitical perspective they 
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adopt must be interpreted as indicating that the latter is 
also a function of their level of cognitive-structural de-
velopment. On the other side, Hogan and Emler contend that 
the conventional and postconventional forms do not represent 
stages in an invariant cognitive-developmental sequence, but 
are themselves the reflection of individual differences in 
sociopolitical perspective engendered by the interaction of 
character structure and social context. 
When applied to the Defining Issues Test, these in-
terpretations lead to very different conclusions about the 
meaning of individual differences in DIT scores among adult 
respondents. On the one hand, if sociopolitical perspective 
and style of moral reasoning are but complementary aspects 
of an individual's level of cognitive-moral development, 
then the observed relationship between sociopolitical orien-
tation and DIT scores is not inconsistent with Rest's claim 
that his test is a valid measure of moral maturity. On the 
other hand, if the conventional and postconventional con-
structs are simply terminologically different characteriza-
tions of the conservative and liberal orientations, with no 
basis in developmental differences, then the correlational 
data support the opposing claim that the Defining Issues 
Test is merely an indirect measure of sociopolitical atti-
tude. 
Clearly, then, the significance of the relationship 
between sociopolitical orientation and DIT scores hinges 
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upon whether the type of moral argument one favors is a 
function of one's level of moral maturity or of one's char-
acter structure and social context. The experimental condi-
tions included in the present experiment were designed so as 
to pit these competing interpretations against one another. 
As was indicated earlier, when subjects are fore-
warned that they will be held accountable for their position 
on some issue, they tend to modify their initial attitudes 
in preparation for their encounter with the anticipated 
audience. Previous research suggests that such shifts rep-
resent a situation-specific strategy of selective self-
presentation (e.g., impression :management) rather than a 
persistent change in subjects' attitudes (Cialdini & Petty, 
1981; Hass, 1981). Accordingly, by exposing subjects to a 
forewarning of accountability, it was possible to evaluate 
Hogan's hypothesis that subjects' DIT responses were in-
stances of self-presentation and thus susceptible to modifi-
cation under conditions known to influence self-presenta-
tions. 
According to cognitiYe-aevelopmental theory, although 
the content of indiYiduals' moral beliefs may be influenced 
by social context, the structure of their beliefs (i.e., 
the form of reasoning by which they justify those beliefs) 
is fixed by their level of cognitive-moral development. 
Thus, if the Defining Issues ~est is indeed a measure of the 
structure of adult subjects 1 moral_reasoning--conventional 
versus postconventional--then accoW1tability 





any case, there should be no upward shift in subjects' post-
conventional reasoning (P) scores, inasmuch as the cognitive-
structural adequacy of their moral judgments can supposedly 
never exceed that of their level of moral maturity. But a 
shift in subjects• DIT scores in response to the accounta-
bility forewarning would suggest that their responses had 
been influenced by social context, and thus were not solely 
a function of their level of maturity. Furthermore, an up-
ward shift in subjects' P scores would indicate that they 
were not constrained by maturational factors from generating 
responses of a purportedly more advanced type; in this event, 
subjects' habitual preference for conventional arguments 
over postconventional arguments would have to be explained 
in terms of nondevelopmental factors--e.g., subjects' socio-
political reference group. 
Inasmuch as the forewarning instructions made salient 
the sociopolitical identity of the anticipated audience, it 
was expected that any effect attributable to accountability 
would be most apparent on a measure of sociopolitical atti-
tude. Therefore, evidence of anticipatory opinion shift was 
sought first in subjects' scores on the Refined MPS Conser-
vatism scale, a measure that had been shown in the no ac-






As expected, subjects in both accoi.mtability condi-
tions displayed systematic shifts in their MPS scores rela-
tive to the scores of subjects in the no accountability con-
dition. Besides serving as a check on the effectiveness of 
the experimental manipulation, these results provided a 
clear test of the two rival explanations for the anticipa-
tory opinion effect, namely, the strategies of conformity 
and moderation. As was explained earlier, the direction of 
the shift displayed by subjects accountable to a sociopoli-
tically similar audience indicates the predominant strategy 
employed, inasmuch as in that situation the positions repre-
senting conformity and moderation are on opposite sides of 
the subjects' own initial position. The MPS data support 
the moderation hypothesis of anticipatory shifts, inasmuch 
as both conservatives and liberals reported opinions that 
were more moderate than those of their counterparts in the 
no accountability condition, irrespective of the sociopoli-
tical identity of their anticipated audience. 
The pattern of MPS scores across accountability con-
ditions for the sociopolitically moderate subjects seems at 
first to support another aspect of the moderation hypothe-
sis: that subjects who are already relatively moderate 
should display little or no shift in their position (Hass, 
1981). However, when the moderate subjects were divided in-
to moderately conservative and moderately liberal subgroups, 
it became apparent that the initial results had masked the 
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the presence of opposite shifts on the part of each subgroup. 
Inasmuch as the subgroup shifts conformed to the pattern dis-
played by the corresponding extremes, this finding does not 
alter the conclusion that the strategy employed by accounta-
ble subjects was one of moderation. Unfortunately, it was 
not possible to determine whether the opinion shifts of the 
more moderate subjects were significantly smaller than those 
of the more extreme subjects, for no precise measure of the 
magnitude of each subject's opinion shift was available. 
Such a pattern would be consistent with both the moderation 
hypothesis and the data just reviewed. 
In short, then, the MPS results indicate that when 
subjects anticipated being held accountable to a sociopoli-
tically partisan audience, they tended to display a socio-
poli tically more moderate position on the MPS issues than 
would have been predicted from measures of their preexperi-
mental orientation. Irrespective of the sociopolitical iden-
tity of that anticipated audience, the MPS scores of both 
conservatives and liberals appeared to shift to the moderate 
region of the MPS Conservatism scale. 
Inasmuch as the present study did not include an ac-
countability condition in which the sociopolitical identity 
of the audience was left unspecified, some question may be 
raised as to whether the anticipatory opinion shifts were a 
response to accountability per se or to the fact that the 
dimension of sociopolitical attitude had been made salient 
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in the accountability situation (by identifying the orienta-
tion of the audience). In other words, was an explicit 
reference to sociopolitical attitude a necessary element of 
the accountability forewarning in order to induce anticipa-
tory opinion shifts of the sort observed here? Replication 
of the experiment with additional accountability conditions 
could settle this question, but it seems plausible that the 
content of the questionnaire itself rendered sociopolitical 
attitude salient and that subjects would have moderated 
their responses in a similar manner whether or not it had 
been raised explicitly in the forewarning instructions. 
Because the issue of authenticity versus role-playing 
or dissimulation in subjects' self-reported attitudes was 
raised in regard to the generality of Emler et al.'s {1983) 
findings, it is worth considering whether subjects' test 
responses under the accountability conditions here repre-
sented an honest account of their own attitudes or a deli-
berate attempt to create a deceptive self-presentation. 
As was noted in the results, the accountability con-
dition subjects indicated in their postexperimental ques-
tionnaire ratings that the forewarning instructions had had 
little or no impact upon their reported attitudes. In view 
of the substantial shifts in MPS scores they displayed, this 
suggests that these subjects either intentionally misrepre-
sented their response to the forewarning or were actually 
unaware that they had moderated their sociopolitical opin-
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ions. Although intentianal misrepresentation cannot be 
!1lled out entirely, several considerations favor the second 
alternative. Citing a number of studies in which subjects 
had been found to be unaware of measured changes in their 
attitudes, Hass (1981) argued that such results were consis-
tent with his attitude-as-latitude model of anticipatory 
opinion shifts. According to Hass, persons tend not to be 
aware of shifts in attitude unless these are so extreme as 
to exceed their typical latitude of acceptance, at which 
point they begin to perceive themselves as misrepresenting 
their t!1le beliefs. 
Indirect support for this comes from subjects' com-
ments during the discussion phase of the experiment. A num-
ber of subjects remarked spontaneously that they had not al-
tered their opinions in response to the forewarning. It was 
the investigator's impression that these subjects felt such 
a response would have compromised their personal integrity 
or betrayed their personal values. These spontaneous re-
marks indicate, first, that these subjects either felt pres-
sured to modify their opinions or felt that the investigator 
had assumed they would and, second, that they appeared hon-
estly to believe that they had not succumbed to such pres-
sures and had thereby preserved their integrity. In this 
light, it is at least plausible that these subjects would 
have defended their test responses as representing no devi-
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moderate than would have been predicted from initial meas-
ures of their sociopolitical attitudes. 
In further support of this interpretation, it was 
found that subjects exposed to the accountability forewarn-
ing subsequently gave ratings of their own sociopolitical 
position that were significantly more moderate than those 
of subjects at the same initial level of orientation in the 
no accountability condition. Although this effect is un-
doubtedly attributable to the impact of the accountability 
forewarning, it is questionable whether the accountable sub-
jects' self-ratings were motivated directly out of concern 
about their own accountability. Accountable subjects were 
aware that their self-defined position ratings would not be 
disclosed to their anticipated audience. It seems more 
plausible that their self-ratings reflect how they perceived 
their own preexperimental orientation between the time they 
received the accountability forewarning and the time they 
were asked to evaluate its impact upon their test responses. 
It is not possible to determine from the data whether sub-
jects inferred their sociopolitical orientation from the 
moderate character of their DIT/MP.3 responses, or whether 
they responded to the DIT/MPS questionnaire in accord with 
a more moderate perception of their initial position. How-
ever, as long as their test responses and the perception of 
their initial orientation were congruent, subjects could as-
sert to the best of their knowledge that they had not shift-
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ed their positions in response to the forewarning. 
Taken together, these considerations suggest that 
subjects were essentially unaware that they had moderated 
their positions in response to the accountability forewarn-
ing. This implies, in turn, that subjects had not engaged 
in deliberately false self-presentation, but rather that 
their moderation shifts were a spontaneous and subconscious 
response to the social context of accountability. This con-
clusion is consistent with Hass' (1981) notion that most 
accountability shifts represent subconscious shifts in em-
phasis within the latitude of attitudes acceptable to the 
subject. 
Finally, the MPS results reported here point to the 
importance of securing data on each subject's initial atti-
tude toward the issue in question when studying the impact 
of accountability upon attitude. Otherwise, systematic in-
dividual dif'ferences in the magnitude and direction of anti-
cipatory shifts in attitude may be overlooked. The lack of 
such pretest data may be responsible for Tetlock's (1983a) 
conclusion that the anticipatory shifts displayed by his 
subjects represented a strategy of conformity. Having em-
ployed an accountability manipulation modelled after Tet-
lock' s, the present study casts doubt upon that conclusion. 
When only the main effect of accountability is examined, the 
results are similar in direction (although not in magnitude) 
to those obtained by Tetlock--i.e., a shift in each case 
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toward the position of the anticipated audience, relative to 
that of the no accountability group. However, when the in-
teraction of initial orientation and type of accountability 
is examined, it becomes apparent that the predominant effect 
is one of moderation and not of conformity. 
The anticipatory MPS shifts are instructive in terms 
of the support they lend to the moderation hypothesis, and 
perhaps to Hass' attitude-as-latitude model as well. Aside 
from this, the MPS accountability results served two basic 
functions: first, to demonstrate that the accountability 
manipulation had been effective in eliciting shifts in self-
reported sociopolitical attitudes and, second, to indicate 
the direction and character of those shifts. This informa-
tion provided the necessary context for interpreting the 
data of primary interest, namely, the mean DIT scores of the 
three sociopolitical orientation groups across accountabili-
ty conditions. 
It had been expected that under conditions known to 
influence subjects' self-presentations, e.g., the anticipa-
tion of accountability, subjects would respond similarly on 
measures of sociopolitical orientation and measures of moral 
judgment. Overall, the results of the analysis of DIT 
scores for the Stage 4 and postconventional forms of moral 
judgment conformed to this expectation. The MPS data re-
vealed that under both sets of accountability instructions 
the liberal and conservative extremes shifted toward the 
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middle of the MPS scale relative to their no accountability 
counterparts, with the net effect of reducing significantly 
the differences in mean MPS scores among the three socio-
poli tical orientation groups. Although the pattern of 
shifts displayed by Stage 4 scores and P scores differed in 
some important respects from one another and from the pat-
tern displayed by MPS scores, the net effect of the account-
ability forewarning was still the same. In each case, the 
differences in mean scores among conservatives, moderates 
and liberals were significantly less under conditions of ac-
countability than in the no accountability condition, owing 
to shifts on the part of some subjects toward the moderate 
region of the scale (i.e., toward the group mean for the 
moderate group in the no accountability condition). 
Before addressing the specific problems for interpre-
tation posed by the differences in the patterns of anticipa-
tory shift displayed by MPS scores, Stage 4 scores and P 
scores, some ·preliminary remarks regarding the initial hy-
pothesis are in order. It was predicted at the outset that 
subjects' test scores would vary systematically as a func-
tion of their anticipations as to the sociopolitical identi-
ty of their audience. The finding that subjects exposed to 
the accountability forewarning displayed systematic shifts 
in their test responses relative to those of subjects in the 
no accountability condition was consistent with the main 
thrust of this prediction. However, the expectation that 
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subjects' responses would differ according to the sociopoli-
tical identity of their anticipated audience--an expectation 
based jointly upon the conclusion drawn by Tetlock (1983a) 
and the speculation offered by Hogan (Johnson & Hogan, 1981) 
--proved not to be supported by the data. For DIT scores 
as for MPS scores, the anticipatory shifts displayed by ac-
countable subjects were toward the middle of the scale ir-
respective of the identity of the anticipated audience. 
Nevertheless, the overall effect of the accountabili-
ty forewarning upon subjects' DIT scores indicates that sub-
jects can (and do) spontaneously modify their self-reported 
preferences for certain types of moral argument on the De-
fining Issues Test, merely in response to the social context 
within which they must report those judgments. With certain 
reservations to be discussed further on, this lends support 
to Hogan's claim that moral judgment questionnaire responses 
constitute instances of strategic self-presentation, and 
that the character of these self-presentations is partly a 
function of the respondent's expectations regarding his or 
her audience (Johnson & Hogan, 1981). 
Where the conclusion of the present study differs 
from Hogan's is with respect to the relevance of the socio-
political identity of the anticipated audience. Whereas 
Hogan seems to operate with the assumption that individuals' 
strategic shifts in self-presentation are typically designed 
to conform to the attitudes and/or expectations of their 
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specific audience, the MPS results at least imply that indi-
viduals tend to employ a more uniform strategy of moderation 
in response to accountability pressures, regardless of the 
orientation of their specific audience. However, as both 
Cialdini and Petty (1981) and Hass (1981) point out, a 
strategy of anticipatory moderation may be even more effec-
tive than one of con~ormity in fulfilling the aims of selec-
tive self-presentation. 
One important implication of the foregoing DIT re-
sults is that although adult respondents may display large 
individual differences in Stage 4 scores and P scores when 
the Defining Issues Test is completed under standard condi-
tions, these same respondents would be likely to obtain 
Stage 4 scores and P scores within a much narrower range 
when subjected to accountability pressures. (Such pressures 
might vary from an awareness that their responses were being 
monitored to the expectation that they would actually be re-
quired to justify those responses to someone.) Thus, the 
measurement of individual differences in level of moral 
judgment by means o~ the DIT may be seriously compromised 
by the respondents' expectations of accountability. This 
conclusion carries with it two serious implications, one 
practical and the other theoretical. 
The susceptibility of the DIT to accountability pres-
sures calls into question the assumption that DIT scores 
constitute a valid index of respondents' "true" preferences 
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for certain forms of moral argument. Even if one accepts 
the cognitive-developmentalists' claim that individual dif-
ferences in moral reasoning are a reflection of differences 
in level of cognitive-moral development--a claim which it-
self will be questioned shortly--the evidence is that DIT 
scores are not solely a function of organismic variables. 
Rather, DIT scores may vary systematically with respondents' 
expectations regarding the social context within which meas-
urement occurs. Thus, as a purely practical matter, this 
dictates that when DIT scores are reported, the conditions 
under which the results were obtained ought to be specified 
as well. 
A case could be made for considering respondents' 
"true" DIT scores to be tnose obtained under standard condi-
tions, inasmuch as research suggests that anticipatory opin-
ion shifts tend to be transient and reverse themselves once 
accountability pressures have been removed (Cialdini & Petty, 
1981). If legitimate, this argument might secure the credi-
bility of the body of DIT results obtained under standard 
conditions. However, one o~ the more popular uses of the 
DIT at present is as a tool ~or assessing interventions de-
signed to stimulate moral development (e.g., programs in 
moral education). DIT scores obtained under these condi-
tions should be treated with some suspicion, inasmuch as 
moral interventions are likely to introduce situational cues 
that could shape subjects' expectations and thus their self-
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presentations. 
Although the considerations under discussion here 
bear specifically upon the Defining Issues Test, they may be 
particularly relevant to Kohlberg's own Moral Judgment In-
strument (MJI). Inasmuch as that measure typically employs 
a face-to-face interview with the respondent, it is reason-
able to expect that it would generate relatively intense 
accountability pressures. Determining whether or not such 
pressures actually do lead to self-presentational effects 
on the MJI similar to those observed on the DIT should be a 
priority for future research. 
Nevertheless, the foregoing concerns are of secondary 
importance to the more fundamental question raised by the 
DIT accountability results: namely, whether even under 
standard conditions the Drr constitutes a measure of matur-
ity of moral judgment. The assumption underlying the cogni-
tive-developmental model is that the structure of subjects• 
moral reasoning is immutable except as it undergoes develop-
mental change. If the DIT is strictly a measure of the 
structural level of subjects' moral reasoning, then DIT 
scores should also be relatively unaffected by variations 
in the social context in which subjects' moral judgments are 
made. 
However, as was indicated before, the DIT accounta-
bility results run counter to this conclusion. Inasmuch as 
subjects' DIT responses varied systematically with their 
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expectation of accountability, it cannot be argued that DIT 
scores invariably correspond to certain fixed forms of cog-
nitive structure. On the contrary, the similarity in the 
overall impact of the accountability forewarning upon MPS 
scores and DIT scores--i.e., the systematic shifts toward 
the level characteristic of sociopolitical moderates--sug-
gests that, like measures of sociopolitical attitude, the 
DIT constitutes a vehicle for selective self-presentation, 
and that subjects have the ability to modify their DIT re-
sponses spontaneously ~or strategic purposes. 
At this point the pivotal question becomes whether 
the observed shifts in DIT scores represent a strategy of 
anticipatory moderation, similar to the shifts in MPS scores, 
or whether a different explanation must be invoked to ac-
count for the impact of the accountability forewarning in 
each case. This question re~uires some deliberation because 
of specific differences in the patterns of accountability 
shifts displayed by MPS scores, Stage 4 scores and P scores, 
beyond their overall similarity with regard to the net ef-
fect of the accountability forewarning upon the range of 
mean scores across levels of sociopolitical orientation. 
Although the pattern o~ MPS shifts conforms clearly 
to the one characteristic of anticipatory moderation, nei-
ther the pattern of Stage 4 shifts nor the pattern of P 
score shifts shows the same sort of symmetry. With respect 
to the Stage 4 pattern, only three of the four sociopoliti-
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cally extreme accountable groups displayed the expected 
shift toward the mean score obtained by sociopolitical mod-
erates in the no accountability condition. The fourth ex-
treme group--liberals accountable to a conservative--exhibit-
ed no detectable shi~t relative to its counterpart in the no 
accountability condition. Although the conformity of the 
moderate subgroup shifts to the expected pattern lends ad-
ditional support to the conclusion that Stage 4 shifts do 
indeed represent anticipatory moderation, the absence of a 
Stage 4 shift on the part of that one extreme group cannot 
be dismissed without comment. 
The anomaly cannot be explained in terms of a failure 
of the accountability manipulation, for the same group dis-
played a rather large MPS shift in the moderate direction. 
In fact, it is this discrepancy between the MPS result and 
the Stage 4 result that creates a problem for interpretation. 
It implies that a shift in position on the issues presented 
on the DIT is not invariably accompanied by a shift in 
Stage 4 item endorsements. Considered in isolation, this 
might support the cognitive-developmentalists• claim that 
the content and the structure of subjects' moral judgments 
are independent. However, in order to conclude that this 
was the case, one must assume that a shift in position was 
not accompanied by a shift in the way the corresponding DIT 
item was interpreted. In other words, one must reject the 













a more moderate interpretation to the same DIT response. 
This cannot be decided on the basis of the accountability 
data, but the MPS results from the no accountability condi-
tion did at least raise the possibility that differences in 
interpretation might occur. 
In any case, moderation shifts in MPS positions on 
the issues presented on the DIT were accompanied by Stage 4 
shifts toward the middle of the scale for the other three 
sociopolitically extreme groups and for all four moderate 
subgroups. The results thus weigh in favor of interpreting 
the Stage 4 shifts as evidence of anticipatory moderation. 
The significance of the anomalous finding will ultimately 
be decided on the basis of whether or not it recurs when 
the experiment is replicated. 
The pattern of P score shifts constitutes a more dif-
ficult problem for interpretation, inasmuch as the conver-
gence of the sociopolitically extreme groups is attributable 
almost entirely to shifts on the pa.rt of the conservatives. 
Although these results do not display the symmetry charac-
teristic of the MPS and Stage 4 profiles, a plausible argu-
ment can be made that the P score shifts still represent a 
strategy of anticipatory moderation. However, the pattern 
might also be interpreted as evidence that the shifts in DIT 
scores have a different source altogether, so this possibil-
ity must be considered as well. 
Undoubtedly the most significant feature of the P 
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score profile is the magnitude of the upward shift in P 
scores on the part of the conservative groups. The increase 
in percentage scores from the no accountability conservative 
group was 11.8 for conservatives accountable to a conserva-
tive and 19.3 for conservatives accountable to a liberal. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that upvard shifts in P 
scores of this magnitude merely in response to accountabili-
ty pressures are entirely inconsistent with the notion that 
subjects are unable to generate DIT responses beyond their 
characteristic level of cognitive-moral maturity. 
Consequently, if one wishes to defend the claim that 
the form of subjects' moral judgments is fixed by their 
level of moral development, one may have to question the 
validity of the DIT as a measure of moral maturity. As long 
as the DIT is not considered a valid measure of the cogni-
tive structure of subjects• moral reasoning, then the muta-
bility of DIT scores cannot be used as evidence against the 
theory that individual differences in moral judgment have a 
developmental basis. However, this is hardly an attractive 
option for most cognitive-developmentalists, inasmuch as the 
evidence marshalled to support their interpretation of indi-
vidual differences in adult moral reasoning is derived large-
ly from studies in which the DIT was used. 
The pattern of accountability shifts associated with 
anticipatory moderation has been characterized so far in 
terms of a convergence o~ both sociopolitical extremes upon 
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the position held by unaccountable moderates. Although the 
liberal extreme failed to display a P score shift comparable 
to that displayed by the conservative extreme, certain fea-
tures of the P score profile suggest that it is still con-
sistent with a pattern of anticipatory moderation. 
First of all, it appears that moderates and liberals 
were initially much more similar in their attitudes toward 
the importance of postconventional items than were moderates 
and conservatives: Whereas the P score difference between 
moderates and conservatives in the no accountability condi-
tion was significant statistically, F(l, 42) = 5.29, 
~ < .025, this was not the case for the difference between 
moderates and liberals, F(l, 42) = .76. If this is taken 
to suggest that the liberals already maintained a relatively 
moderate position with respect to their endorsement of post-
conventional items, then little or no shift in P scores 
should be expected. When the profiles for the liberal group 
and the moderately liberal subgroup are compared, these ap-
pear to be nearly identical. Furthermore, the relatively 
large initial difference between conservatives and moderates 
implies that a strategy of moderation would require a rather 
large shift in P scores. ~his is precisely what was ob-
served. 
In light of earlier comments on the relatively con-
servative character of the overall sample and the suggestion 
that the subjects identified as liberal were in fact rather 
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moderate, this result may not be particularly remarkable. 
Nevertheless, a replication of this study with subjects more 
representative of the liberal extreme would provide clearer 
support for the conclusion that the P score shifts did in-
deed represent a strategy of anticipatory moderation. 
Pending evidence of this sort, some consideration 
should be afforded to an alternative interpretation of the 
upward shift in P scores in the absence of any corresponding 
downward shifts. rt might be argued that the impact of the 
accountability forewarning upon subjects' DIT responses was 
attributable solely to the pressure it exerted upon subjects 
to articulate their thoughts more clearly in anticipation of 
having to explain and justify their responses. In other 
words, subjects held accountable for their responses may 
have made a greater effort to adopt a morally more adequate 
position and not a sociopolitically defensible one. Accord-
ing to cognitive-developmental theory, postconventional re-
sponses are morally more adequate than conventional ones. 
Consequently, when forced to think carefully about the DIT 
issue statements, the conservatives may have recognized that 
the postconventional arguments were superior and endorsed 
them more frequently than did their counterparts in the no 
accountability condition, whereas liberals became more se-
cure in their judgments and so did not abandon their endorse-
ment of the postconventional items. 
At first glance, this interpretation might seem to 
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offer cognitive-developmentalists an escape from the unfa-
vorable implications of these DIT accountability results. 
However, upon further consideration it becomes clear that 
this apparent solution creates its own problems for the 
cognitive-developmental model. For example, if the upnard 
shift in P scores on the part of the conservative subjects 
was due to more careful thought, it is legitimate to ask why 
the moderate and liberal subjects did not also display up-
ward shifts in their P scores. After all, the mean P scores 
for the liberal groups were still considerably short of the 
levels attained by some adult samples. It might be argued 
that the conservatives had mobilized some latent ability to 
comprehend more advanced moral arguments, whereas the lib-
erals had already reached the ceiling imposed by their level 
of cognitive-moral maturity. Yet this would imply, first, 
that some subjects had access to a latent comprehension of 
more advanced moral arguments while others did not, and, 
second, that individual differences in the comprehension of 
postconventional arguments were greatly attenuated under 
conditions that stimulated that ability. Neither of these 
implications fits very well into the cognitive-developmental 
model. 
Aside from such problems, this interpretation suffers 
from the fact that it must posit two separate mechanisms to 
account for similar overall effectss the strategy of anti-
cipatory moderation to account for the MPS accountability 
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shifts, and the mobilization of latent comprehension to ex-
plain the shifts in DIT scores. The more parsimonious in-
terpretation is that both MPS shifts and DIT shifts repre-
sent a similar response to the accountability forewarning, 
namely, the adoption for strategic purposes of a sociopoli-
tically more moderate position on the issues raised on the 
Defining Issues Test. 
If a shift in DIT scores toward the level typical of 
sociopolitical moderates is equivalent to the adoption of a 
sociopolitically moderate stance, it seems unlikely that 
subjects differentiated between sociopolitical position and 
moral judgment in the way specified by cognitive-develop-
mental theory. Rather, it implies that subjects may have 
seen moral judgments as expressive of sociopolitical atti-
tudes, and that under accountability conditions they modi-
fied the moral judgments they reported as a means of manipu-
lating the sociopolitical identity they presented to their 
audience. This conclusion conforms to Hogan and Emler's 
claim that respondents present themselves differently on 
measures of moral judgment depending upon the identity they 
seek to project (although, as noted earlier, their specula-
tion that these self-presentations would vary systematically 
with the sociopolitical context or identity of the audience 
was not supported in the present case). 
Actually, there is a serencipitous aspect to the find-
ing that accountability shifts followed a pattern of antici-
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patory moderation rather than conformity. The Emler et al. 
(1983) study had left unresolved whether in reproducing the 
conventional and postconventional response patterns their 
subjects had responded merely to such superficial charac-
teristics as the relative abstractness of certain DIT items, 
without truly comprehending the type of moral reasoning that 
generated those response patterns spontaneously. If the 
anticipatory shifts in the present study had followed the 
pattern characteristic of conformity, these could have been 
discounted on similar grounds--namely, that they might have 
been merely the result of role-playing based on superficial 
cues. Moderation shifts cannot be dismissed in this way. 
If the strategy of moderation is to be considered a form of 
role-playing at all, then at least it represents a more com-
plex achievement than role-playing either extreme. In order 
to adopt a moderate position, the subject must have not only 
an awareness of the extreme positions, but also of the bal-
ance or interplay between them. With respect to the DIT, 
this suggests that subjects had a broader comprehension of 
the range of moral arguments than cognitive-developmental 
theory would have allowed. 
Before closing this discussion, some comment should 
be made regarding the integrative complexity results. As 
reported, none of the predictions involving the integrative 
complexity of subjects' written thoughts--its relationship 
to level of sociopolitical orientation, to level of moral 
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reasoning or to the employment of strategic anticipatory 
shifts--was supported by the data. However, at least two 
reservations should be considered before any specific con-
clusions are drawn from these results. The first is that 
the range of sociopolitical attitudes represented in this 
study may simply have been too restricted to reveal differ-
ences in level of integrative complexity. The studies by 
Tetlock (198Jb, 198~) that demonstrated a relationship be-
tween sociopolitical orientation and integrative complexity 
involved subjects representing nearly the entire sociopoli-
tical spectrum (U.S. senators in the first study and members 
of the British House of Commons in the second). In compari-
son, the differences in position among the sociopolitical 
orientation groups in the present study were undoubtedly 
rather small. 
The other consideration is more subtle, but may ulti-
mately prove equally important. The instructions for the 
story booklet in which subjects recorded their thoughts 
stated explicitly that they were to indicate their position 
on each story problem and to explain the reasons for their 
decision. These instructions could have led subjects to 
give their written thoughts a narrower focus than they might 
otherwise have done, concentrating upon defending a particu-
lar position rather than considering the problem in its 
various aspects. Although such a bias in the instructions 
should not wipe out all differences in integrative complex-
ity, it might have constrained subjects enough to render 
those differences less distinct. 
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With these questions in mind, it is probably wiser 
to reserve judgment on the hypotheses that pertain to inte-
grative complexity, pending further research with a sample 
more representative of the sociopolitical extremes and in-
structions less likely to bias subjects' written reports. 
The purpose of this investigation has been to examine 
the relationship between sociopolitical orientation and 
moral judgment in light o~ Hogan and Emler's critique of 
Kohlberg's cognitive-structural model of moral development. 
Whereas the cognitive-developmentalists explain individual 
differences in adult moral judgment in terms of developmen-
tal levels of cognitive-structural complexity in reasoning 
about moral problems, Hogan and Emler maintain that differ-
ences in adult moral judgment are an expression of differ-
ences in sociopolitical orientation, reflecting one's social 
reference group and not one's level of cognitive-moral 
maturity. 
Both sides agree that there is a systematic relation-
ship between sociopolitical orientation and type of moral 
judgment--conservatives tending to display Stage 4 conven-
tional reasoning and liberals tending to display postconven-
tional reasoning. The disagreement surrounds how to inter-
pret that relationship. Cognitive-developmentalists inter-
pret the relationship within the framework of their model, 
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thereby implying that if postconventional reasoners display 
liberal values it must be because liberal values offer a 
structurally more adequate solution to social and moral prob-
lems. Against this interpretation, Hogan and Emler charge 
that it is only cognitive-developmentalists' own liberal 
bias that leads them to accept that conclusion so readily, 
and that there is no good evidence to support the view that 
the conventional and postconventional forms of moral reason-
ing constitute an invariant developmental sequence. 
From the cognitive-developmental perspective, the 
character of an individual's self-reported moral judgments 
is fixed by his or her level of maturity of moral reasoning; 
consequently, an individual operating at the conventional 
level should be unable to generate moral judgments charac-
teristic of postconventional reasoners. Hogan and Emler re-
ject the notion that an individual is constrained by cogni-
tive-developmental factors, arguing instead that the moral 
judgments an individual reports are a reflection of the so-
ciopoli tical position with which he or she identifies and 
the specific sociopolitical identity that he or she wishes 
to project in a given situation. 
These two interpretations generate opposing predic-
tions as to the impact of social context upon self-reported 
moral judgments. I~ Bogan and Emler are correct that the 
moral judgments individuals report are an expression of 
their sociopolitical identity, then the type of moral judg-
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ment they display should vary systematically across condi-
tions under which individuals tend to modify their socio-
poli tical self-presentations. However, any shift in level 
of moral judgment--and especially any upward shift--merely 
in response to the context within which those judgments were 
reported would be inconsistent with the cognitive-develop-
mental model. 
The results of the present investigation are general-
ly consistent with Hogan and Emler's account of the nature 
of self-reported moral judgments, while constituting a seri-
ous problem for cognitive-developmentalists. The analysis 
of the relationship between sociopolitical orientation and 
level of moral judgment for subjects who had not received 
the accountability forewarning yielded the expected outcome: 
Conservatives obtained significantly higher Stage 4 scores 
on the Defining Issues Test than did liberals, whereas lib-
erals obtained significantly higher P scores than did con-
servatives. These results speak neither for nor against 
the cognitive-developmental model, inasmuch as the mere fact 
that this relationship exists is not in dispute. The only 
novel findings in the no accountability condition pertain 
to the analysis of the Moral Position Survey responses. The 
MPS data indicate, first, that the alternative positions im-
plicit in a majority of tbe issues presented in the DIT are 
polarized along sociopolitical lines and, second, that the 
degree of importance subjects assign to an issue statement 
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on the DIT is frequently related to their pro-or-con posi-
tion on that issue. The first finding suggests that in 
considering the DIT items, subjects' own sociopolitical 
attitudes may be spontaneously engaged. The second suggests 
that once those attitudes are engaged, subjects' DIT respon-
ses may be determined by them. 
The most important findings of the experiment pertain 
to the impact of the accountability forewarning upon DIT 
scores. The first is that the accountability forewarning 
appeared to have a similar overall effect upon Stage 4 
scores and P scores as it had upon the Refined MPS Conserva-
tism scale scores--namely, that of eliciting shifts toward 
the middle of the scale, significantly reducing the range 
of mean scores among conservatives, moderates and liberals 
relative to their no accountability counterparts. This re-
sult implies that individuals who obtained widely different 
DIT scores under standard (no accountability) conditions 
might be indistinguishable in terms of level of moral judg-
ment when tested under conditions of accountability. Clear-
ly, this does not fit well with the notion of fixed and dis-
crete stage-structures. 
Although the pattern of shifts displayed by Stage 4 
scores and P scores differed from one another and from the 
MPS profile in some respects, it was concluded that these 
were most likely all indicative of a strategy of anticipa-
tory moderation. In other words, it appeared that subjects 
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had modified their self-reported moral judgments so as to 
project the moral response style of a sociopolitically mod-
erate individual. This result is consistent with Hogan's 
claim that subjects use their moral judgment test responses 
as a vehicle for strategic self-presentation, although it 
suggests that moderation rather than conformity is the fa-
vored strategy when individuals anticipate confronting a 
partisan audience. Furthermore, the evidence that subjects 
were able to identify and adopt the moral response style 
characteristic of a sociopolitical moderate suggests that 
moral judgment and sociopolitical attitude are (as Hogan 
and Emler contend) not as discrete as cognitive-developmen-
talists claim. 
The other significant finding with regard to the im-
pact of the accountability forewarning is the ver-y large 
upward shift in P scores on the part of the accountable con-
servative groups. As mentioned before, the movement from 
conventional to postconventional moral judgment merely in 
response to social context runs counter to cognitive-devel-
opmental theory, but is entirely consistent with the account 
offered by Hogan and Emler. 
It should be noted that the foregoing results bear 
directly only upon Rest's claim that his Defining Issues 
Test constitutes a Yalia measure of his respondents' level 
of moral maturity. In that regard, the conclusion of this 
investigation is that respondents' DIT scores more likely 
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reflect the sociopolitical identity they seek to project 
than the level of cognitive-structural development in moral 
reasoning they have attained. 
Of course, the cognitive-developmental model itself 
could be insulated from the findings presented here if the 
Defining Issues Test were abandoned as a measure of moral 
maturity. However, inasmuch as a great deal of the evidence 
used to support the cognitive-developmentalists' interpre-
tation of individual differences in adult moral reasoning 
has been derived from DIT research, any serious question 
about the validity of the DIT would challenge the credibili-
ty of that interpretation. Thus, the results of this study 
should at least raise some concern as to whether the cogni-
tive-developmentalists' account of the nature of adult moral 
reasoning is as well-established as its popularity and in-
fluence might suggest. 
SUMMA.Ki 
Individual differences in the moral judgments of 
adults have been interpreted by Kohlberg and his associates 
in terms of cognitive-structural levels of maturity of moral 
reasoning. However, critics have argued that moral judg-
ments reported by adults are instead a reflection of the 
politico-moral ideology of their reference group and of the 
specific sociopolitical identity they seek to project. 
This study explored two implications of that chal-
lenge to cognitive-developmental theory. First, it sought 
confirmation of previous findings that sociopolitical conser-
vatives were more likely to employ Stage 4 conventional rea-
soning whereas liberals were more likely to employ the pur-
portedly more mature postconventional reasoning. Second, 
it exploited the tendency for suojects expecting to justify 
their views to a partisan audience to display strategic an-
ticipatory shifts in opinion relative to their preexperimen-
tal position. If self-reported moral judgments do consti-
tute sociopolitical self-presentations, then subjects held 
accountable for their opinions on moral issues should dis-
play similar patterns of anticipatory shift in the socio-
poli tical orientation and level of moral reasoning of their 
judgments. 
Subjects identified as conservative, moderate or lib-
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eral by their Wilson-Patterson Attitude Inventory Conserva-
tism scores completed a moral judgment questionnaire under 
one of three conditions: expecting their responses to be 
anonymous or expecting to justify their responses to a con-
servative or liberal. The questionnaire included a short 
form of Rest's Defining rssues Test (DIT), measuring level 
of moral reasoning via judgments of the relative importance 
of various stage-specific issues in resolving specified 
moral dilemmas, plus a specially constructed Moral Position 
Survey (MPS), consisting of the DIT items reworded to elicit 
subjects' pro-or-con positions on those issues. Subjects 
also recorded their thoughts on each dilemma, so the concep-
tual complexity of their reasoning could be assessed. 
//Results showed the expected relationship between so-
ciopolitical orientation and level of moral reasoning. More-
over, accountable subjects displayed shifts in both DIT 
scores and MPS Conservatism scores toward the level charac-
teristic of sociopolitical moderates, irrespective of audi-
ence. The increase in postconventional reasoning by account-
able conservatives was sizable. Results challenge the view 
that the DIT measures moral maturity, calling into question 
evidence supporting cognitive-developmentalists• claims. 
\ 
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APPENDIX A 
APPE'NDIX A 
MORAL POSITION SURVEYl 
Instructions 
Below are a number of statements about the stories 
you have read. Read each statement, decide how you feel 
about it, and then mark your answer next to that statement. 
If you agree with the statement, or believe that it is 
true, circle "True". I:f' you disagree with the statement, 
or believe that it is not true, circle "False". 
Work quickly and answer every item. Do not refer 
back to the previous section of the questionnaire. 
1. The doctor's decision should depend on whether or not 
the woman's family is in favor of giving her the 
drug. (F) 
2. The doctor is obligated by the same laws as everybody 
else if giving her an overdose would be the same as 
killing her. (T) 
*J. People would be much better off without society regi-
menting their lives and even their deaths. (F) 
4. The doctor's decision should depend on whether he 
could make it appear like an accident. (F) 
5. The state has the right to :f'orce continued existence 
on those who don't want to live. (T) 
lnirection of scoring :f'or the MPS Conservatism Scale 
is indicated in :parentheses (T =True; F =False). Items 




*6. The doctor should have more sympathy for the woman's 
suffering than care about what society might 
think. (F) 
*7· Helping to end another's life is sometimes a respon-
sible act of cooperation. (F) 
*8. Only God should decide when a person's life should 
end. (T) 
*9· The doctor should follow the values he has set for 
himself in his own personal code of behavior. (F) 
10. Society cannot af:ford to let everybody end their 
lives when they want to. (T) 
*11. Society should be able to allow suicides or mercy 
killing and still protect the lives of individuals 
who want to live. (F) 
12. Mr. Thompson has been good enough for a long enough 
time to prove he isn't a bad person. (F) 
13. Everytime someone escapes punishment for a cr~me, 
that just encourages more crime. (T) 
14. we would be better off without prisons and the oppres-
sion of our legal systems. (F) 
*15. Mr. Thompson has really paid his debt to society. (F) 
16. Society would be failing what Mr. Thompson should 
fairly expect if he isn't returned to prison. (T) 
*17. It would be cruel and heartless for someone to send 
Mr. Thompson to prison. (F) 
18. It would not be fair to all the prisoners who had 
served out their full sentences if Mr. Thompson was 
let off. ( T) 
*19. It is a citizen1 s duty to report an escaped prisoner, 
regardless of the circumstances. (T) 
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*20. The will of the people and the public good would best 
be served by reporting Mr. Thompson. (T) 
*21. Going to prison would not do any good for Mr. Thomp-
son or protect anybody. (F) 
22. The students were really taking over the building to 
help other people and not just for kicks. (F) 
23. The students had no right to take over property that 
didn't belong to them. (T) 
24. The students realized that they might be arrested and 
fined, and even expelled from school. (F) 
25. Taking over the building would in the long run benefit 
more people to a greater extent. (F) 
26. The president stayed within the limits of his author-
ity in ignoring the faculty vote. (T) 
27. Such student takeovers anger the public and give all 
students a bad name. (T) 
28. Taking over the building was consistent with prin-
ciples of justice. (P) 
*29. Allowing one student takeover would encourage many 
other student takeovers. (T) 
JO. The president brought this misunderstanding on himself 
by being so unreasonable and unresponsive. (F) 
*31. Running the university ought to be in the hands of the 
administrators and not in the hands of all the 
people. (T) 
*32. The students were ~allowing principles which they 
believed were above the law. (F) 






Please provide the following demographic information 
about yourself. Your responses will remain entirely anony-
mous, so please answer every item. 
1. Your sex: Male Female 2. Your age: 
J. Your intended major: 
4. your intended career: 
5. Your class: Fresh. Soph. _ Jr. 
6. Your current religious preference, if any: 
(specify denominationJ 





8. Your parents' occupations: 
Mother 
~~~~~~~~~--







Please refer to the following scale in answering the 
remaining questions: 
1 - extremely liberal 
2 - mostly liberal 
5 - somewhat conservative 
6 - mostly conservative 
2J2 
J - somewhat liberal 
4 - moderate 
7 - extremely conservative 
Circle the number that corresponds to your response: 
10. How would you describe your views on most 
economic issues: 
1 2 3 4 .5 6 7 
11. How would you describe your views on most 
social issues: 
1 2 J 4 5 6 7 
12. How would you describe your parents' views on most 
social issues: 
Father: 1 2 3 l.j. 5 6 7 




Instructions. Please answer the following questions as 
honestly as you can: 
1. Of how much importance was it to you that you would have 
to explain and justify your questionnaire responses to 
someone, irrespective of his or her identity: 
5 3 2 1 
great much some little none at all 
2. Of how much importance was it to you that you would have 
to explain and justify your questionnaire responses to 
an instructor, irrespective of his or her views: 
5 3 2 1 
great much some little none at all 
J. How much were your responses on the story questionnaire 
influenced by knowing the viewpoint of the instructor 
to whom you would have to explain and justify your 
responses: 
5 4 J 2 1 
great much some little none at all 
4. How much were the thoughts and opinions you wrote down 
in the story booklet influenced by knowing the viewpoint 
of the instructor to whom you would have to explain and 
justify your responses: 
great 
5 4 3 2 
none at all 
1 
much some little 
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5. Which of the following best describes the effect of 
knowing the viewpoint of the instructor to whom you 
would have to explain and justify your responses? 
~-(1) rrry responses became ~ conservative 
235 
(2) rrry responses remained as conservative as usual 
~-(3) rrry responses shifted from conservative to moderate 
(4) my responses remained as moderate as usual 
~<5) rrry responses shifted from liberal to moderate 
~<6) my responses remained as liberal as usual 
~-<?) my responses became~ liberal 
APPENDIX D 
APPENDIX D 
DEFINING ISSUES TEST RESULTS 
Percentage Scores and Standard Deviations for All Groups 
No Accountable to Accountable to 
Percentage Accountability Conservative Liberal 
Score Con. Mod. Lib. Con. Mod. Lib. Con. Mod. Lib. 
F% !Y! 26.9 39,8 44.7 38.7 41.3 45.3 46.2 40.4 4J.l 
SD l0.7 1,5.1 19.1 1).6 14.4 17.5 lJ.6 14.o 16.1 
Sta~e 4% M 42.4 35.3 29.1 
-
39.3 34.2 29.3 J6.4 JJ.1 .:n .1 
SD 8.4 15.1 12.4 l).5 19.J l).5 18.6 11.5 16.9 
N Stage 3% M 19.6 14.9 18.0 17.1 16.2 18.7 12.9 21.J 11.J \J.) 
.J 
14.2 14.o SD 11.2 11.3 1317 9.8 12.2 9.7 7.3 
Stage 2% M 1.8 l.J l.J 2.4 1.3 1.6 .o 1.1 .9 
SD 4.o 3.0 3.7 3.9 3.5 3.3 .o 3.5 3.4 
A% M 6.7 5.3 5.8 2.0 4.9 3.6 2.2 3.6 6.2 
SD 7.3 5.6 7.5 4.1 7.8 7.2 5.3 4.4 7.1 
M% M 2.7 3.3 1.1 .4 2.0 1.6 2.2 .4 1.3 
SD 3.4 5.0 3.0 1.2 4.3 3.5 3.5 1.7 2.5 
Note. Maximum percentage scores were as follows: 96.7 for the 11 P score items; 
9):)" for the 10 Stage 4 items; 83.3 for the 8 Stage 3 items; 40.0 for the 3 Anti-
social items; 26.7 for the 2 Stage 2 items and for the 2 Meaningless items. 
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